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Summary 
 
Over the last decades, urbanisation rapidly increased in European countries and forced 
European policy makers to adapt to those changing circumstances. In 2006, the European 
Commission reacted to the arising urban needs by launching the JESSICA (Joint European 
Support for Sustainable Investments in City Areas) initiative to promote new instruments for 
financing urban regeneration and renewal. In contrast to traditional grant funding, this 
initiative aims to provide revolving financial instruments – equity, loans, and guarantees – 
organised as funds and co-financed by other investors. The four working papers of this thesis 
analyse the whole structure surrounding these so-called Urban Development Funds (UDFs).    
The first paper analyses the general need for urban development funding regardless of the 
financial subsidy instrument. It elaborates on measuring differences among cities, regions, or 
countries by the use of indicators representing numerous aspects of urban life. Principal 
Component Analysis is used to identify a small set of indicators relevant to the comparison 
of urban development for each of the three geographical units: cities, regions, and countries.  
The second paper focuses on failures in urban capital markets and their connection to urban 
development projects. It analyses three main market imperfections which justify public 
authority intervention. Depending on the (combination of) market imperfections connected 
to a particular category of urban development projects, either grants or revolving 
instruments – equity, loans, and guarantees – are the suitable subsidy means to remedy 
market failures and initiate project financing.    
The third paper combines and extends the results of the former two papers to reveal 
possible regional targets for the establishment of UDFs by a three step approach. The first 
step consists of computing a distance measurement between possible funding targets. The 
second step describes the movability through former funding, i.e., the funding efficiency 
measured by a Data Envelopment Analysis. The last step considers the market imperfections 
revealed by the needs of the respective urban projects. 
Finally, the fourth paper analyses whether a second level of funds is beneficial in the context 
of urban development support. A second level diversifies among first-level funds which have 
 
 
 
restricted investment universes such as regionally focused UDFs. This multi-level fund 
structure is beneficial for medium to high degrees of investor’s risk aversion due to the (low) 
costs incurred by this additional passive fund level.  
All in all, this thesis broadly covers a new and unexplored topic which is of high relevance to 
our society today and in the near future. The overall contribution is twofold. On the one 
hand, it provides tools for the analysis of several aspects of urban development and its 
financial support. These tools enable novel objective investigations for the establishment of 
UDFs which are not possible up to now. On the other hand, some general insights could be 
gained in the four papers. First of all, it was found to be important that funding decisions rely 
on indicator values for the considered geographical level to ensure the coherence of actual 
funding needs with the allocation of funds. Second, some types of projects suggested for 
UDFs should rather be supported by traditional grants. Finally, a second-level fund for urban 
development can indeed deliver risk reduction and should not remain a purely 
administrational unit. 
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1 Introduction 
Urbanisation describes the population increase in city areas caused by people leaving rural 
areas. In 2011, the percentage of population living in cities was nearly 80 for northern and 
western European countries as well as nearly 70 for eastern and southern European 
countries. Over the last decades, urbanisation rapidly increased not only in Europe, which is 
the focus of this dissertation, but in the whole world. Figure 1 shows this development based 
on historical and extrapolated data from the United Nations (2012). This figure reveals that 
there was an increase in urbanisation over the last decades in nearly all parts of the world. 
Europe was one of the continents with the highest fraction of urban population in the last 
years and the United Nations even predict a further increase for the European continent. 
Therefore, it is extremely important to adapt cities to the changing circumstances arising 
from incoming population flows.  
 
Figure 1: Urbanisation in the world  
(the ordinate is measured as the percentage of population residing in cities). 
The European Union (EU) recognised this necessity and introduced several policy 
mechanisms to enhance urban development since the beginning of the 1990s. The first 
attempts to draw attention to urban issues were made with the URBAN I and URBAN II 
initiatives in the policy programming periods 1994-1999 and 2000-2006, respectively (see 
European Union, 1993, and European Union, 1999). At a famous meeting in Bristol in 2005, 
EU ministers agreed on the establishment of a common agenda to promote sustainable 
communities and identified cities as a key driver (see Department for Communities and Local 
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Government, 2007). There was general consensus on the necessity to improve the scope for 
intervention by innovative instruments for the financing of urban regeneration and renewal. 
Hence, the European Commission launched the JESSICA (Joint European Support for 
Sustainable Investments in City Areas) initiative in 2006 and made a crucial step to 
revolutionise former funding efforts. The initiative aims at providing revolving financial 
instruments – loans, equity and guarantees – organised as funds for project financing in this 
context. This approach tackles market failures in the urban sector, a process which attracts 
other investors and thereby levers scarce public subsidies (see European Union, 2006, as 
well as Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007). However, the 
documents provided by the European institutions do not give any guidelines on the 
application of the new funding instruments with the help of so-called Urban Development 
Funds (UDFs). Hence, the implementation turned out to be difficult for the responsible 
national and regional authorities. 
At this point, the motivation for the dissertation at hand arises. For a successful realisation 
of these ideas, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms of revolving instruments in 
combination with the analysis of potential urban capital markets with their investment 
needs and transition failures. Therefore, a blind and indiscriminate application is not 
effective. Only for certain urban development projects and markets, such UDFs are 
beneficial and complement traditional subsidy grants. By considering urban capital markets, 
the measurement of investment needs, the movability of cities and regions through funding, 
as well as multi-level fund structures for urban project financing, this thesis contributes to 
study the mechanisms of this new policy initiative. Thereby, it supplies both a practical guide 
for the complex investment decision on the one hand and a theoretical foundation on the 
other hand. The former is missing in the European institution documents and the latter in 
the theoretical research community.  
Despite the fact that the implementation phase of the JESSICA initiative started in 2007, 
seven years ago, specialised literature on UDFs still is notably absent as demonstrates Figure 
2.  
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Figure 2: Number of Publications on Urban Development Funds (dark) in comparison to  
Real Estate Investment Trusts (light). 
It visualises the number of publications available at Google Scholar when searching with the 
keyword “Urban Development Fund” on the one hand (displayed in dark colour) and “Real 
Estate Investment Trust” (REIT) on the other hand (displayed in light colour). This plot 
reveals that the number of publications on UDFs ranges between 0 and 35. In contrast, 
searching for publications on REITs delivers between 41 and 661 results in the same period 
(1990-2013). Despite the fact that both keywords have a comparable degree of 
specialisation with similar Google hits in the general search function and similar beginning of 
appearance, they have a very different development. The numbers of REIT publications 
largely exceed those on UDFs. Therefore, this dissertation with its broad and structural 
approach contributes to the fairly scarce research conducted in this field so far. 
The dissertation is structured as follows. First, it introduces European structural policy in 
general, the urban development policy with a specific focus on the JESSICA initiative, and its 
sustainability aspects. The second part covers the basic principles of three mathematical 
methods and processes – Principal Component and Data Envelopment Analysis as well as 
correlated Geometric Brownian Motion – which are used in the overall approach presented 
in this thesis. Afterwards, the dissertation gives an overview of the four working papers 
which define the main part of this cumulative thesis. Then, the connection between the four 
working papers and the JESSICA scheme as well as the implications derived from the 
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dissertation are highlighted. Finally, the four papers are subsequently attached in the last 
sections.  
1.1 European Structural Policy 
As Europe is very heterogeneous in its structure, the ways to achieve policy objectives are 
diverse as well. It is thus not possible to decide on a fixed set of detailed measures at a 
European level, but the member states and their regions need to conduct specific 
implementation plans covering their individual development needs, which of course have to 
be in line with the overall objectives set by the EU. The multi-level structure leads to a 
number of bureaucratic actions, which are inevitable because of the autonomy of the 
member states. This section introduces the documents which regulate the involvement of 
European Structural Funds in each member state or region. As policy objectives are not 
consistent in time, the documents are only valid for a defined period of seven years. The 
main parts of the thesis at hand were conducted during the European policy programming 
period 2007-2013, which simultaneously represents a turning point for urban development 
policy with the introduction of the JESSICA initiative. Hence, this period serves as a 
framework for the following analyses of the European structural policy. 
There are three Structural Funds – the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the 
European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) – which aim to reduce regional 
disparities across Europe. Those three financial instruments help to achieve the three 
European policy objectives convergence, regional competitiveness and employment, as well 
as European territorial cooperation with different focuses depending on the respective fund 
as shown in Figure 3. The CF only concentrates on the EU objective of convergence, whereas 
the ESF also includes regional competitiveness and employment. The third fund, the ERDF, 
covers all EU objectives in the context of structural policy, which already emphasises its 
importance. This specific fund aims to reduce development discrepancies among regions in 
Europe by supporting rural or naturally and geographically disadvantaged areas, e.g., 
deprived cities. 
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Figure 3: European structural policy objectives and financial instruments. 
Each European member state draws up a National Strategic Reference Framework as 
guideline for Operational Programmes (OPs), which then contain more detailed plans about 
the implementation of policy objectives by supporting projects in certain geographical areas. 
These documents help to ensure the coherence of the European objectives with the practical 
realisation on the lower administration levels. The plans for urban and regional development 
support and, where applicable the use of JESSICA instruments, are defined in the ERDF OPs 
for each region. The exact regional level of an OP depends on the respective country. Mostly, 
the ERDF OPs are valid for the NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) I level, 
the highest tier of subnational levels, which are the federal states in the case of Germany. 
One such region is North-Rhine Westphalia, which constitutes a good example of embedding 
urban development in the overall plans of an OP as demonstrated in Figure 4 (see 
Operational Programme NRW, 2006).  
 
Figure 4: Objectives and implementation orientation for the ERDF OP of North-Rhine Westphalia. 
The EU objective for this region is regional competitiveness and employment, because the 
region’s gross domestic product per capita exceeds 75% of the EU average, which is the 
classification basis for the high-level objectives defined by the EU. This EU objective is 
further divided into two main objectives for North-Rhine Westphalia, namely the 
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development of competitiveness through innovation and specific strengths of the entire 
region on the one hand and the convergence of the region through improvements in 
disadvantaged areas on the other hand. To achieve these aims, North-Rhine Westphalia 
assigns three priorities, named priority axes, which are the strengthening of the 
entrepreneurial basis, the innovation and knowledge-based economy support, and 
sustainable urban and regional development. Among the priority axes, the latter is clearly 
the most important one for the context of this thesis. Finally, each priority axis is further 
divided into specific measures. For the highlighted axis, those are the integrated 
development of disadvantaged urban areas as well as the improvement of location factors in 
industrial regions. The former consists of activities related to the support of local economies, 
social and ethical integration, district management, improvement of city image, urban 
renewal for public spaces and living environment, education and job integration for 
graduates, environment discharge, and international networking. The latter enforces the 
development of urban brownfield areas in the city centres and in industrial urban 
environments, modernisation and infrastructure improvement of business parks, and 
elimination of water pollution. The OP intends to use JESSICA instruments as one form of 
ERDF funds allocated to urban development support for financing of activities from this 
priority axis. 
As public funds are scarce, an efficient allocation on subnational units is crucial for the 
success of the respective policy. Nevertheless, the OPs only determine the funding amounts 
they pass along to their geographical sub-levels by very simple methods, if at all, i.e., some 
OPs state the number or names of cities and regions for development support without 
further specification of the reasons for their selection. By far more precise, but still very 
simplified, are those OPs which define (without explanation) some indicators, e.g., the 
unemployment rate and the fiscal income in the OP Nord-Pas-de-Calais, France. However, 
the idea of allocating money to those cities or regions which perform poorly with respect to 
selected indicators is a promising starting point. But of course, how to select these indicators 
is essential and highly interesting from a practical and theoretical point of view. Naturally, 
the indicators strongly depend on the topic of the objective. The focus of the thesis at hand 
is urban development funding and the fact that the subsequent programming period 2014-
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2020 still has a priority in this field of intervention further emphasises the need for solid 
selection and allocation criteria based on indicators connected to urban issues. 
1.2 Urban Development Policy and the JESSICA Initiative 
As already seen in the previous sections, urban development is part of the overall funding 
objectives in the binding documents of the European Structural Funds. With the introduction 
of the JESSICA initiative, the European Commission, the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
and the Council of Europe Development Bank aimed to support new ways of financing 
projects by repayable investments from their Structural Funds in contrast to traditional 
grants given to projects. The new financial instruments should help to attract private 
investors to finance urban development projects via such UDFs, thereby increasing the 
amounts available for the renewal of cities across Europe in times of scarce public funds. The 
initiators planned to channel the funds as demonstrated by Figure 5 (which is an adapted 
version of the one in the “JESSICA – Holding Fund Handbook” by PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
EU Services EESV, 2008).    
 
Figure 5: Funds channelled for the JESSICA initiative. 
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Each member state or region decides whether or not to establish a revolving financial 
structure to finance urban development. If they do so, the European Commission allows that 
some of their Structural Fund resources (“OP resources”) flow into a Holding Fund (HF: a 
portfolio of UDFs) or directly into one or more UDFs, which then further allocate the money 
to projects which are in line with the EU framework defined in the relevant OP. One very 
important condition is that these projects are declared as being part of an integrated plan 
for sustainable urban development in the OP. Nonetheless, the composition of the UDF itself 
is less restricted: it can be fed by an HF that invests in more than one UDF or directly by the 
Structural Funds (mainly ERDF) grants and it should be complemented by more investors’ 
monies, cities’ land and buildings, or money from other international financing institutions 
(“Other public or private investors”). Further options when creating an UDF, within some 
restrictions, are the legal entity of the UDF itself and the exact level at which it will be 
established, either national, regional, or local. In Spain, for example, there is one UDF in 
operation on a national level and one on a regional (NUTS II) level. The former is the so-
called UDF “Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA” and the latter the UDF “AC JESSICA 
Andalucía, S.A.”. 
Due to the high degrees of freedom offered by this open construct combined with the 
resulting heterogeneity and the novelty of the instrument, the implementation of JESSICA 
funds took its time and thus most of the UDFs and HFs existing today have only been set up 
since 2011, four years after the start of the programming period. Meanwhile, the number of 
JESSICA funds increased in various member states as shown in Figure 6. There are 18 HFs and 
41 UDFs operating in 9 member states in cooperation with the EIB1. Some countries seem to 
prefer other structures over the establishment of JESSICA funds, among them are Germany 
and France. The map emphasises this unequal distribution across Europe with focuses on the 
southern and eastern countries. In line with this distribution is the fact that the southern and 
eastern European countries have experienced a higher increase in urban population (United 
Nations, 2012) which might result in higher efforts to quickly implement these financial 
instruments. Positively outstanding in the number of funds are Poland in the east, Italy in the 
south, and the UK in the north with at least three HFs and six UDFs. 
                                                     
1 Effective 25 November 2013 at http://eib.europa.eu/products/jessica/funds/list.htm. 
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Figure 6: Existing JESSICA funds in Europe 
(HF: Holding Fund, UDF: Urban Development Fund). 
Apparently, most countries struggle to determine possible target areas for JESSICA funds and 
thus their involvement in UDFs and HFs remains on a non-existent or very low level. To 
render the initiative successful, it is necessary to structure the decision process of 
establishing such funds as they can be expected to be beneficial for several parts of Europe. 
This is the starting point of the thesis at hand. The methods applied to some member states 
and regions in the attached working papers demonstrate one possible way of targeting the 
new instrument, which should help the decision makers responsible for urban development 
funding to overcome the barriers currently hindering its use. 
1.3 Sustainable Urban Development 
For the selection of funding targets suitable for the implementation of the JESSICA initiative, 
the exact definition of quantifiable and meaningful indicators is the first step in compliance 
with the OPs. The second “S” in the word JESSICA stands for “sustainable”, referring to 
sustainable development, which also defines the name for the third priority axis in the 
aforementioned OP of North-Rhine Westphalia. Unfortunately, the concept of sustainability 
is ambiguous and no particular definition is delivered by the official JESSICA documents, 
which renders the selection of suitable indicators difficult. In general, there is consensus 
about a three-dimensional combination of ecological, economic, and social aspects when 
talking about sustainable development. However, the term was initially composed of 
“sustain” and “ability”, which highly emphasises long-term effects in the sense that future 
 
10 
 
generations should still have all necessary resources to achieve the same quality of  life as 
we do today (see Starik and Kanashiro, 2013, as well as United Nations, 1987). Hans Carl von 
Carlowitz, the father of sustainability in forestry, already manifested this long-term view in 
1713. The long-term orientation of forestry describes the roots of modern sustainability 
thinking for the ecological dimension. Hence, the three dimensions typically considered need 
to be enlarged by their development over time as is shown in Figure 7. 
When speaking about fostering sustainable urban development within the JESSICA initiative, 
the European institutions aim to promote all kinds of urban projects with, e.g., ecological or 
social focus. The long-term orientation for the economic dimension is indirectly covered by 
the attempt to establish fund constructions with a lasting character, strengthening the 
capital market in the respective region or city. Furthermore, ecological projects focus on, 
e.g., renewable energy renovations which help to maintain natural resources. Hence, the 
long-term orientation is intended to be addressed in the ecological dimension as well. The 
same applies to social projects which help to maintain, e.g., a diverse population stock. 
Therefore, the JESSICA approach aims to indeed cover all dimensions of a sustainable 
development as demonstrated in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Sustainable development with three components and time consideration. 
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Such a systematisation may serve as the basis for measuring the need for and finally the 
impact of JESSICA. Nonetheless, this is only possible if all dimensions are clearly defined. 
Unfortunately, such a definition is missing in the respective funding documents. Several 
other works describe ecological resources as natural capital (see, e.g., Lange, 2004). With 
this definition by capital dimensions, the capital preservation is in line with the time 
consideration introduced above. However, the overall application of capital dimensions is 
not common in sustainability literature. For most parts, the literature remains on a 
descriptive level and only focuses on the necessity that projects should cover ecological, 
economic, and social aspects without specifying how to apply the “concept” in practice. 
There are only few (partly practical) approaches which explicitly cover the topic of capital 
preservation for more than just ecology, among which is Stevens (2005) as well as Ekins and 
Medhurst (2006). We adapt this idea to all aspects of sustainable (urban) development as 
typically expressed in existing large indicator sets. To account for general capital definitions, 
we extend the three dimensions to six. First, the economic dimension consists of financial 
and manufactured (produced assets) capital. Second, the social dimension divides into 
demographic, human, and social capital. These three types of capital are not self-
explanatory. Demographic capital describes the general constitution of the population, e.g., 
the population density or change. Human capital refers to all aspects of human well-being 
such as education and health of individual people whereas social capital describes the 
human well-being in terms of, e.g., security aspects on a societal level (see Ekins and 
Medhurst, 2006). Finally, the ecological dimension is the same as natural capital covering 
among others water or energy resources. All indicators employed for the measurement of 
sustainable development needs and its impact should then aim at providing the degree of 
capital preservation for the six capital categories, respectively. For a wide range of indicator 
sets, this systematisation by capital categories indeed seems applicable. Therefore, we will 
base our analyses on such indicators. However, it is important to note that the long-term 
orientation is missing for some indicators typically used. This issue often concerns the social 
dimension and therefore it might be necessary to adapt existing sets in the future. 
After this introduction to the general context of urban development policy, the next section 
will cover the methods needed to develop the structural analysis of the JESSICA initiative. 
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Afterwards, Section 3 will bridge the gap between this part – Section 1 – and the following 
one – Section 2. 
2 Mathematical Methods and Processes 
This section introduces the most important methods and processes which were applied in 
the papers. In order to provide the reader with a practical intuition for the methods, a focus 
on simplified descriptions which capture the basic ideas was chosen over rigorous 
mathematical treatment of the matter. To complement their pure application in the papers, 
the following should help to understand the mechanism of the respective method on the 
one hand and the applicability on the other hand. This – by no means exhaustive – overview 
focuses on those aspects essential for the application in the working papers of this thesis. 
References marked for each method may serve as entry point for a more general discussion 
of these methods in addition to this specialised introduction. 
2.1 Principal Component Analysis 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a widely used tool for data analysis in several research 
areas (see, e.g., Hoffman and Franke (1986) as well as Pertoni and Braglia (2000) for 
marketing research or Back and Weigend (1997) as well as Ince and Trafalis (2007) for stock 
market analyses). It transforms complex data into a smaller number of dimensions by 
linearly combining the variables to create new variables which capture most of the 
underlying information and eliminating those that are irrelevant to a certain degree of 
accuracy. Frequent applications lie in the relative comparisons of objects under 
consideration, because this method is based on the overall data variance explained which 
provides a measurement for disparity. Furthermore, covariance between the variables is 
eliminated and as a result the new variables describe the differences in the objects of 
comparison in a neatly arranged space. This leads to easy interpretation possibilities for 
differences among the considered objects. 
To introduce this theoretical concept, the hypothetical example shown in Figure 8 
demonstrates the identification of the important dimensions by a PCA. Obviously, the two 
initial indicators I1 and I2 do not offer the best representation to compare the ten cities 
C1,…,C10 (marked by crosses), but the vector P1 clearly represents the main direction along 
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which the cities differ. A second (orthogonal) vector P2 then helps to describe the rest of the 
variance in the data. However, P2 only adds very limited information for the comparison as 
the respective variability in the data is much lower than in P1. A PCA identifies P1 and P2 
based on the data of the ten cities and describes their relationship to the original indicators. 
By doing so, it is also possible to analyse the relevance of the initial indicators for the 
description of differences. In Figure 8 the indicator I1 is the important determinant of P1. 
 
Figure 8: Identification of relevant dimensions by a PCA. 
To illustrate the idea of a PCA in more detail and to derive the results step by step, we 
consider another illustrative example, which is highly simplistic and has a straightforward 
transformation as solution. However, despite the simplicity the general approach should 
become obvious. In the example, we have two objects of comparison only, which are the 
two cities C1 and C2, with three properties measured by three indicators I1, I2, and I3. The 
indicator values for C1 are 2, 0, and 0 as well as –2, 0, and 0 for C2. Plotting them in the 
three-dimensional (I1, I2, I3)-space emphasises graphically that the two cities only differ in 
terms of I1 (see left plot of Figure 9). In this example, the right plot of Figure 9 illustrates the 
obvious result obtained by a PCA, which is the selection of the I1-dimension as new variable 
P1, because this single variable describes all variance in the data.  
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Figure 9: Simple system with two cities before (left plot) and after PCA (right plot). 
Of course, the example is very simple, but helps to derive the general mechanism as we will 
do subsequently. Usually, the method serves to uncover determining variables for very 
complex decision environments and the results are by no means as simple to deduct, but 
with the help of some mathematical deliberations, a neat solution becomes obvious. The 
theoretical basics behind these arise from classical linear algebra, where the cleverly chosen 
transformation is based on the principle of eigenvectors and their particular properties. A 
non-zero vector c is an eigenvector of the matrix C if C·c = λ·c. Hence, the eigenvector has 
the same direction after multiplication with the matrix. Only the length is changed by its 
scalar multiple – the eigenvalue – denoted as λ. Eigenvalues and eigenvectors are specific for 
each matrix and help to describe the matrix similar to how roots describe a polynomial. The 
matrix can therefore be defined by its eigenvectors as its basis. With the size of the 
corresponding eigenvalue revealing the informational content of this vector. For more 
details on eigenvalues and eigenvectors see, e.g., Fischer (2014). 
Each linear transformation aims to convert the original n x m data matrix C into the new 
n x m matrix C̅ by multiplication with a basis P, expressed as an n x n matrix: 
C̅   P · C  (1) 
In the case of a PCA, the matrix P consists of orthogonal basis vectors as rows which are the 
eigenvectors of C. The definitions of P and the eigenvectors reveal that the determined basis 
depends on C, which is a special characteristic of the PCA and not the case for 
transformations in general. Moreover, a PCA aims to eliminate redundancies between 
variables by employing the new basis P. The transformed system consists of new variables – 
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the Principal Components (PCs) – and the respective data points C̅ which are uncorrelated to 
each other, i.e., Cov (C̅) is of a diagonal type (as the squares of the covariances define the 
nominators of the correlations between two variables). Rearranging the empirical equation 
for covariances of normalised values with matrix multiplication and transposition rules leads 
to equation (2). The derivation of equations (2) to (5) is based on Shlens (2003) and the 
applied properties can be found in, e.g., Dahmen and Reusken (2008). 
      Cov (C̅)  
 
n  
C̅ · C̅
T
  
 
n  
(P·C) · (P·C)T   
 
n  
P · C · CT· PT   
 
   
P · (C·CT) · PT    (2) 
As each self-multiplication for matrices results in a symmetric matrix, the parenthetic term 
C·CT is symmetric and for each real symmetric matrix the following decomposition exist:  
C · CT  E · D · ET  (3) 
where D is a diagonal matrix consisting of the eigenvalues of C as elements and the columns 
of the matrix E are the corresponding eigenvectors of C. Consequently, the matrix ET is 
nothing else but the previously defined P and thus equation (2) leads to:  
      Cov (C̅)  
 
n  
P · (C·CT) · PT   
 
n  
P · (PT· D · P) · PT   
 
n  
P·PT· D · P·PT  (4) 
Per construction, the multiplication of P and PT results in the identity matrix – as its vectors 
are orthogonal – and, hence, equation (4) simplifies to: 
      Cov (C̅)  
 
n  
 · D  (5) 
Equation (5) demonstrates that the transformed data is indeed uncorrelated as D is a 
diagonal matrix. To achieve an actual reduction of dimensions (variables), those rows of P 
corresponding to the n-r smallest eigenvalues are removed in the final step so that P consists 
of only r instead of n rows afterwards (with r < n). Small eigenvalues represent eigenvectors 
with a low magnitude which in turn implicates that this dimension is less important for 
describing the created system. Therefore, it is suitable to neglect them. 
For the simplistic example initially introduced C, P and C̅ correspond to: 
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In this case, the eigenvectors of C are equal to the unit vectors with the eigenvalues 8, 0 and 
0. The first row of P (corresponding to the highest eigenvalue) is sufficient to cover all the 
variance of C and thus the final matrix P – a vector in this special case – which transforms C 
into C̅ with 100 % accuracy is 
  P   (     ). (7) 
Accordingly, the transformed data is 
C̅   P · C   (     ) ·( 
 
 
 
    
      
      
)   (     )  (8) 
which corresponds to the right plot of Figure 9. In this example, the interpretation of the 
obtained data is easy. But the first working paper of the thesis goes beyond standard 
applications of PCA by focusing on the interpretation of the new variables of a complex data 
set with the final aim of selecting those initial indicators with the highest connection to the 
PCs. Equation (9) illustrates the detailed multiplication of P and C written as sums describing 
C̅ before (left) and after (right) the elimination of the second and third dimension with r = 1 
dimensions left. 
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Elimination  
⇒        C̅   ( ∑ P iCi 
n
i  
     ∑ P iCi 
n
i  
 )  (9) 
This illustration clearly shows the influence of the initial indicators on the PCs. For instance, 
if the value P12 is large, then the second indicator strongly influences the value of the first 
PC. Hence, indicators which have a large proportional influence on at least one PC are 
particularly important for the description of the new system. In the simplistic example 
analysed above, there is a clear distinction between those indicators which have a high 
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explanatory power on the new system and those which are redundant, i.e., I1 fully suffices to 
describe the transformed system and I2 and I3 have no influence at all as P12 and P13 are zero. 
For a general application, there is more than one indicator necessary to describe the 
differences among the objects of comparison – the cities. Nevertheless, the interpretation 
remains similar. 
Within the derivation of the PCA, there is no need to assume a certain ratio of r or n with m. 
Hence, the relation between the number of reduced dimensions or initial indicators and 
cities has no impact on the robustness of the transformation. The principle of eigenvector 
decomposition works for any typically occurring combination of cities and indicators, which 
renders the application in policy contexts favourable as sometimes there is only a small 
number of objects for comparison. Nevertheless, a brief robustness check is always useful, 
because the method’s results may vary if data is too similar for many indicators, which 
should however not be the case for typical policy contexts.   
2.2 Data Envelopment Analysis 
The second mathematical method applied in this thesis is called Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA). A DEA is a performance analysis tool which measures the relative efficiency of objects 
– usually named decision making units (DMUs) – described by several in- and outputs. This 
method serves to evaluate objects of similar type by monetary or nonmonetary inputs and 
outputs. Some typical applications cover comparisons of hospitals (see, e.g., Banker et al., 
1986 or Steinmann et al., 2008), airlines or airports (see, e.g., Gillan and Lall, 1997, or Nissi 
and Rapposelli, 2008), and universities or their departments (see, e.g., Tomkins and Green, 
1988, Ng and Li, 2000 or Martín, 2008). Comparing cities in terms of their development with 
several indicator values and the amount of funding they received is another possible 
application of a DEA and is part of the third working paper, where funding amounts are used 
as inputs and changes in a small number of urban development indicators as outputs. 
In a first hypothetical example (see Figure 10), we now consider a simplified version of such 
an analysis where we measure the change of indicator I1 (the output, denoted as ΔI in the 
following) caused by the funding F (the input) for the ten cities C1,…,C10 marked by crosses in 
the figure. A relative comparison by a DEA enables the classification of efficient and 
inefficient cities. Whether a city is efficient or not depends on the chosen model. For each 
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application, there are three main parameters to be set. First, a set of inputs and outputs 
needs to be defined. For the choice of this first parameter, the exact aim of the performance 
comparison is used as the basis. In our example, we compare the efficiency of urban 
development funding. Therefore, the input is the funding and the output is the achieved 
change in urban development. Second, the model technique can rely on constant or non-
constant returns to scale. This parameter describes which DMUs are denoted as efficient. 
Third, the model can measure the efficiency by assuming that DMUs should produce a given 
output with the smallest input possible – input orientation – or the highest output for a 
given input – output orientation. Mixed forms of these two extremes are also possible. 
Finally, the model orientation defines how to measure the degree of inefficiency for the 
remaining units. Consequently, the so-called efficiency frontier, which connects all efficient 
units, differs for each model specification. The most common models are called CCR 
(Charnes-Cooper-Rhodes) for the technique of constant returns to scale and BCC (Banker-
Charnes-Cooper) for non-constant returns to scale while typical efficiency measures are 
input and output orientation. The input-oriented CCR model defines the dashed and the 
input-oriented BCC model the dotted line as efficiency frontiers in Figure 10. All cities not 
lying on these lines are not efficient under the respective model assumptions and should 
orient their appropriation of funds on the efficient ones to their left. In the CCR model 
applied here, only C1 is efficient wheras in the input-oriented BCC model C1, C3 and C4 define 
the frontier. 
 
Figure 10: DEA efficiency frontiers for the input-oriented CCR (dashed line) and BCC (dotted line) models. 
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Considering a second, more reduced, and highly simplistic example serves as the entry point 
for a detailed explanation of the DEA with its different parameters. The following 
explanations are all derived from the introduction to the DEA by Cooper et al. (2006). In this 
example, we only compare the two cities C1 and C2 according to the change in the indicator, 
ΔI, for two subsequent periods and the amount of funding F they received by the EU in the 
same time with  
  I   (      )  and F   (     )  (10) 
The variable ΔIl describes the development of the l-th city in the respective policy 
intervention field that was achieved with the help of the amount of funding Fl allocated to it.  
The efficiency ratio is defined as 
output of city l
input of city l
    
 Il
Fl
    l  (11) 
Plotting the properties of the cities in the (ΔI, F)-space reveals the ratios (11) graphically in 
the left part of Figure 11. City 1 utilises funding (the input) efficiently to improve its 
positioning in terms of the indicator (ΔI, the output) as this city achieves more change in 
output per input. The plot highlights this fact by the higher slope indicated by the tangent 
M1 of the left triangle in comparison to M2.  
 
Figure 11: Illustrative example for the comparison of two cities with the efficiency ratios M1 and M2 (left) and efficiency 
frontiers for two different input-oriented DEA models (right: dashed line for CCR and dotted line for BCC). 
The ratio of ratios el defines the efficiency score for the l-th city in comparison to the 
benchmark, which is C1 in this example. 
 
20 
 
e   
  
  
   
 . 
 . 
     and  e    
  
  
   
 .  
 . 
    .   (12) 
Equation (12) thus computes the relative efficiency in comparison to the best city (the 
benchmark) in the data under consideration. Hence, the efficiency score is highly dependent 
on the mechanism used to choose the benchmark(s). The so-called efficiency frontier which 
envelops all objects under consideration then is a linear combination of all efficient units. 
The right plot of Figure 11 reveals this frontier defined for the set of the two DMUs – C1 and 
C2 – for the CCR and the BCC model as a dashed and a dotted line. The CCR model sets those 
cities as efficient which have the overall best ratio (11), assuming that there are constant 
returns to scale and thus every city has the chance to become as good as the overall best 
one. However, if there are certain restrictions leading to the assumption that, e.g., the 
indicator values are bounded, returns to scale are not constant anymore. The BCC model is 
based on the second assumption which is more reasonable for the comparison of cities, 
because indicators used are often bounded. An example of such an indicator, which is 
restricted to values between 0 and 1 per definition, is the proportion of a subgroup of the 
population. The efficiency frontier in the CCR model only considers C1 and connects it with 
the origin, whereas the BCC efficiency frontier combines the efficient DMUs – in this case 
only C1 – linearly without the origin. Hence, every other city lying higher than and to the 
right of C1 would define another benchmark and would modify the input-oriented BCC 
frontier (to a piecewise linear one as seen in Figure 10). It is important to note that the 
equivalence of ΔI1 and ΔI2 is not sufficient to also render C2 efficient when considering input 
orientation as C2 needs more funding (input) to achieve the same output ΔI. Therefore, C2 is 
not part of the efficiency frontier. 
There is another parameter choice which affects the efficiency scores, namely the input or 
output orientation of the model. Our examples assume input orientation, which explains the 
positioning of the dotted line in Figure 11. This choice is useful if the decision maker has 
more influence on the input than on the output (which is plausible for funding). For this 
reason, the aim is to achieve the same output but with less funding proportionally to the 
relation of the benchmark results. Otherwise, the efficiency frontier of the BCC model with 
output orientation would be the line intersecting C1 and C2 and the benchmark definition 
would change. However, this choice does not affect the CCR frontier of Figure 10 (because of 
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one input and output only), but the benchmark definition still is different. Including a third 
city, namely C7, in the analyses demonstrates the changes in the benchmarks for both 
models, as shown in Figure 12. As marked by the arrows, the benchmarks defined by the 
models are the cities (or the frontier) with a similar horizontal position in case of input 
orientation and a similar vertical position for output orientation. The benchmark for C7 and 
input orientation is close to C1 for both models as indicated by the intersections between the 
dashed arrow and the dashed line for the CCR model and the dotted arrow and the dotted 
line for the BCC model in the left plot. In contrast, the benchmarks for C7 and output 
orientation have a high distance to C1. For the BCC model, the benchmark even is C2.  
 
Figure 12: Illustrative example for the comparison of three cities with the efficiency frontiers for input orientation (left) 
and output orientation (right; dashed line for CCR and dotted line for BCC). 
These examples helped us to demonstrate the most important properties and types of DEA 
from an application-oriented point of view. The following takes the analyses to a 
computationally-oriented level. For the sake of clarity, we will return to the example with 
one input and one output for the two cities C1 and C2. However, the following mathematical 
formulation can easily be adapted for more inputs or outputs and objects (see Cooper et al., 
2006). The overall aim is to determine an efficiency score for each city as defined in (12). As 
the efficient DMU is not known in advance, the efficiency ratio  l of each city cannot be 
normalised by the efficiency ratio of the efficient DMU as done in (12). Hence, a version of 
(12) with normalising weights is introduced instead and maximised for each city to 
determine its efficiency score. As shown in (13), this equation uses positive weights w and v 
for normalisation.  
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ma  el   
w  Il
v Fl
 (13) 
These weights are selected to be the same for all cities when maximising el and under the 
constraint that only efficient DMUs have an efficiency score of 1, i.e., the weights must be 
chosen in a manner which guarantees that after applying the same weights to all cities the 
upper bound of the resulting efficiency scores remains 1. The formal constraints is defined 
through 
w  Il̃
v Fl̃
          l̃    ,…,m   (14) 
An intuition for why the weights are necessary can be gained by considering that the inputs 
and outputs typically do not have the same magnitude, i.e., ΔI ϵ {1} and F ϵ {2, 4} in our 
example. Hence, the weights w and v are necessary to ensure that the efficiency value for 
the best DMU is 1 and not 0.5. In the case of e1, for example, a combination of w = 1 and v = 
0.5 results in M1 = e1 = 1. This implicitly corresponds to a compression of the abscissa from 2 
and 4 to 1 and 2. It is important to note, that this is one possible choice of normalisation 
which conforms to the above constraint. However, it is not necessary to determine those 
weights in advance, instead they are a result of the optimisation.  So far, the introduced 
maximisation problem under constraints corresponds to the CCR model only. For the BCC 
model, some adaptations are necessary. Subsequently, we will concentrate on the 
mathematical operations behind the computations for the input-oriented BCC model applied 
in the third working paper of this dissertation. To account for the assumption on variable 
returns to scale (convexity surrounding the cities) a constant term w0 is included in (13) and 
(14) to obtain the overall optimisation function (15) under the same constraints as 
mentioned before. This programme needs to be solved separately for each DMU under 
consideration.  
ma  el   
w  Il    w 
v Fl
  
s.t.    
w  Il̃   w 
v Fl̃
          l̃    ,…,m 
w, v      
(15) 
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w    IR 
The constant term w0 accounts for differences in the outputs, which should be similar for the 
benchmark of the l-th city in the BCC version of a DEA. The term can be understood as some 
kind of fixed costs which have a different degree of influence depending on the extent of the 
output. Thereby, the term w0 classifies the DMUs by similarity in the outputs. The numerator 
is called virtual output. By normalising the denominator of (15) for the l-th city and 
rearranging the auxiliary constraints, the optimisation problem for this city can be 
transformed into the easily solvable linear form described in (16). 
ma  el   w  Il    w   
s.t.    v Fl     
w  Il̃   w   v Fl̃          l ̃   ,…,m 
w, v      
w    IR 
(16) 
In practical implementations, DEA algorithms typically even solve a (further developed) dual 
form of this linear programme. Nevertheless, the linear programme (16) already completely 
describes the main mathematical principle underlying the application of a DEA to the given 
example with one input and one output. To get a solution for the overall performance 
comparison, such a programme needs to be solved for each DMU under consideration. For 
the values of the example introduced above, this results in the two linear programmes 
shown in (17). 
ma  e   w    w   
s.t.      v     
w   w    v      
w   w    v      
w, v    
w    IR 
ma  e   w    w   
s.t.     v     
w   w    v      
w   w    v      
w, v    
w    IR 
(17) 
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The optimal solutions of (17), easily verifiable without the help of a solver, are e1 = 1 and e2 = 
0.5: The first constraint of each programme directly reveals the values for v. The second 
constraint overrides the third and therefore the latter can be neglected. From the second 
restriction, w – w0   1 follows in the left programme and w – w0   0.5 in the right one. The 
maxima thus are 1 in the left case and 0.5 in the right case. This corresponds to the 
efficiency values derived in (12). For this special example, there only is one DMU for 
comparison in each programme, which renders the exact value of w0 irrelevant as it solely 
occurs in combination with w. Thus, we could set w0 = 0 and we would obtain w = 1 and 
v = 0.5 for the maximisation of e1, respectively. This combination of w = 1 and v = 0.5 from 
the left programme corresponds to the previous example explained to motivate the use of 
weights in (13). 
While for such a simplistic example, it may not be necessary to employ the DEA optimisation 
techniques described above, it generally is. The simplicity of the example served to illustrate 
the mechanisms while remaining tractable enough for the reader to be able to confirm the 
results manually. For more inputs and outputs, weighted sums are considered instead of wΔI 
and vF. The applicability of the solution from the optimisation programmes depends on the 
relationship of the number of inputs and outputs to the number of cities for comparison, 
because each city defines a constraint in each programme and each input and output results 
in a component in these constraints. If the ratio between the set of DMUs and the 
considered inputs and outputs is too low, a large share of DMUs is denoted efficient. This 
undesired result is based on the fact that the programme has too many degrees of freedom 
for a high number of inputs and outputs. Therefore, not all DMU constraints are valid and 
thus a high number of programmes deliver the optimal solution, i.e., the respective DMU is 
denoted efficient. The example revealed that the programme solution is reasonable for as 
many inputs and outputs as cities. Nevertheless, several rules of thumb signify that a ratio of 
three DMUs per input or output yields more useful solutions for general applications (see, 
e.g., Vitnera et al, 2006). 
2.3 Correlated Geometric Brownian Motion 
The third mathematical technique used in this thesis is the so-called Geometric Brownian 
Motion (GBM). A GBM is a random process with log-normal distribution, a constant drift, 
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and a constant standard deviation. Furthermore, the development of a future value is 
independent of its past or current state (see, e.g., Borodin and Salminen, 2002, or 
Glasserman, 2004). The resulting random development can be visualised in the same way as 
typically known for the jagged chart of a stock price. Modelling such stock or also asset 
values with the help of a GBM is common in the fields of finance and economics. Although 
first applications date back to the 1970s (see, e.g., Merton, 1973, or Brennan and Schwartz, 
1977), it still experiences frequent current use (see, e.g., Gerber and Shiu, 2003, as well as 
Postali and Picchetti, 2006). With slight adaptations, the same method helps to generate 
possible future cash flows for urban development projects. This specific application forms 
part of the fourth working paper of this dissertation.  
The cash flows which drive the asset values for urban development projects are the EBITDAs 
(Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortisation). Random influences on 
project EBITDAs will now be considered for a very simplistic example of two correlated 
projects, denoted as P1 and P2. Both projects have an initial EBITDA of E1(t0) = E2(t0) = 100 
and an average increase in EBITDA of μ1 = μ2 = 5 % per period. Furthermore, both EBITDAs 
are assumed to have a standard deviation σ1 = σ2 of 10 % and a correlation coefficient ρ of 
0.9. A project maturity of two periods results in three time points (t0, t1 and t2) to be 
considered. For each time point, greater than zero, one pair of random numbers influences 
the stochastically based development of the two EBITDAs. Equation (18) shows one possible 
realisation of the four standard normally independent identically distributed random 
numbers used for this example. 
     (   ,    )   ( .  ,  .  ), 
     (   ,    ) = (-1.17, 0.12). 
(18) 
The first two realisations (vector Z1) have an influence on the development of the EBITDA in 
the first period while the second vector is used to calculate the values in the second period 
as we will see in detail in the following. To describe the mechanism of a GBM, we will first 
derive the formal equations and show how they are connected to these random numbers. 
Afterwards, the additional use of all other inputs (the initial EBITDAs, drift rates, and 
standard deviation) just introduced leads to a visualisation of the overall process.  
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Equation (19) defines the exact process giving the equation of a GBM for the first period and 
first project of this example (see, e.g., Sigman (2007), or Hull (2012) for a more generalised 
explanation) with t0 = 0: 
E  (t )   E (t )⏟
I)
 e
√t   σ     ⏟ 
II)
      t ⏟
III)   (19) 
The first term – I) – describes the start value, the second term – II) – is the stochastic process 
(a so-called Gaussian random walk, see, e.g., Ibe (2013) for more details on random walks) 
and the third – III) – adds the drift. Rearranging II) as well as III) and applying rules of 
exponents reveals that Z11 increases the value as long as it is greater than 
– μ
  
t  
√t  σ 
  because 
then the term right of E1(t0) is greater than 1. Otherwise, it decreases the value. Under 
consideration of the random number Z11 defined in (18) and the positive values for all other 
variables, the EBITDA of the first project P1 rises, because Z11 is positive and thus greater 
than the aforementioned condition.  
The development for the second project in the first period correlates with the first process 
as defined in (20):  
E  (t )   E  (t )⏟
I)
  e
√t  σ ( ρ       √  ρ     )⏟           
IV)
       t ⏟
III)   (20) 
Again, we see the same structure with three terms as in (19). Under consideration of the 
variables defined at the beginning, it is obvious that the EBITDA of the second project P2 also 
rises in the first period as Z11 and Z12 are both positive. However, this time the second term – 
denoted as IV) – differs. Instead of a multiplication of the standard deviation and the first 
assigned random number, it contains a combination of both random numbers weighted with 
the influence of the correlation coefficient. More precisely, it combines a part of Z11 
(weighted with the correlation coefficient ρ) and a part of  12 (weighted with the square root 
of 1-ρ2). This term is in general called Cholesky factorisation or decomposition (see, e.g., 
Dahmen and Reusken, 2008, for general Cholesky factorisations) and exists for most 
correlation matrices. A Cholesky decomposition is achieved if one can find a lower triangular 
matrix M where M multiplied with its transpose equals the initial matrix. If the initial matrix 
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is the correlation matrix, then the expected value of M·Z corresponds to the correlation 
matrix entries again as the expected value of Z is zero per definition of standard normal 
numbers. Hence, the entries of M·Z also are correlated standard normal random numbers. 
The definition of the weights applied in the equations (19) and (20), which are ρ as well as 
the square root of 1 – ρ2, is always the same for a case with two correlated processes. This is 
based on the fact that the decomposition of the correlation matrix with entries 1 on the 
diagonals and ρ on the off-diagonals results in the matrix M with the entries M11 = 1, M12 = 0, 
M21 = ρ, and  22 = √ -ρ . Thus, Z11 and ρ  11+√ -ρ  Z12 are nothing else but the vector 
entries of M·Z in a case of two dimensions. Nevertheless, the exact decomposition is 
dependent on the number of projects involved and needs to be adapted for a case with 
more than two projects.  
For the second period, the new start values are each defined as the resulting value from the 
first period. A second difference in the equation of the GBM for the next period lies in the 
change of t1 to the delta of the next time step, which is the difference of t2 and t1. Finally, the 
random numbers Z2 assigned for the second period substitute Z1. Such an adaption of (19) 
and (20) leads to the formulation of the GBM for the EBITDAs in t2 in equation (21): 
E  (t )   E  (t )  e√
t  t  σ           (t    t )  
E  (t )   E  (t )  e
√t  t  σ ( ρ       √  ρ     )      (t    t )   
(21) 
In contrast to the first period, the values will both decrease in the second period because of 
the high extent of the negative random number Z21. However, this time it is not that obvious 
as it depends on the exact values for the other variables. If we now apply all values defined 
before, the results of the GBM for the EBITDAs for both projects and periods confirm this 
decrease in value: 
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E  (t )       e
 .  ·  .      .        .    
E  (t )      .   e
 .  · (  .  )    .        .    
E  (t )       e
 .  ·  .  ·  .      .  √ .   ·  .      .        .    
E  (t )      .   e
 .  ·  .  · (  .  )    .  √ .    ·  .      .        .    
(22) 
Plotting the corresponding results easily demonstrates the correlation and the development 
of the two processes in the way already predicted before (see Figure 13). Both project 
EBITDAs increase in the first period and decrease in the second. The similarity of the process 
development derives from their high correlation of 0.9.  
 
Figure 13: Illustrative example for a GBM process of the EBITDAs for two projects and two periods. 
Nevertheless, as the process is stochastic and two periods are not sufficient enough to 
reconstruct the periodical drift rate, the 5 % are not realised in this brief example. The 
realised drift rates of this short sequence only are 1 % and 2 %. More time steps would be 
necessary to demonstrate the agreement of the input values and the resulting properties of 
the process. The same is true for the actual deviations between two time steps, which are 
lower than the defined standard deviation for this short sequence analysed. An extension of 
the example to a project maturity of 20 periods with 18 further vectors of random numbers 
assigned and calculated analogously to (21) is shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Illustrative example for a GBM process of the EBITDAs for two projects and 20 periods. 
With the help of this longer version, a reconstruction of the input parameters is possible. 
The development of the EBITDAs of project 1 and 2 without a stochastic component is 
represented by the dotted drift curve. The realised EBITDAs for project 1 describe the dark 
graph with the discrete values E1(t0),…,E1(t20). On average, the stochastically constructed 
EBITDAs E1(t0),…,E1(t20) correspond to the dotted curve at first sight. Computing the exact 
average realised drift rate of the results from the GBM process confirms this impression for 
project 1 and project 2. Such a defined drift rate of 5 % is plausible if the project includes, 
e.g., incoming cash flows from increasing rents of a constructed building. A smaller given 
drift rate could be applied or the consideration of an inflation factor. The realised deviation 
of the generated EBITDAs is on average 10 % between two periods, which is also in line with 
the input definition. This deviation could result, e.g., from temporary vacant offices in the 
constructed building.  
Our approach deviates from applications broadly represented in the literature because we 
model the cash flows without any accumulation to a value in the classical economic sense. 
Thereby, we want to emphasise the importance of periodical payments for financing of 
projects with very limited financial reserves. Even though this is not the most common 
application, there also is literature using GBM or similar stochastic processes for cash flows 
even though the approach is not as widely used as it is for, e.g., asset values. Among the 
former is Brennan (2003), who applies a GBM for uncertain cash flows in his elaborations on 
corporate investment policy. Earlier research such as the work of Myers and Turnbull (1977) 
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as well as Bhattacharya (1978) included Gaussian or discrete random walks for the 
description of cash flows. They assumed the same stochastic process for the cash flow itself 
and not the accumulated value. Furthermore, other and more recent examples of GBM 
application to revenues (instead of cash flows) of infrastructure projects are Huang and Chou 
(2006) as well as Brandao and Saraiva (2008). The last two papers are very similar to our 
intended application to project flows and indicate that the stochastic influence on periodical 
non-cumulated variables is in general suitable.  
As we have just seen, GBMs are a versatile tool. Whether the application is indeed 
appropriate depends on the suitability of the assumptions mentioned at the beginning: First, 
the GBM assumes that the cash flows are log-normally distributed with constant   and σ. 
Second, the development is independent of previous data. It must be checked whether the 
assumptions are adequate for a specific analysis. For the application introduced above, these 
do not represent a major obstacle. However, for the analysis of EBITDAs with this stochastic 
process, it is important to note that GBM generates positive values only. Therefore, the 
application to EBITDAs as cash flows is only appropriate as long as negative realisations do 
not need to be considered. This will be the case for the fourth working paper. Otherwise, the 
application of an Arithmetic Brownian Motion would have been the random process of 
choice. 
As the three major mathematical methods applied in the four working papers have been 
introduced, we will derive their connection to the overall research approach of this thesis in 
the next section. 
3 Introduction to the Four Working Papers 
The four papers of the dissertation at hand will be introduced in the following with an 
emphasis on the link between the policy frameworks, the establishment of funds for urban 
development, and the introduced mathematical methods. 
3.1 Overview of the Four Working Papers 
This section briefly summarises the four working papers (denoted as WP #1 to WP #4) which 
are part of the thesis. Table 1 shows an overview of the main aspects of each paper. 
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Working paper Method Data Result 
WP #1:  
„Indicators“ 
PCA Eurostat Funding need 
WP #2:  
„Urban Capital 
 arkets“ 
NPV 
Qualitative theory 
Evaluation studies Subsidy type 
WP #3:  
„D I Approach“ 
DEA 
„D I“ 
Eurostat 
Evaluation studies 
ERDF funding 
UDF regions 
WP #4:  
„ ulti-level Fund 
Structures“ 
MCS, GBM, 
Qualitative theory 
Evaluation studies 
IPD 
HF advantages 
Table 1: Overview of the four working papers with their methods, data, and results. 
The first paper elaborates on measuring differences among cities, regions, or countries by 
the use of indicators representing numerous aspects of urban life. Such an indicator analysis 
should help to determine the funding need within the policy objectives defined by the 
European Commission. The applied PCA method identifies important indicators for the 
determination of urban, regional, and national investment needs. The data basis is the 
Urban Audit Key Indicator Set from the Eurostat database. This set covers 46 typical 
indicators relevant to urban development policies such as infrastructure, environmental 
parameters, and population structures. The final result of the analysis is a small set of 
indicators which reveals the funding need for each of the three geographical areas: 
countries, regions, and cities.  
The second paper concentrates on failures in urban capital markets and their connection to 
urban development projects. As public authority interventions are a justified means to 
remedy market failures, we analyse the three main market imperfections: external effects, 
imperfect competition, and incomplete information. The methods applied are the 
conceptual analysis of project Net Present Values (NPVs) in combination with qualitative 
arguments. The result of this analysis provides a matching of particular subsidy types to 
(combinations of) certain market failures. Afterwards, data from the JESSICA evaluation 
studies serves as a basis for the classification of typical urban development projects. For 
each project category, literature findings help to determine the sensitivity of such projects to 
the three imperfections. Depending on the (combination) of market imperfections 
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connected to a particular category, either grants or revolving instruments – equity, loans, 
and guarantees – are the suitable subsidy means to remedy market failures and initiate 
project financing. 
The third paper then combines the results achieved so far and extends them by the use of a 
DEA to reveal possible regional targets for the establishment of JESSICA UDFs. The 
combination of all aspects leads to an approach called “D I” which consists of three 
subsequent steps. The first step “D” refers to the distance measurement between possible 
funding targets and uses the results of WP #1 as inputs. The second step “ ” describes the 
movability through former funding – the funding efficiency measured by a DEA. In addition 
to the aforementioned data sources, ERDF funding data is analysed as input here. The last 
step “I” considers the market imperfections revealed by the needs of the respective urban 
projects and thus applies the results of WP #2. A combination of all three steps identifies 
those regions which are indeed suitable for the establishment of UDFs. An example of 
selected European regions is used to demonstrate the application of this approach and to 
compare the results with actual JESSICA funds on the one hand and across different 
geographical levels on the other hand. The former shows that regions determined by the 
DMI approach partly coincide with the geographical areas which have established actual 
JESSICA funds. 
Finally, the fourth paper analyses whether the second level of funds – the HF – is beneficial 
in the context of urban development support. Such a second level is plausible for restricted 
investment universes on the first level of funds (the UDFs) as this hinders direct 
diversification. Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) in combination with a GBM reveals the risk 
related to project cash flows and fund wealth deviations. The data sources for the simulation 
inputs are again the evaluation studies and furthermore the International Property Database 
(IPD). Thereby, we obtain the probability density of investors’ terminal wealth generated by 
the funds. An exemplary assessment of the utility of an investment in either one of the UDFs 
– first level – or the HF – second level – reveals that the diversification benefits through the 
latter exceed possible (small) increases in transaction costs for a wide range of investors’ risk 
preferences. 
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3.2 Connection between the Four Working Papers and the JESSICA Scheme 
Finally, each of the four working papers analyses one part of the overall JESSICA scheme 
introduced in Figure 5 and contributes to a broad and structured investigation of this policy 
initiative. The relation of WP #1 to WP #4 to the scheme is demonstrated in Figure 15. The 
numeration of the working papers might seem unsystematic compared to the pathway of 
JESSICA funding as demonstrated in the figure. However, the dependence of the results 
achieved in the papers requires the treatment and review in the successive order by their 
original numeration. 
 
Figure 15: Connection between the general JESSICA scheme and the four working papers. 
WP #1 helps to determine whether there is a general need for European funding of urban 
development. The respective funding should then be awarded from the European 
Commission to the regional or national authorities within the framework of their respective 
OP. WP #4 delivers decision support for the optional HF level. Depending on the other public 
and private investors with their own risk preferences, the introduction of an (national) HF for 
mere diversification purposes may lead to a beneficial second level fund structure in this 
context. WP #3 combines three different aspects to get one final separation of potential 
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regional JESSICA UDF targets. Thereby, the analysis identifies those geographical areas which 
are indeed suitable for the establishment of a UDF. Finally, WP #2 covers the lowest level by 
matching the appropriate type of subsidy intervention to the respective category of urban 
development projects. It is crucial to apply grant funding or revolving instruments such as 
loans only if they are suitable to correct the underlying market imperfections which hinder 
the project realisation through other investors.  
Hence, the dissertation at hand covers all levels connected to the idea of JESSICA funding. It 
starts out with the European institutions and goes down through the European member 
states and regions to the local level. The member states and regions cover a possible setting 
for HFs and UDFs and the focus for the local level is on issues related to project financing. 
This work contributes to barely existing research by broadly covering this new and complex 
topic. A matter which is of high relevance for the European Union, bearing in mind the 
urbanisation in the last decades and the predictions for the future. 
3.3 Contribution and Implications 
The contribution of this dissertation is twofold. On the one hand, we provide tools for the 
analysis of several aspects of urban development and its financial support. The first tool 
reduces irrelevant indicators from large initial sets (WP #1). This could be interesting for 
many applications similar to urban development as well. The second tool elaborates on the 
geographical areas in which the employment of JESSICA funds is suitable (WP #3). Thereby, 
we make a first step into the direction of objective investigations for the establishment of 
these funding means. Up to now, the decisions for or against these funds seem to be made 
on a rather intuitive basis. The third tool provides an evaluation of investment alternatives of 
credit funds (WP #4). Hence, its use goes beyond JESSICA related applications.  
On the other hand, some general insights could be gained by the working papers. First, we 
demonstrated that the meaningful indicators to describe the relative situation among 
possible funding targets highly depend on the geographical unit under consideration (WP 
#1). Hence, it is very important that funding decisions rely on indicator values for the 
considered level only. It is necessary to appropriately select those indicators which are the 
basis for a specific funding decision. In practice, this is not the case, e.g., regional indicators 
are used to determine urban funding needs. This issue is supported by WP #3, where we 
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derived that the currently existing regional budget allocation for urban development leads to 
deviations of funding amounts from actual urban need for support. Second, we learnt that 
some types of projects suggested for JESSICA funding should be rather supported by 
traditional grants or not at all (WP #2). Among the former are projects with, e.g., a cultural 
or tourism focus and the latter concerns, e.g., the construction of office or residential 
buildings. We did not find such a distinction between different funding means for project 
categories in any other practical and research literature. Finally, WP #4 revealed the 
relevance of diversification through a second fund level. An HF helps to overcome the 
restrictions imposed on the first level of funds which hinder broad diversification for 
investors other than the European institutions. This outcome is in contrast to the current 
thinking that HFs mainly have administrative benefits. 
During the development of the methods and their implications, some open issues for future 
research emerged. The same analyses as conducted in WP #1 could be applied for cluster 
specific groups of countries, regions, or cities. Furthermore, one possible extension of WP #2 
would be the detailed investigation of some projects as a complement to the groupings 
which were the basis for our approach. Once the JESSICA funding instruments have been 
broadly established in practice, data on UDFs might be used to further compare the results 
of the DMI approach with actual funds (WP #3). In the meanwhile, other data for suitable 
urban and regional development indicators should be available for most geographical areas 
as well. Hence, a combined update of WP #3 would further contribute to future adaptations 
of this new method. Finally, WP #4 would benefit from an expanded ex post UDF database 
as well. With the help of more specific project data – indicators and financial properties – 
the advantages of the second fund level could be quantified for more countries with its 
UDFs. 
To conclude, we saw that this dissertation broadly covers a new and unexplored topic which 
is of high relevance to our society today and in the near future. It supplies a practical guide 
for complex investment decisions based on empirical analyses on the one hand and a 
theoretical foundation on the other hand. The papers yield necessary tools for the 
implementation of policy measures, interesting implications, and uncovered fruitful further 
research potential.  
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Determining Indicators of Quality of Life Differences in European Cities 
by 
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Abstract. Measuring differences among cities by using indicators which represent numerous 
quantitative aspects of urban life is crucial to form policy decisions, such as funding 
allocation for urban development. We investigate Principal Component Analysis as a method 
to identify a suitable set of indicators which concisely represent the quality of life differences 
in European cities. Our analysis reveals a small number of indicators – from an initial set of 
46 – which accurately describe the overall differences between the selected cities from ten 
countries and across five time frames. These selected indicators are distributed over various 
groups, representing environmental, human, manufactured, and social urban capital as well 
as demographic aspects. They cover current political debate on environmental, 
infrastructural and migration issues in cities, safety and especially security impairment as 
well as population changes leading to space shortage in larger cities, or even abandonment 
in smaller cities. Furthermore, a second analysis reveals that the specific choice of most 
important indicators for relative comparisons of possible funding targets heavily depends on 
the particular geographical level (urban, regional, national) under consideration. Thus, the 
amount of funding for urban development should be decided by urban-level indicators and 
not by regional or national ones. 
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1 Introduction 
Urbanisation is one of the most challenging aspects of our modern society. Nowadays, cities 
are both an engine of economic growth and a locus of social problems. As approximately 
80 % of the European Union’s population lives and works in urban areas, the regeneration of 
cities is an important issue for ensuring economic and social stability of the countries 
involved. Therefore, urban development policy measures for improving the quality of life in 
European cities have become more and more important over the last years. In the 2006-
2013 European Structural Funds programming period, the issue of urban development has 
reached a new dimension with the introduction of the JESSICA (Joint European Support for 
Sustainable Investments in City Areas) initiative, which promotes sustainable development in 
urban areas through financial engineering instruments (see European Council, 2006a). Urban 
quality of life assessments are increasingly required as a basis for objective urban 
comparisons in order to build a sound foundation for such policy decisions. 
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) Operational Programmes (OPs) enforce, 
among others, European policy decisions for urban development. In these programmes, 
urban or regional comparisons are a part of the identification of funding targets. Figure 1 
gives an overview of methods applied for determining these targets. This figure represents 
an extension of the previous findings of the European Commission (2008) on this topic. 
Financial resources from the ERDF are currently proposed for investment in urban 
development by the use of two very different strategies, namely competition among specific 
projects and the selection of entire cities. Examples for the first strategy can be found, e.g., 
in the OP of Brussels, Belgium. Among the variants of the second selection strategy, we can 
observe either “subjective” or “objective” selection approaches. The former is regarded as a 
“black box”, since the selection processes follow intransparent criteria which cannot be 
reconstructed by us. The “subjective” selection methods can further be divided into two 
subgroups. OPs belonging to the first subgroup simply state the names of cities eligible for 
funding. This is the case for the OP South-East of the Czech Republic. The OP names the two 
urbanisation centres, Brno and Jihlav, that should be supported through integrated urban 
development plans. The second subgroup is characterised by only providing the number of 
cities which should receive funding. For instance, the OP Brandenburg, Germany, does this. 
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It states that, based on experiences from the URBAN II initiative, 12 to 15 cities in this region 
should be supported.  
<<< Insert Figure 1 about here >>> 
Concerning the “objective” selection methods, there are mainly three different selection 
procedures, all of a quantitative nature. The first defines thresholds for a specific indicator in 
order to determine cities eligible for funding. This is the case for the OP Andalusia, Spain, 
where cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants are considered favourable for funding. The 
second selection procedure uses development indicators to determine cities for funding. In 
the OP Nord-Pas-de-Calais, France, we find that cities with a need for funding are 
determined by selecting the three cities with the poorest performance in each of a few 
indicators, such as unemployment or fiscal income. A third selection method is characterised 
by defining certain types of cities, e.g., cities which are regional growth poles (centres in 
polycentrical agglomerations) as in the OPs of Romania.  
What we consider the most promising path to determine funding allocation is highlighted in 
Figure 1, i.e., defining cities eligible for funding through objective data-based (quantitative) 
criteria that include development indicators. While our study adopts the general idea of 
employing indicators, we systematically identify only a small number of indicators for quality 
of life comparisons of cities as a basis for policy decisions. With our approach, cities should 
be compared using a small number of meaningful measures, e.g., two indicators for the 
assessment of nonmonetary aspects of quality of life as shown in Figure 2. This figure reveals 
one possibility of comparing cities – represented by the points – based on two indicators 
which define the axes of the diagram. In this two-dimensional case, differences can be 
shown graphically and a benchmark can be set. This benchmark can then serve as the basis 
for measuring the need for urban development support by calculating the distance between 
each city and the benchmark in the two nonmonetary indicators. 
<<< Insert Figure 2 about here >>> 
However, the assessment of nonmonetary aspects always poses a difficult problem. In the 
case shown in Figure 2, the exact definition of the two considered indicators is crucial to the 
results and their interpretation. The same holds true when applying other techniques for 
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urban comparisons, such as the definition of one highly aggregated index, or the proposal of 
large indicator sets. These two extremes have their own advantages and disadvantages.  
With respect to the first technique, difficulties in interpretability arise with single indexes 
(Mayer, 2008) when they combine multiple aspects, such as environment, manufacturing or 
demography. Aggregated approaches to city comparison produce neat results and clearly 
reflect extremes in the differences. However, index values that do not clearly belong to 
either the top or the bottom of the ranked field do not allow a solid conclusion, since the 
differences in the values of medium-ranked cities are comparatively small due to 
neutralisation effects in the aggregation. Consequently, it is impossible to derive the 
principal determinants that are responsible for the differences among the compared cities. 
Currently, the main indicator used for regional allocation of European Structural Funds is not 
even aggregated; it is simply the gross domestic product (European Council, 2006b).  
The latter approach – the definition of whole indicator sets – is a tedious task and yields a 
large number of indicators trying to measure the quality of life in cities. Handling the data 
provided by these large indicator sets in a manner which maintains all information enclosed 
within, all while allowing the funding need to be objectively measured, is impossible using 
common methods. Some form of trade-off between information quality and interpretability 
is necessary. In the practice of European regional development policies, the targets for urban 
areas are defined in the ERDF OPs (see Figure 1). These documents include a broad analysis 
of regional differences, where often hundreds of indicators are considered. However, the 
final decision on funding targets for supporting neglected areas is often opaque on account 
of either information overflow or a lack of justification for the particular choice of indicators.  
Finally, as a middle course, frameworks that apply more sophisticated methods, such as 
multidimensional scaling or Principal Component Analysis (PCA), exist. These approaches 
reduce the complexity of the initial indicator sets to a smaller dimension, which is more 
tractable yet still larger than one, by defining synthetically compressed indicators. The 
benefit of these methods is that they lower the complexity in the number of indicators, 
while at the same time maintaining the intrinsic information about the relative positioning of 
the analysed cities. However, practitioners often tend to avoid such reduced approaches 
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based on advanced mathematical methods, because the interpretation of the resulting 
compressed indicators can be difficult.  
Our study aims at uncovering those original indicators from an initial large set which clearly 
describe and represent the overall differences among cities, by employing PCA without 
relying on synthetic indicators. Our paper helps to determine funding targets through an 
approach which, even though the method itself is complex, provides results which are easily 
interpretable by practitioners and thus comes without the disadvantages which might inhibit 
its practical use. Revealing clusters and uncovering disparities among countries or regions of 
one country through PCA is not new. However, this study analyses the influences of the 
initial indicators on the new composites in a broader way in order to reveal determinants of 
urban quality of life differences over a large sample of several countries, including cities and 
different time frames. With our approach, we contribute to bridging the gap between the 
existing approaches of comparing cities using only one index on the one hand and by only 
considering particular aspects of development on the other hand. In addition, our approach 
improves upon those that solely apply large sets of indicators with no specific methodology 
to reduce their complexity. 
Of course, the most desirable approach would be to have a theoretical foundation for those 
indicators which have a high explanatory power for the differences among cities. Up to now, 
however, there is no established theory for this field of research and the development of a 
theoretical model seems to be unlikely. That is why the only feasible approach at the 
moment, which is also the one we applied in this paper, is of empirical nature. Naturally, we 
check whether the resulting indicators are plausible, in the sense that they cover all aspects 
of urban life, and that they have been identified as relevant in the literature on urban 
development.   
After analysing cities, we perform a second analysis which is extended to regional and 
national comparisons of possible funding targets. Our results reveal that the current practice 
of allocating money to regions and/or countries without considering the specific funding 
focus should be called into question. 
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This paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature.  Section 3 
introduces PCA and the applied rotation technique. Section 4 presents the data and their 
selection criteria. Afterwards, the general structure of the analysis is shown in Section 5. 
Section 6 offers insights into the results of the analysis. Section 7 covers the three 
geographical units – cities, regions, and countries – involved in the allocation of funding. 
Finally, Section 8 concludes.  
2 Literature Review 
This section aims to provide an overview of existing methodologies known in the literature 
on comparing urban quality of life differences. To completely cover current research 
approaches, this review also covers the slightly more general case of urban and regional 
development discrepancies.  
First, some very specific approaches consider only limited aspects of development for the 
comparison of cities and regions, such as that of Nijkamp (1986), who only concentrates on 
infrastructural influences. Another example is the work of Callois and Aubert (2007). They 
empirically analyse the impact of social capital on regional development. A great advantage 
of such approaches is the limited number of variables included in the analyses. Hence, 
interpretation of the results is immediately possible without strong compressions. 
A second strand of literature related to this study tries to identify indexes for the 
measurement of quality of life and sustainability in general. Singh et al. (2009) give an 
overview of sustainable development indexes showing that the application of PCA for the 
definition of indexes is not unusual. Li et al. (2006) and Soler-Rovira (2009) both develop a 
synthetic index, but do not interpret the results in the context of sustainability aspects. 
Additional papers which lack an interpretation of their quality of life indexes are Slottje 
(1991) as well as Somarriba and Pena (2009). The benefit of indexing is the ability to define a 
clear ranking of items, but at the same time, in-depth interpretation is not easily possible. 
Mayer (2008) concludes that one index cannot cover the multidimensionality of 
sustainability. Parris and Kates (2003) state that the plurality nature of sustainable 
development inhibits a clear definition of one appropriate and interpretable index. Of 
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course, both issues are equally true for the measurement of quality of life, as the topics are 
strongly connected (see Mitchel et al., 1995). 
The third group of publications consists of specific studies in the context of uncovering 
regional disparities by PCA and is thus not only methodologically similar to our approach but 
also aims for an objective comparison. This is done, e.g., for Portuguese regions by Oliveira 
Soares et al. (2003), for Greek regions by Monastiriotis (2007), for Turkish regions by Özaslan 
et al. (2006), and on a higher level for European countries by Tausch et al. (2007). In terms of 
methodology, common indexing problems still arise, as proper interpretation of the new 
synthetic components is often missing. Mostly, authors fail to explain topic-related indicator 
clusters for the new components that thus seem to be set up without any specific methods.  
In the first group, which describes very specific approaches, the input for comparison is very 
limited, whereas in the other two literature categories, the output is very compressed and 
thus in-depth interpretation is problematic. This study will help to steer a middle course by 
identifying a small number of determining indicators for differences among cities. The input 
is a large indicator set and in this vein not limited, whereas the output is a smaller set of 
indicators, which are not compressed, so that interpretation is easily possible. In addition to 
the methodological contribution, our analysis covers ten countries and their cities (and 
regions), therefore not restricting the examination to one country’s cities (or regions) or the 
comparison of countries as a whole.  
3 Method 
3.1 Principal Component Analysis for Urban Comparison 
PCA transforms differences that are originally defined in a complex, multidimensional 
manner (by a large set of indicators) into a smaller number of dimensions. Hence, it neatly 
arranges the objects under comparison into a smaller dimensional space without any 
assumption on the indicators’ distributions or their patterns of causality (Morrision, 1990). 
PCA reduces the dimensions through a variance-maximising technique. It therefore 
maintains as much of the data’s original variability as possible while reducing the complexity. 
A new set of variables is generated by combining the initial indicators linearly. The initial 
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“position” of each city is defined by its n indicator values. Each individual initial data point Cil 
represents the i-th indicator value of the l-th city. The index i covers all integers ranging from 
1 to the maximum n, where n equals the total number of indicators. By applying PCA, a new 
transformed position for the city Ckl is computed as follows: 
 C̅kl  ∑   ki   Cil
n
i  . (1) 
The loadings Pki of the principal component Pk describe the linear transformation of the 
overall system for the k-th dimension. The principal components are determined stepwise 
while preserving the maximum possible information defined by the variability in the initial 
data. A useful feature of PCA is that the newly generated variables – the principal 
components – are ordered according to the amount of variance in the data which they 
describe (i.e., they are arranged according to their informational contents). By only 
considering the variables that capture the majority of the information, the number of 
variables to be further analysed can be reduced. This is easily achieved by computing less 
than n transformed indices, i.e., the index k stops at a reduced number of variables (denoted 
as r in the further discussion). Hence, the following inequality holds true for the reduced 
system: 
r  max  k    with r   n  (2) 
 
As an illustrative example of this approach, a comparison of cities by the two standardised 
indicators “highly educated proportion (female)” and “highly educated proportion” is 
exhibited in Figure 3. The original data points of the cities (shown as asterisks) lie 
approximately on the dashed line, representing the angle bisector. In this example, PCA 
determines a new single variable, which is represented by the angle bisector – that 
expresses almost all the differences between cities in their relative positioning. The new 
data points for the compressed variable all lie on the angle bisector (shown as dots in Figure 
3). In this case, 99 % of the original overall variance, originally represented by two indicators, 
is now captured by a single new variable. Comparing Cologne and Bielefeld, the plot reveals 
that the distance of the original data points is approximately the same as the distance of the 
new points corresponding to these cities, as shown by the two bold lines of nearly the same 
length. In this special case, the new score for each city is calculated by the equally weighted 
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sum of the two initial indicators. It is not necessary to separately analyse the two indicators 
for the relative comparison of the cities here, because PCA condenses this information in a 
new single value with hardly any loss of information.  
<<< Insert Figure 3 about here>>> 
Normally, if considering more indicators, one new variable is insufficient to retain enough of 
the overall variance of the data set. Then, additional new variables are determined in the 
same way as described above, with the condition of being orthogonal – thus uncorrelated – 
to the previous ones. This results in a set of new variables – principal components – that 
explains the differences between the cities with less dimensions. The number of principal 
components necessary to reproduce the differences of the cities depends on the desired 
accuracy. There are several criteria for the definition of thresholds to determine the new 
number of axes. 
Finally, the influences of the original indicators – known as “factor loadings” – can be 
reconstructed to allow for analyses of the final positioning of cities and interpretation of the 
obtained principal components (Marques de Sá, 2007). As the factor loadings are often 
widely spread among the principal components, rotation methods help to overcome the 
resulting interpretation difficulties. 
3.2 Rotation of the Principal Components for the Identification of Determining In-
dicators 
The aim of rotation techniques for principal components is to find new axes that maintain 
the mathematical fit of the method while providing better interpretation opportunities. Each 
rotated principal component should have high factor loadings of some initial indicators, 
while the loadings of the other indicators should be small. In other words, rotation yields a 
new set of variables such that each new variable summarises the impact of a different set of 
underlying indicators.  
Figure 4 shows the influences of a set of five initial indicators on two principal components 
(namely, the compressed indicators 1 and 2) before (left plot) and after (right plot) rotation. 
The right plot almost perfectly aligns the new axes with the two bold initial indicators, while 
the other initial indicators are apparently less important for the differences among the 
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compared cities. Accordingly, the factor loadings of the rotated principal components 
indicate the explanatory power of the urban audit indicators for the differences among 
cities. This means that the positioning of the cities can be explained for each new dimension 
by only a few initial indicators. In the special case demonstrated in Figure 4, only one 
indicator explains each new dimension.  
<<< Insert Figure 4 about here >>> 
The rotation method employed in this paper is known as “varimax rotation”. It maintains the 
orthogonality of the axes while maximising the sum of the variance of the squared loadings 
for each component (Mulaik, 1972). This procedure is suitable for our application, because 
the principal components are almost uncorrelated, and thus orthogonal. To name one 
example, the average correlation between the principal components of each partial analysis, 
as implemented in Section 6.2, is only 0.09 with an even lower median of 0.07. In addition, 
the varimax rotation simplifies the interpretation of the resulting rotated principal 
components in the best way in comparison to all existing orthogonal rotations (see Brosius, 
2011). And such interpretation possibilities are exactly our aim.  
4 Data 
4.1 General Data Structure and Categorisation 
The data basis for this research is the Urban Audit Key Indicator Set for core cities, which is 
available as part of the Eurostat database. A city is defined to represent the respective 
administrative unit. Generally, Urban Audit is a database of indicators which measure the 
quality of life in cities of the European Union, of candidate countries, or of neighbouring 
countries. With this data set, the DG Regio and Eurostat intended to create a quantitative 
basis for comparisons necessary for policy measures on the urban level, which aligns exactly 
with our approach. The criteria for including a city in Urban Audit were, e.g., a 20 % 
proportion of inhabitants living in Urban Audit cities as well as geographic and size 
distributions (European Commission, 2009). The data set for the analyses of this paper 
(downloaded on February 7th 2012) contains 30 countries – the EU 27 together with Turkey, 
Switzerland, and Norway – with 372 urban units (counting some metropolitan areas twice: 
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the city itself and the broader urban area). Table 1 shows the number of cities (# Units) 
participating in the Urban Audit for each country. 
<<< Insert Table 1 about here >>> 
The data for each urban unit is available for different time frames. One time frame therefore 
defines only one data point. The specific calculation of each data point in the Urban Audit 
database depends on the original data availability (European Commission, 2009). The 
considered time frames are: 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2002, 2003-2006, and 2007-2009. 
For more details on country-specific differences in data acquisition and variations of 
reference years, see European Commission (2007b) and for general clarification of concepts, 
see European Commission (2004). 
The key indicators cover several aspects related to the quality of urban life. For our analyses, 
the indicators are newly categorised to maintain a more general and broader structure. 
Table 2 shows all indicators arranged by their categories. 
<<< Insert Table 2 about here >>> 
The demographic category covers indicators such as population size, changes, and 
distribution. The other four categories represent Ekins and Medhurst’s (2006) concept of 
“capital”. Environmental (or natural) capital covers all natural aspects linked in a narrow or 
broader sense to human welfare, whereas manufactured capital describes produced assets 
which help the production of goods and services. The last two categories are human and 
social capital. They refer to well-being on an individual or societal level, respectively. Table 2 
already reveals that the indicators are not equally distributed among these categories. 
Above all, manufactured and social capital are represented to very different extents. This 
imbalance is not only a concern for the general category structure applied in this study, but 
also for Eurostat’s own more detailed and differently arranged categorisation. It divides the 
indicators into demography, social aspects, economy, civic involvement, training and 
education, environment, travel and transport, information society, as well as culture and 
recreation.  
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4.2 Data Selection and Final Data Availability for the Study 
Unfortunately, there are high variations with respect to data availability across different 
cities and time frames. Therefore, we have to reduce the cities and time frames under 
consideration in order to avoid gaps in the data. We do so in such a way that the remaining 
numbers of cities and time frames are as large as possible for the ten countries with the 
highest number of Urban Audit cities. Table 3 presents the resulting data set. 
<<< Insert Table 3 about here >>> 
Furthermore, a minimum-maximum standardisation technique is used to scale each 
indicator as a second step, as we want to ensure that the different indicators have identical 
numerical ranges, i.e., between zero and one. For each indicator, the original data points xi – 
with i   ,…,m, where m represents the number of cities from one country – are transformed 
into  
yi  
xi min x 
max x  min x 
 , with i, j =  , …,m. (3) 
Before going into details on the analysis, we want to elaborate on some practical issues 
arising from data availability. Funding through the ERDF, which was our starting point, is, per 
definition, allocated to larger geographical units than cities. That is why funding of urban 
areas is mainly decided on a regional level for practical purposes. However, it is very likely 
that data on urban issues is not comparable across several European regions and that data 
gaps would therefore be even more prevalent. We thus use Urban Audit data on the city 
level, because it is normalised by Eurostat and its availability is high enough to conduct 
broad analyses. This approach constitutes an acceptable compromise when combined with 
the more limited regional and national studies which will be discussed in Section 7. 
Moreover, Section 7 will even show the necessity for considerations on the urban level. 
5 Analysis 
The aim of this study is to identify a small number of indicators which have a high 
explanatory power of the overall differences between the Urban Audit cities of each of the 
analysed countries and time frames. Therefore, three decision steps are necessary in each 
partial analysis: first, the definition of accuracy limits, second, the choice of a country, and 
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third, the selection of a time frame. Our study covers six combinations of accuracy limits for 
the method, ten countries, and five time frames, which lead (after elimination of some data 
sets due to low availability) to 244 partial analyses. The first accuracy-related parameter that 
we vary is the minimum variance of the original data set that must be explained by the 
selected principal components.  Three different thresholds were evaluated: 70 %, 80 %, and 
90 %. This means that at least 70 %, 80 %, or 90 % of the overall variation in the data had to 
be explained by inclusion of all principal components with explanatory power of at least 
10 % of the overall variation. All these limits are above the 60 % limit which is normally 
considered to be satisfactory in the context of PCA (see Oliveira Soares et al., 2003). After 
this procedure, only those r principal components remain for further calculations that 
exhibit the highest explanatory power. The second parameter that is varied is a threshold 
which determines the minimum loading of an indicator required for its inclusion in further 
processing. The loadings  ki, with i = 1, …, n and k    , …,r, after rotation (where n is the 
number of initial indicators and r is the number of components as defined in equation 2) 
should have at least a value of 0.3 or 0.4, respectively. This means that only indicators i with 
coefficients  ki that are not smaller than 0.3 or 0.4 for at least one k in the relationship 
revealed in equation (1) are further considered. Loadings Pki that are greater than or equal to 
the limit of 0.3 or 0.4 fulfil the condition of being significant in explaining differences among 
cities for sample sizes of our study (Kline, 1993). In such a case, the indicator i is selected. 
The combination of these two thresholds with the three previously discussed thresholds for 
the minimum variance results in a total of six accuracy-related parameter combinations.  
Each partial analysis selects a set of indicators with a sufficiently high explanatory power 
regarding the differences between the cities under consideration. Afterwards, for each 
indicator, the percentage of situations (characterised by a certain accuracy limit, a certain 
country, and a certain time frame) in which the respective indicator has been chosen, is 
calculated. The top 20 % of the most frequently chosen indicators are then selected as 
determinants for urban differences, as a result of the overall analysis. Thereby, we define a 
limit which leads to the identification of a small set of nine indicators, thus steering a middle 
course between accuracy and manageability. In addition, it represents the maximum 
number suitable for further applications like efficiency measurement of funding for typical 
sample sizes when comparing cities of a single country. 
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Moreover, we conduct robustness and adaptability checks by investigating the results for 
countries and time frames separately in a partial analysis. This allows us to test for country- 
and time-specific variations. 
6 Results 
6.1 Overall Analysis for all Time Frames and Cities of all Countries 
This part of the study presents the overall explanatory power of indicators for urban quality 
of life differences measured by Urban Audit data for cities in ten countries and for five time 
frames. Table 4 shows our results. 
<<< Insert Table 4 about here >>> 
The first two columns describe the capital categories and the indicators. The subsequent 
columns contain the results (as the number of times an indicator was selected relative to its 
availability) of the calculations for all cities and time frames for the six different accuracy 
limits, i.e., 70% variance explained and 0.3 loadings after rotation, 70 % and 0.4, 80 % and 
0.3, 80 % and 0.4, 90 % and 0.3, as well as 90 % and 0.4. Thus, the results for all 
combinations of accuracy parameters as defined above are given. Finally, the last column 
shows the overall proportion of the indicator selection to its availability as the mean over 
the different accuracy levels. The values of the upper quintile are highlighted with dark 
backgrounds in each column. Even though the upper quintile usually consists of nine values, 
there might be more cells highlighted if multiple identical values lie on the lower quintile 
boundary. Our analysis reveals a good general alignment of the results for the different 
accuracy parameters, with only some outliers. However, outliers mainly occur for the lower 
boundary of 0.3 for the principal component loadings. This can be explained by the fact that 
with these boundaries, compared to the case of 0.4 (with the same other accuracy limits), 
more indicators are selected. Hence, the variance of the corresponding proportions given in 
Table 4 is lower, so that small differences in the number of selections are already able to 
affect which indicators are among the upper quintile. Hence, the 0.4 boundary better 
reflects the overall results in general, and will therefore be used as the basis for the 
robustness checks with respect to country and time frame variations presented in Section 
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6.2. Considering all boundaries for the whole sample leads to the following nine indicators in 
decreasing order of importance:  
─ number of public transport stops per km2,  
─ proportion of solid waste arising within the boundary processed by landfill,  
─ number of days where ozone concentration exceeds 120 µg/m³ in Urban Audit cities 
as days per year,  
─ nationals born abroad as a proportion of total population,  
─ total population change over one year,  
─ female proportion of working age population qualified at level 5 or 6 ISCED,  
─ total annual population change over approximately five years,  
─ number of domestic burglaries per 1,000 inhabitants, 
─ car thefts in Urban Audit cities as number per 1,000 inhabitants.  
These indicators cover the fields of manufactured capital with public transport 
infrastructure, environmental capital with waste management and air quality, social capital 
with migration, safety and security, human capital with female education, as well as 
demographic aspects with population changes (for the description of all indicators, see 
European Commission,  2007a). Hence, the nine selected indicators are more or less equally 
spread among all aspects of urban quality of life, as covered by the initial set of 46 
indicators. Thus, it is not necessary to compare cities by all initial indicators; instead, the set 
of nine is a sufficient representative selection.  
A closer examination of possible reasons for the exclusion of some indicators offers 
interesting insights. There are two main factors which could explain this phenomenon. The 
first one is that indicators are similar among cities. As data is standardised, we are able to 
control for this reason by considering the difference between mean and median values for 
the respective indicator. If these two values are close, cities differ from each other, but the 
differences are equally spread among them. The explanatory power of such an equally 
spread indicator is not as high as it is when the mean and median value do not coincide at 
all. Such an indicator separates some cities from some others – it separates the good ones 
from the bad ones in terms of quality of life development. The second reason lies in one 
indicator’s similarity to one of the selected indicators, because it is not necessary to look at 
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both anymore, since one captures the information contained in both of them. Now, 
comparing data with respect to those two aspects, we see that there is a tendency of 
unselected indicators to either have a low difference between the mean and median value 
or to have a high correlation with one of the selected indicators. By showing the irrelevance 
of some indicators for urban comparisons, studies like ours might question some political 
focuses. For example, employment and poverty indicators seem to be missing in our 
selection, although they are widely cited in political debates. Our study reveals that each 
problem in these fields is either significant to quite a similar extent in all cities of a given 
country or that the indicators measuring the respective fields can be represented by one of 
the selected set. 
Moreover, the nine selected indicators are also in line with the topics of the current and 
recurrent political debate on environmental and infrastructural problems arising from 
urbanisation, migration difficulties in cities, safety, and especially security impairment due to 
anonymity and poverty in densely populated areas, as well as population changes leading to 
space shortage in large cities, but also abandonment in smaller cities and rural regions. In 
addition, gender equality causes heated political discussions, and is also represented as part 
of the selected indicators. Hence, the nine chosen indicators do not only satisfy analytical 
criteria, but also fit to the practical perception as well. However, an in-depth interpretation 
with a theoretical justification of the resulting smaller set is impossible. As urban and 
regional development is very complex in structure, there is no established theoretical 
foundation. This can also be seen indirectly by the high number of existing indicator sets, 
which consist of different indicators. Thus, the only way to justify our selection is to make 
them plausible as being important in the context of urban development with the help of 
other empirical research and perceptions. For the first indicator, there is empirical evidence 
that infrastructure has a positive influence on growth and income (see, e.g., Calderón and 
Servén, 2004). Moreover, the contribution of solid waste management to sustainable urban 
development has been mainly studied for developing countries revealing significant 
influences on the quality of life (see Baud et al., 2001). Analyses of the impact of educational 
gender inequality on economic growth also focuses on developing countries (Klasen, 2000). 
It is reasonable to assume that these two effects on urban wealth in Europe are less strong, 
but still prevalent. Greenhouse gases are also perceived as a relevant topic for urban 
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development (see, e.g., Dodman, 2009). Reasons for population changes in European cities 
can be derived from quality of life differences as shown by Cheshire and Magrini (2006). 
Finally, del Frate and van Kesteren (2004) state that with increased urban life quality, crime 
in cities decreases, thus approving the importance of urban security indicators. Furthermore, 
some aspects covered by the nine indicators also seem to have priorities for practitioners as 
well, because current EIB JESSICA agreements focus on, e.g., urban infrastructure and waste 
management. 
6.2 Partial Analysis 
We check the robustness of the obtained results by examining the variations of selected 
indicators among the results for different time frames and countries. This is one feasible way 
to check for robustness when variations in data availability occur, as in our case. Comparing 
only those time frames and countries where at least all nine selected indicators are available 
would reduce the sample size to zero. Hence, in the following, we compare the results for 
partial analyses with time frame on the one hand and country variation on the other hand. 
Another kind of robustness check will follow in Section 7, where different geographical levels 
are analysed.  
6.2.1 Time Frame Variation 
We first analyse the time dependence of the indicator selection based on the rotated PCA. 
Table 5 shows the results obtained with the 70 % and 0.4 boundaries. The first column 
presents the indicators in the same order as in Table 4 (with the selected indicators in the 
first nine rows), and the following columns describe the proportion of selected indicators 
with respect to data availability for the different time frames. The highlighted cells represent 
the values in the upper quintile of the respective column, and fonts in italics show absent 
data.    
<<< Insert Table 5 about here >>> 
The analysis immediately reveals data availability problems for the first two time frames. In 
the first nine rows, the bundled absence of data is striking and reinforces the overall 
assumption that these indicators would also have been selected if data had been available. 
This finding is underpinned by the fact that for the other periods, there are only two cases in 
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the first nine rows where data is available but not selected. The two cases correspond to the 
indicators “proportion of solid waste arising within the boundary processed by landfill” for 
the time frame 1999-2002 and “female proportion of working age population qualified at 
level 5 or 6 ISCED” for the period between 2007-2009. In every other case without selection, 
the data simply was not available. Hence, improved data availability is an unconditional 
requirement for the continued use of Eurostat data for policy decisions. 
Besides the aforementioned problems, the results show a number of consistencies. This 
means that indicators are selected for two subsequent time frames or only with a disruption 
of one period. Hence, there are 12 consistencies of the first type and, in addition, five 
indicators are selected again after being excluded for one period. Seven of the 17 mentioned 
consistencies are represented by the selected nine indicators in the first rows. This fact 
indicates robustness of our results, when we compare it to the large overall time frame of 20 
years, where development naturally influences quality of life determinants over time. 
Therefore, an application to policy decisions needs to account for the possibility of changes 
in relevance and for adopting time specific structures. 
If structural changes over time and not the current relative position of a city in terms of its 
development is the basis for a funding decision, the problem of time variation becomes 
crucial for the identification of indicators. In such a scenario, funding allocation would be 
measured by comparing the development of cities between two subsequent time frames 
(which correspond to two single data points). To address the problem of changing indicators 
over time, one straightforward approach could be to take the first year’s selected indicators 
as the basis and analyse their development without considering all time frames, as we did 
before. Then, the second reference point with its selected indicators builds the new basis for 
the measurement for the next two time frames. Thereby, the measurement basis (the 
indicators) could change. If the selected indicators for the two mentioned time frames 
change to a great extent, this could cause problems with long-term incentives enforced by 
policies on the European level. To prevent such circumstances, the indicator set should 
always be smoothened by defining the most important indicators over a number of former 
time frames plus a new one (in the way we did before, by selecting the indicators which are 
most often selected for all time frames). As a consequence, the smaller set of selected 
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indicators is adapted in a modest way to natural development changes, so that incentives 
are in line with these developments.  
6.2.2 Country Variation 
A distribution analysis among the ten countries constitutes the second robustness test. The 
structure, the used accuracy boundaries, and the presentation of the results are the same as 
in the previous section, with the columns of Table 6 referring to the countries instead of 
time frames.  
<<< Insert Table 6 about here >>> 
Table 6 indicates that there are some countries with quite a high number of identical 
indicator selections among the upper quintile. The group of Spain, Turkey, and the UK each 
have six selected indicators in common. Another group consists of Poland, France, and Spain 
with five consistencies. Furthermore, Spain has five selections in common with Italy, and the 
UK with Romania. In addition, there are 14 further consistencies of four selected indicators. 
A cluster analysis with correlations as the distance metric and the unweighted average 
algorithm for the determination of distances between clusters helps to objectively define 
groups of countries with similar indicators chosen among all values. Allowing for five 
clusters, the results are: a first group of the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Turkey, UK and a 
second group of France and Poland, and the other three countries – CR, Germany, Italy – 
each define a group by themselves. Hence, these objectively computed clusters correspond 
more or less to those obtained at first sight with regard to only the upper quintile of 
indicators. The results suggest that there might be a need for country- or cluster-specific 
indicator sets.  
The table indicates a high absence of data for the nine generally selected indicators, 
represented by the first rows, for some countries. This underpins the need for reliable data 
as mentioned above. This analysis again suggests that the first indicators would likely be 
selected for those countries’ cities as well, because there are comparably few cases where 
data is available and the indicators are not chosen. Nevertheless, due to these data 
availability problems, we cannot guarantee robustness in every detail. In addition, it might 
not be suitable to simply have one indicator set to compare cities across all countries, but to 
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have a specific indicator set for each country or clusters of certain countries, as indicated by 
the cluster analysis. However, one may take a look at the development of cities regarding 
the above-listed nine key indicators for, e.g., different countries, and base quantitative 
funding decisions or efficiency analysis on this indicator set, while keeping the possible 
drawbacks in mind. 
7 Determining Indicators for Different Geographical Levels of Comparison 
Another issue mentioned before is the fact that regardless of the funding aims, money is 
allocated on a regional level and not directly to, e.g., cities, even if a policy initiative is 
intended to strengthen urban development. Hence, the development of the region as a 
whole is decisive for the amount of the resulting funding. Nevertheless, if funding has a 
specific aim, then the development of the respective field of interest and/or geographical 
unit should not only be the reference value used to intra-regionally reallocate the funds, but 
also to allocate public funds to the region itself. In other words, if urban development should 
be supported, then the respective urban areas should be considered by urban indicators and 
not the regional development in general. However, the latter mechanism does not 
necessarily lead to the wrong funding decisions as long as the urban and regional 
development is similar in terms of the underlying indicators. Otherwise, the wrong targets 
can be elicited. This raises the question whether comparisons of cities and comparisons of 
regions can rely on the same set of indicators or whether the relevant indicators differ from 
one level to another. In the following, we will determine the most important indicators from 
a larger set for different levels of consideration (urban, regional, and national). This will 
reveal if the comparison of cities can be made with the help of the same indicators as cross-
country or cross-region comparisons in terms of urban development support.      
7.1 Reduced Initial Indicator Sets 
7.1.1 Data Availability for all Levels 
The basis for the analyses is the same indicator set as before when we analysed a set of size 
46 for the urban level. Region-level and country-level data is not provided for the set of 
Urban Audit Indicators in a compressed way as it is for cities. Hence, we collected it from 
several datasheets of the Eurostat database and partly filled the missing values from other 
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indicators (e.g., for population change over five years). We again use the same set of 
countries as before for national and regional comparisons except for Turkey where national 
data is not sufficiently available. The time frames begin in 1994 and end in 2010 in order to 
match with those used by Urban Audit. Nevertheless, not all of the Urban Audit indicators 
could be collected for regions and countries. To ensure comparability in the following 
analyses, a reduced set of initial indicators is the basis for the comparison among different 
levels. From the 46 initial indicators, only 21 are available for all three levels. For the regional 
level, the lowest number of indicators (21) was available, while for countries, a medium 
number (36) could be acquired. Table 7 shows the resulting set of 21 indicators in the second 
column. The first column describes the respective category as defined before.  
<<< Insert Table 7 about here >>> 
Comparing this set to the larger one listed in Table 2, it strikes that especially the indicators 
from the social capital category are not collected for all levels, i.e., only three of the 22 social 
indicators are left in the set, which is now available for the comparison of all three levels. On 
the contrary, all other categories are still represented by at least 70 % remaining indicators 
(demographic: 80 %, environmental: 75 %, human: 70 %, and manufactured: 100 %). These 
facts strongly change the weighting of the set, which is used as input for the PCA. Hence, 
before we start analysing the differences among the three levels, we first have to check 
whether the method is robust to these changes in the input set.   
7.1.2 Robustness for Changes in the Initial Set 
So far, we ignored the potential impact of variations of the initial indicator set (see Section 
6.2). For the sake of completeness and to evaluate the restriction of having only 21 
indicators as input for the PCA for comparisons across different geographical levels, we will 
now add such an analysis for cities and countries. For cities we compare the results from the 
PCA with rotation with an input set of size 46 on the one hand and 21 on the other hand. For 
countries, the two input sets consist of either 36 or 21 indicators. For regions, we refrain 
from lowering the size of the set as we only have 21 indicators available to begin with. 
First, we conduct the same analyses as before for cities (with the same accuracy thresholds 
as in Section 5), but with the 21 indicators from Table 7 as inputs. To be able to compare the 
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results with those achieved with an input set of size 46, we delete the other 25 from the 
results of the PCA with rotation (for all accuracy thresholds), and integrate them together 
with the results for the computation with only 21 indicators in one table (see Table 8). We 
define two categories of importance: If the indicators are among the first third of the 21 
remaining ones (for both input sets), they are marked with an “X” and highlighted in dark 
colour, representing their relevance in describing differences among the compared cities. If 
they are among the other two thirds, they remain without shading and “X”, demonstrating 
their insignificance. A further distinction by their specific position in the listings is not 
intended: The indicators are only listed by those two categories in Table 8, but the order 
within the categories is not maintained for the sake of clarity of the overall comparison. We 
set the highest third as barrier as a compromise between the quintile and the absolute 
number of nine which defined the selection criteria for cities before and seemed to be 
manageable for practical applications. 
<<< Insert Table 8 about here >>> 
This representation demonstrates that our method is partly dependent on the size of the 
initial indicator set. However, the majority of the most meaningful (darkly highlighted) 
indicators are the same if we only include the first third of the remaining 21 indicators. The 
five indicators of the first rows remain important independent of the range of the initial set. 
The variation only covers two indicators for each input set and the exchanged indicators are 
very similar in their meaning. The former is also true for the cross-country comparison with 
either 21 or all 36 available indicators. Table 9 shows the respective results. Again, five of the 
selected indicators remain the same and no more than two differ for each initial set.  
<<< Insert Table 9 about here >>> 
Most interestingly, the dependence of education indicators on the input set is present and 
has the same extent for both levels – cities and regions – if one compares the markings in 
Table 8 and Table 9. We thus see that it is important to be aware of the fact that indicator 
selections are dependent on the initial input set, because it can slightly change the results if 
funding decisions are based on the value of some particular indicators. This deviation in 
selection of indicators is a disadvantage if we isolate a smaller set of indicators as 
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representative and is explainable through the limits we set to determine the selection of an 
indicator in our specific method. If we take another set as basis, the proportion of one 
coefficient can fall below the limits for some evaluations of the differences among the cities 
or countries, respectively. Thus, the overall selection can slightly change for different 
underlying indicator sets and this will always be an issue for any similar method. Defining 
other thresholds for the selection would not help to overcome this intrinsic drawback. 
However, we showed that the results remain largely identical, which demonstrates the 
general validity of the method. Hence, for potential applications of our selection method, 
the advantages and drawbacks of such a simplification should be carefully weighted 
depending on the underlying situation. 
7.2 Selected Indicators for the Urban, Regional and National Level 
As a result of the former analysis, we utilise the same set for our computations in order to 
exclude method-based changes and get reliable results. Thus, we work with the set of 21 
indicators listed in Table 7 for the comparison of important indicators for cities, regions, and 
countries individually. Then, we perform a PCA with rotation for each level (with the other 
parameters chosen as described in Section 5). Table 10 shows the resulting selections for all 
levels. Dark markings reveal important indicators for the respective comparisons. 
<<< Insert Table 10 about here >>> 
In contrast to Table 8 and Table 9, the darkly highlighted cells now differ to a much greater 
extent. Only one of the seven most relevant indicators (from the initial set of size 21) for 
cities, namely “Total population”, is also selected for all levels. An additional indicator for 
cities is also selected for regions – “ roportion of working age population at level   or 2 
ISCED female” – while another indicator is selected for both cities and countries – Number of 
stops of public transport per km². Furthermore, only three indicators are selected for their 
suitability to compare both regions and countries: “Total population”, “Total population at 
working age” and “Tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation as number of nights 
per year”. As the input set for all three levels is the same, the resulting deviations cannot be 
explained by the limits of selection within the method. This time, the changes must come 
from the differences in the variations among the indicators for the levels under 
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consideration (urban, regional or national). Those differences seem plausible if we consider 
them in more detail.  
“Total population change over one year” is highly diverging among cities. However, for 
regions and countries the relative differences in population change are less relevant. The 
fact that people often move, but still keep their workplace, strengthens the assumption that 
they stay within their region (and country) and just relocate their personal residence to a city 
or county nearby. In addition, the higher the aggregation level, the higher is the probability 
of having compensatory effects from those people that are moving in and those that are 
leaving a geographical unit. Such compensations are also realistic for, e.g., unemployment 
rates. The unemployment rate for cities is more diverse than it is for regions and countries. It 
is unrealistic that all areas in one region or country suffer from the same high 
unemployment. However, locally concentrated spots (individual cities) with employment 
issues are typical. Other data published by, e g , the German “Bundesagentur für Arbeit” 
support this thesis; the spread of averaged unemployment rates among regions in 2012 is 
8.6 percentage points, whereas the spread among cities/counties is 14.4 percentage points 
and thus much higher. This demonstrates the higher heterogeneity on lower geographical 
levels due to the absence of neutralisation effects.  
In contrast, “Total population at working age” differs more for regions and countries than it 
does for cities. As cities are often more attractive for young professionals in general (see 
Peri, 2001), and too expensive for families, the latter leave within their working life and 
typically do not move back as pensioners due to emotional or financial commitment. This 
effect of having families and pensioners living in rural areas is probably the reason for a high 
homogeneity of working age population in cities on the one hand and a high heterogeneity 
in regions and countries on the other hand  The indicator “ opulation in part-time 
employment” is just important for the comparison of countries and not for the lower levels. 
This might be due to cultural differences in combining work and family as well as traditional 
ways of life in the respective environment. As culture is the same or at least very similar for 
regions and cities of one country, because it is a strong commitment device for staying 
within one country according to Cheshire and Magrini (2006), the differences are only 
relevant for the comparison at the highest geographical level. 
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To conclude, we saw that meaningful indicators to describe the relative situation among 
possible funding targets of a specific geographical unit are not the same for the three levels 
under consideration. Therefore, the selection of indicators for, e.g., funding allocation 
should be carefully analysed with respect to the intended aim and especially the 
geographical scope, because it is not advisable to apply the same indicators for all purposes 
and levels. Hence, the allocation of urban development funding should be based on urban 
indicators evaluated for cities. 
8 Conclusion 
This study used PCA with a subsequent rotation technique to identify a small number of 
indicators that adequately represent urban quality of life differences among a country’s 
cities. Furthermore, we provided several robustness checks and derived application 
conditions as well as data requirements. Moreover, we compared the selection of urban 
development indicators with this method for three geographical units – cities, regions, and 
countries. 
The overall analysis points out that a small indicator set of nine items determines the 
differences among one country’s cities for several accuracy thresholds, countries, and time 
frames. This smaller set of indicators helps to steer a middle course between the findings in 
the literature by combining several aspects of urban life and refraining from only considering 
one compressed indicator without interpretation opportunities. The results are plausible in 
the context of current political debate, as the set covers nearly all policy aspects of urban 
life. Additionally, in the context of methodology, the selections do not vary much when the 
thresholds are changed. However, the general application of a smaller indicator set needs to 
be controlled over time and space. It might be advisable to consider cluster-specific indicator 
sets, depending on data and the decision problem at hand. These could be obtained for the 
concerned countries by using PCA with subsequent rotation, as implemented in this study. In 
addition, politicians should be aware of the dependence of relative indicator values on the 
underlying geographical level. Thus, the input sets for comparisons and the geographical unit 
measured need to be carefully adjusted to the respective policy aim. 
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The general motivation of this paper was covered in the overall analysis. The more detailed 
parts of the study revealed problems arising from data availability that weaken its 
robustness and from geographical dependencies. However, the results are plausible from a 
methodological and practical point of view, and applying this method to wider data sets with 
longer time periods and more units seems promising. This analysis may lead to important 
insights, which could impact policy measures on urban development with its processes for 
funding allocation as well as similar fields. 
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Figure 1: Funding target determination in the ERDF Operational Programmes of the programming period 2007-2013. 
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Figure 2:  City comparison for funding target determination. 
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Figure 3: PCA with two education indicators. 
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Figure 4: Influence of the initial indicators on the compressed indicators before (left) and after (right) rotation. 
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Table 1: Number of Urban Audit cities (Units) for each available country. 
Country # Units Country # Units Country # Units 
Germany 40 Portugal 10 Austria 5 
France 36 Switzerland 10 Denmark 5 
Italy 32 Greece 9 Finland 5 
United Kingdom 31 Hungary 9 Lithuania 3 
Poland 28 Sweden 9 Estonia 2 
Spain 26 Bulgaria 8 Latvia 2 
Turkey 26 Slovakia 8 Malta 2 
Netherlands 15 Belgium 7 Slovenia 2 
Czech Republic 14 Ireland 6 Cyprus 1 
Romania 14 Norway 6 Luxembourg 1 
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Table 2: Urban Audit Key Indicators arranged by general categories. 
Category Indicators 
Demographic Population density in Urban Audit cities    
Demographic Total annual population change over approximately 5 years 
Demographic Total population change over 1 year 
Demographic Total Population at working age 
Demographic Total population in Urban Audit cities 
Environmental Registered cars in Urban Audit cities as number of cars per 1,000 inhabitants 
Environmental Share of journeys to work by car in Urban Audit cities as % 
Environmental Total land area (km
2
) according to cadastral register 
Environmental Proportion of solid waste arising within the boundary processed by landfill 
Environmental Collected solid waste in Urban Audit cities as tonnes per inhabitant and year 
Environmental Consumption of water (as cubic metres per annum) per inhabitant 
Environmental Number of days particulate matter concentrations exceeds 50 µg/m³ in Urban Audit cities as days per year 
Environmental Number of days ozone concentration exceeds 120 µg/m³ in Urban Audit cities  as days per year 
Human Number of deaths in road accidents per 10,000 population 
Human Proportion of working age population qualified at level 5 or 6 ISCED – female 
Human Proportion of population aged 15-64 qualified at tertiary level (ISCED 5-6) living in Urban Audit cities as % 
Human Proportion of working age population at level 1 or 2 ISCED – female 
Human Proportion of working age population qualified at level 1 or 2 ISCED 
Human Proportion of female students in higher education (ISCED level 5-6) 
Human Proportion in part-time employment 
Human Employment/Population (of working age) ratio 
Human Self-employment rate 
Human Unemployment rate in Urban Audit cities as % 
Manufactured Number of stops of public transport per km
2
 
Social Cost of a monthly ticket for public transport (for 5-10 km) 
Social Average time of journey to work 
Social Children 0-2 in day care (public and private) per 1,000 children 
Social Number of domestic burglary per 1,000 population 
Social Car thefts in Urban Audit cities as number per 1,000 inhabitants 
Social Available hospital beds in Urban Audit cities per 1,000 inhabitants 
Social Average living area in Urban Audit cities as m² per person 
Social Proportion of households living in owned dwellings in Urban Audit cities as % 
Social Price of a m
3
 of domestic water 
Social Percentage of households receiving less than half of the national average household income 
Social Proportion of households with children aged 0-17 in Urban Audit cities as % 
Social Average household size in Urban Audit cities as number of persons per household 
Social Proportion of one-person households in Urban Audit cities as % 
Social Nationals born abroad as a proportion of total population 
Social Non-EU nationals as a proportion of total population 
Social EU nationals as a proportion of total population 
Social Nationals as a proportion of total population 
Social Number of tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation per year per resident population 
Social Tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation in Urban Audit cities as number of nights per year 
Social Annual visitors to museums per resident 
Social Cinema seats in Urban Audit cities as seats per 1,000 inhabitants 
Social Percentage of elected city representatives who are men 
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Table 3: Remaining data after selection by number of cities (Units) and indicators (the abbreviation CR stands for the 
Czech Republic and UK for United Kingdom). 
Country Time frame # Units # Indicators Country Time frame # Units # Indicators
CR 1989-1993 5 19 Netherlands 2007-2009 15 14
CR 1994-1998 5 18 Poland 1989-1993 23 10
CR 1999-2002 5 31 Poland 1994-1998 23 10
CR 2003-2006 4 20 Poland 1999-2002 22 37
CR 2007-2009 14 17 Poland 2003-2006 27 21
France 1989-1993 35 11 Poland 2007-2009 28 24
France 1999-2002 28 24 Romania 1989-1993 14 13
France 2003-2006 34 28 Romania 1994-1998 14 5
Germany 1989-1993 30 15 Romania 1999-2002 13 23
Germany 1994-1998 31 23 Romania 2003-2006 14 14
Germany 1999-2002 38 26 Romania 2007-2009 14 11
Germany 2003-2006 40 34 Spain 1989-1993 16 11
Germany 2007-2009 39 32 Spain 1994-1998 17 13
Ita ly 1989-1993 27 17 Spain 1999-2002 14 23
Ita ly 1994-1998 27 11 Spain 2003-2006 25 28
Ita ly 1999-2002 27 32 Spain 2007-2009 25 28
Ita ly 2003-2006 32 20 Turkey 1999-2002 26 12
Ita ly 2007-2009 32 19 Turkey 2003-2006 22 6
Netherlands 1994-1998 10 5 UK 1999-2002 25 11
Netherlands 1999-2002 10 25 UK 2003-2006 31 10
Netherlands 2003-2006 15 30 UK 2007-2009 31 9
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Table 4: Results of the overall analysis: explanatory power of the initial indicators on urban quality of life differences. 
Results
Category Indicators 70 %, 0.3 70 %, 0.4 80 %, 0.3 80 %, 0.4 90 %, 0.3 90 %, 0.4
Manufactured Number of stops of public transport per km² 0,67 0,67 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,89
Environmental Proportion of solid waste arising within the boundary processed by landfil l 0,75 0,38 1,00 0,75 1,00 1,00 0,81
Environmental Number of days ozone concentration exceeds 120 µg/m³ in Urban Audit cities  as days per year 0,83 0,67 0,83 0,83 0,83 0,83 0,81
Social Nationals born abroad as a proportion of total population 0,81 0,63 0,93 0,57 1,00 0,71 0,78
Demographic Total population change over 1 year 0,78 0,47 0,93 0,67 0,93 0,77 0,76
Human  roportion of working age population qualified at level 5 or 6 ISCED – female 0,67 0,44 1,00 0,63 1,00 0,75 0,75
Demographic Total annual population change over approximately 5 years 0,69 0,45 0,93 0,63 0,93 0,78 0,73
Social Number of domestic burglary per 1,000 population 0,69 0,46 0,77 0,69 0,85 0,85 0,72
Social Car thefts in Urban Audit cities as number per 1,000 inhabitants 0,68 0,47 0,79 0,68 0,89 0,74 0,71
Demographic Total population in Urban Audit cities 0,76 0,34 0,90 0,49 0,95 0,77 0,70
Human Number of deaths in road accidents per 10,000 population 0,41 0,41 0,81 0,63 1,00 0,94 0,70
Demographic Total Population at working age 0,74 0,36 0,89 0,49 0,92 0,76 0,69
Human Proportion of population aged 15-64 qualified at tertiary level (ISCED 5-6) l iving in Urban Audit cities as % 0,78 0,22 1,00 0,50 1,00 0,63 0,69
Human Unemployment rate in Urban Audit cities as % 0,88 0,48 0,88 0,50 0,83 0,50 0,68
Environmental Number of days particulate matter concentrations exceeds 50 µg/m³ in Urban Audit cities as days per year 1,00 0,25 1,00 0,25 1,00 0,50 0,67
Human Employment/Population (of working age) ratio 0,71 0,48 0,75 0,60 0,85 0,55 0,66
Social Cinema seats in Urban Audit cities as seats per 1,000 inhabitants 0,58 0,42 0,82 0,45 1,00 0,64 0,65
Social Proportion of households l iving in owned dwellings in Urban Audit cities as % 0,62 0,29 0,89 0,53 0,89 0,63 0,64
Social Nationals as a proportion of total population 0,70 0,33 0,76 0,52 0,84 0,68 0,64
Social Percentage of elected city representatives who are men 0,67 0,11 0,89 0,44 1,00 0,67 0,63
Social Non-EU nationals as a proportion of total population 0,74 0,30 0,76 0,43 0,81 0,67 0,62
Social Average living area in Urban Audit cities as m² per person 0,76 0,38 0,80 0,40 0,80 0,55 0,62
Environmental Total land area (km²) according to cadastral register 0,64 0,24 0,83 0,42 0,88 0,67 0,61
Environmental Consumption of water (as cubic metres per annum) per inhabitant 0,63 0,31 0,73 0,53 0,87 0,60 0,61
Social Cost of a monthly ticket for public transport (for 5-10 km) 0,71 0,29 0,83 0,33 0,83 0,67 0,61
Human  roportion of working age population at level   or 2 ISCED – female 0,50 0,25 0,86 0,43 1,00 0,57 0,60
Social Number of tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation per year per resident population 0,45 0,30 0,75 0,55 0,85 0,70 0,60
Environmental Collected solid waste in Urban Audit cities as tonnes per inhabitant and year 0,44 0,22 0,67 0,56 0,89 0,67 0,57
Social Available hospital beds in Urban Audit cities per 1,000 inhabitants 0,56 0,32 0,76 0,32 0,88 0,60 0,57
Social Proportion of one-person households in Urban Audit cities as % 0,64 0,32 0,70 0,35 0,87 0,57 0,57
Human Proportion of female students in higher education (ISCED level 5-6) 0,57 0,29 0,69 0,38 0,92 0,54 0,57
Social Average household size in Urban Audit cities as number of persons per household 0,50 0,25 0,60 0,50 0,80 0,70 0,56
Social Tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation in Urban Audit cities as number of nights per year 0,70 0,25 0,85 0,35 0,90 0,30 0,56
Human Self-employment rate 0,58 0,38 0,74 0,35 0,74 0,57 0,56
Environmental Registered cars in Urban Audit cities as number of cars per 1,000 inhabitants 0,53 0,16 0,78 0,39 0,83 0,61 0,55
Demographic Population density in Urban Audit cities   0,58 0,35 0,68 0,48 0,72 0,48 0,55
Human Proportion in part-time employment 0,58 0,21 0,74 0,35 0,78 0,52 0,53
Human Proportion of working age population qualified at level 1 or 2 ISCED 0,67 0,11 0,75 0,38 0,88 0,38 0,53
Social Proportion of households with children aged 0-17 in Urban Audit cities as % 0,60 0,20 0,68 0,32 0,79 0,53 0,52
Social Children 0-2 in day care (public and private) per 1,000 children 0,75 0,38 0,57 0,43 0,57 0,29 0,50
Social Annual visitors to museums per resident 0,31 0,08 0,58 0,33 0,83 0,58 0,45
Social Average time of journey to work 0,71 0,14 0,69 0,15 0,77 0,23 0,45
Social EU nationals as a proportion of total population 0,48 0,17 0,76 0,19 0,71 0,38 0,45
Social Percentage of the households receiving less than half of the national average household income 0,20 0,20 0,67 0,00 1,00 0,33 0,40
Social Price of a m³ of domestic water 0,40 0,20 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,25 0,39
Environmental Share of journeys to work by car in Urban Audit cities as % 0,50 0,08 0,36 0,09 0,73 0,36 0,35
Accuracy limits
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Table 5: Results of the time frame analysis: explanatory power of the initial indicators on urban quality of life 
differences. 
 
 
Indicators
1
9
8
9
-1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
-1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
-2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
-2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
-2
0
0
9
Number of stops of public transport per km² 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.67
Proportion of solid waste arising within the boundary processed by landfil l 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.33
Number of days ozone concentration exceeds 120 µg/m³ in Urban Audit cities  as days per year 0.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00
Nationals born abroad as a proportion of total population 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.75 0.67
Total population change over 1 year 0.33 0.67 0.29 0.50 0.50
 roportion of working age population qualified at level 5 or 6 ISCED – female 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00
Total annual population change over approximately 5 years 0.00 0.71 0.14 0.14 0.75
Number of domestic burglary per 1,000 population 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.40
Car thefts in Urban Audit cities as number per 1,000 inhabitants 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.29 0.60
Total population in Urban Audit cities 0.43 0.43 0.20 0.33 0.38
Number of deaths in road accidents per 10,000 population 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.57
Total Population at working age 0.50 0.50 0.11 0.40 0.38
Proportion of population aged 15-64 qualified at tertiary level (ISCED 5-6) l iving in Urban Audit cities as % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00
Unemployment rate in Urban Audit cities as % 0.50 0.33 0.50 0.60 0.00
Number of days particulate matter concentrations exceeds 50 µg/m³ in Urban Audit cities as days per year 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Employment/Population (of working age) ratio 0.33 0.67 0.25 0.60 1.00
Cinema seats in Urban Audit cities as seats per 1,000 inhabitants 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.60 0.50
Proportion of households l iving in owned dwellings in Urban Audit cities as % 0.80 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00
Nationals as a proportion of total population 0.40 0.80 0.11 0.00 0.50
Percentage of elected city representatives who are men 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00
Non-EU nationals as a proportion of total population 0.50 1.00 0.11 0.20 0.40
Average living area in Urban Audit cities as m² per person 0.40 0.50 0.29 0.50 0.33
Total land area (km²) according to cadastral register 0.60 0.20 0.00 0.25 0.20
Consumption of water (as cubic metres per annum) per inhabitant 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.20 0.00
Cost of a monthly ticket for public transport (for 5-10 km) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33
 roportion of working age population at level   or 2 ISCED – female 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.33 0.00
Number of tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation per year per resident population 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.20 0.40
Collected solid waste in Urban Audit cities as tonnes per inhabitant and year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00
Available hospital beds in Urban Audit cities per 1,000 inhabitants 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.50 0.50
Proportion of one-person households in Urban Audit cities as % 0.29 0.50 0.33 0.25 0.33
Proportion of female students in higher education (ISCED level 5-6) 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.33 0.33
Average household size in Urban Audit cities as number of persons per household 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.33
Tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation in Urban Audit cities as number of nights per year 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.20 0.40
Self-employment rate 0.40 0.00 0.44 0.43 0.00
Registered cars in Urban Audit cities as number of cars per 1,000 inhabitants 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.20 0.00
Population density in Urban Audit cities   0.60 0.60 0.00 0.25 0.40
Proportion in part-time employment 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.50
Proportion of working age population qualified at level 1 or 2 ISCED 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00
Proportion of households with children aged 0-17 in Urban Audit cities as % 0.17 0.00 0.13 0.33 0.50
Children 0-2 in day care (public and private) per 1,000 children 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.50
Annual visitors to museums per resident 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25
Average time of journey to work 0.33 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00
EU nationals as a proportion of total population 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Percentage of the households receiving less than half of the national average household income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
Price of a m³ of domestic water 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00
Share of journeys to work by car in Urban Audit cities as % 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 6: Results of the countries’ analysis: explanatory power of the initial indicators on urban quality of life differences.  
 
 
 
Indicators G
e
rm
an
y
R
o
m
an
ia
N
e
th
e
rl
an
d
s
It
al
y
Tu
rk
e
y
U
K
Sp
ai
n
Fr
an
ce
P
o
la
n
d
C
R
Number of stops of public transport per km² 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Proportion of solid waste arising within the boundary processed by landfil l 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of days ozone concentration exceeds 120 µg/m³ in Urban Audit cities  as days per year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.67
Nationals born abroad as a proportion of total population 0.00 0.50 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Total population change over 1 year 0.00 0.80 0.50 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.25 0.20
 roportion of working age population qualified at level 5 or 6 ISCED – female 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Total annual population change over approximately 5 years 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.25
Number of domestic burglary per 1,000 population 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00
Car thefts in Urban Audit cities as number per 1,000 inhabitants 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.33
Total population in Urban Audit cities 0.00 0.80 0.25 0.40 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.00 0.20 0.00
Number of deaths in road accidents per 10,000 population 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Total Population at working age 0.00 0.80 0.25 0.40 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.00 0.25 0.00
Proportion of population aged 15-64 qualified at tertiary level (ISCED 5-6) l iving in Urban Audit cities as % 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unemployment rate in Urban Audit cities as % 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.25
Number of days particulate matter concentrations exceeds 50 µg/m³ in Urban Audit cities as days per year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33
Employment/Population (of working age) ratio 0.25 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.33
Cinema seats in Urban Audit cities as seats per 1,000 inhabitants 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.67 0.00
Proportion of households l iving in owned dwellings in Urban Audit cities as % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.50
Nationals as a proportion of total population 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.40 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.67
Percentage of elected city representatives who are men 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non-EU nationals as a proportion of total population 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average living area in Urban Audit cities as m² per person 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.80 0.00
Total land area (km²) according to cadastral register 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.50 0.00
Consumption of water (as cubic metres per annum) per inhabitant 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.33
Cost of a monthly ticket for public transport (for 5-10 km) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00
 roportion of working age population at level   or 2 ISCED – female 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation per year per resident population 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25
Collected solid waste in Urban Audit cities as tonnes per inhabitant and year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
Available hospital beds in Urban Audit cities per 1,000 inhabitants 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.20
Proportion of one-person households in Urban Audit cities as % 0.00 0.50 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
Proportion of female students in higher education (ISCED level 5-6) 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00
Average household size in Urban Audit cities as number of persons per household 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation in Urban Audit cities as number of nights per year 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.00
Self-employment rate 0.20 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.25
Registered cars in Urban Audit cities as number of cars per 1,000 inhabitants 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33
Population density in Urban Audit cities   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.50 0.20
Proportion in part-time employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.25
Proportion of working age population qualified at level 1 or 2 ISCED 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Proportion of households with children aged 0-17 in Urban Audit cities as % 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.50 0.00
Children 0-2 in day care (public and private) per 1,000 children 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.67 0.00
Annual visitors to museums per resident 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average time of journey to work 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
EU nationals as a proportion of total population 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.00
Percentage of the households receiving less than half of the national average household income 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Price of a m³ of domestic water 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Share of journeys to work by car in Urban Audit cities as % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 7: Available indicators for all levels – cities, regions, countries.  
 
Category Indicators
Demographic Population density
Demographic Total population
Demographic Total Population at working age
Demographic Total population change over 1 year
Environmental Collected solid waste as tonnes per inhabitant and year
Environmental Consumption of water (as cubic metres per annum) per inhabitant
Environmental Proportion of solid waste arising within the boundary processed by landfill
Environmental Registered cars as number of cars per 1,000 inhabitants
Environmental Share of journeys to work by car as %
Environmental Total land area (km²) according to cadastral register
Human Employment/Population (of working age) ratio
Human Proportion in part-time employment
Human Proportion of population aged 15-64 qualified at tertiary level (ISCED 5-6) as %
Human  roportion of working age population at level   or 2 ISCED – female
Human Proportion of working age population qualified at level 1 or 2 ISCED
Human  roportion of working age population qualified at level 5 or 6 ISCED – female
Human Unemployment rate as %
Manufactured Number of stops of public transport per km²
Social Available hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants
Social Number of tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation per year per resident population
Social Tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation as number of nights per year
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Table 8: Urban comparison with respect to different input sizes.  
 
Indicators
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Number of stops of public transport per km² X X
Proportion of solid waste arising within the boundary processed by landfill X X
Unemployment rate in Urban Audit cities as % X X
Total population in Urban Audit cities X X
Total population change over 1 year X X
Proportion of working age population at level 1 or 2 ISCED – female X
Proportion of working age population qualified at level 1 or 2 ISCED X
Total Population at working age X
Proportion of working age population qualified at level 5 or 6 ISCED – female X
Proportion of population aged 15-64 qualified at tertiary level (ISCED 5-6) as %
Total land area (km²) according to cadastral register
Collected solid waste in Urban Audit cities as tonnes per inhabitant and year
Tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation as number of nights per year
Registered cars in Urban Audit cities as number of cars per 1,000 inhabitants
Employment/Population (of working age) ratio
Consumption of water (as cubic metres per annum) per inhabitant
Number of tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation per year per resident population
Available hospital beds in Urban Audit cities per 1,000 inhabitants
Proportion in part-time employment
Population density in Urban Audit cities   
Share of journeys to work by car in Urban Audit cities as %
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Table 9: Country comparison with respect to different input sizes. 
Indicators
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Total Population at working age X X
Total population X X
Population density X X
Tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation as number of nights per year X X
Number of stops of public transport per km² X X
Proportion in part-time employment X
Available hospital beds cities per 1,000 inhabitants X
Proportion of working age population at level 1 or 2 ISCED – female X
Proportion of working age population qualified at level 5 or 6 ISCED – female X
Proportion of working age population qualified at level 1 or 2 ISCED
Employment/Population (of working age) ratio
Total land area (km²) according to cadastral register
Unemployment rate as %
Number of tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation per year per resident population
Total population change over 1 year
Registered cars as number of cars per 1,000 inhabitants
Proportion of population aged 15-64 qualified at tertiary level (ISCED 5-6) as %
Collected solid waste as tonnes per inhabitant and year
Total annual population change over approximately 5 years
Share of journeys to work by car as %
Proportion of solid waste arising within the boundary processed by landfill
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Table 10: Comparison of the relevance of 21 indicators for different levels.  
 
 
Indicators C
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Total population X X X
 roportion of working age population at level   or 2 ISCED – female X X
Number of stops of public transport per km² X X
Total population change over 1 year X
Proportion of working age population qualified at level 1 or 2 ISCED X
Unemployment rate as % X
Proportion of solid waste arising within the boundary processed by landfill X
Total Population at working age X X
Tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation as number of nights per year X X
Total land area (km²) according to cadastral register X
Consumption of water (as cubic metres per annum) per inhabitant X
Number of tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation per year per resident population X
Proportion in part-time employment X
Population density X
Available hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants X
 roportion of working age population qualified at level 5 or 6 ISCED – female
Proportion of population aged 15-64 qualified at tertiary level (ISCED 5-6) as %
Collected solid waste as tonnes per inhabitant and year
Registered cars as number of cars per 1,000 inhabitants
Employment/Population (of working age) ratio
Share of journeys to work by car as %
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1 Introduction 
As urban areas are nowadays the engines of economic growth for the whole region, politics 
is more and more concerned with problems related to urban development. Most 
importantly, the question of how projects which enhance urban life should be funded raises 
concerns. The European Commission reacted to this topic by the introduction of the JESSICA 
(Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas) initiative for the 2007-
2012 programming period of their Structural Funds. Within this initiative, resources can be 
invested in so-called Urban Development Funds (UDFs) which should pass the money on to 
projects eligible for funding. In contrast to traditional grant financing, the JESSICA 
instruments (loans, equity, guarantees) have a revolving character. As the European 
Commission launched the initiative only some years ago, research on the advantages of the 
new instruments and their appropriateness for different project types is notably absent up 
to now. The most reliable sources in these fields are evaluation studies carried out for the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) for regions of various member states. The disadvantage is 
that these studies are conducted by consultants from different organisations and often do 
not have a scientific research background. Hence, these results give interesting insights into 
possible projects for the implementation of JESSICA, but they also need to be critically 
analysed. This will be covered by the paper at hand. Therefore, we combine the research on 
the JESSICA initiative with the field of interventions for capital market imperfections. 
Of course, the analysis of policy interventions not specifically connected to urban 
development is prevalent in the literature. One branch studies market failures in several 
public policy fields (Bator, 1958, Baumol, 1965, Fisher and Rothkopf, 1989, Bartik, 1990, 
Cowen, 1999). All these approaches reveal that intervention through politics should aim to 
reduce market failures in order to (re)establish normal market functioning. Hence, situations 
where market failures are the reasons for unwanted development in general need to be 
separated from those which are unwanted by, e.g., politicians but represent normal market 
functioning in an overall welfare sense. Another interesting branch of research considers 
government failures from wasteful governance or omitted intervention as a reason for 
inefficient policies (see, e.g., Shepsle and Weingast, 1984, Le Grand, 1991). In addition, the 
evaluation of both failures has been studied by, e.g., Datta-Chaudhuri (1990) and Winston 
(2006). However, for the rest of this paper, we will assume that government failures do not 
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exist and concentrate on market failures, as this is the focus of JESSICA. Nevertheless, it 
should be mentioned that a successful implementation of JESSICA can of course be hindered 
by government failures. 
This paper is structured as follows. The following section introduces capital markets for 
urban finance. Afterwards, Section 3 presents the reasons for market failures in these capital 
markets and reveals suitable intervention measures. Section 4 offers insights into possible 
urban development projects suggested by the EIB evaluation studies and analyses their 
relation to market imperfections in order to determine the appropriate funding types. 
Section 5 reveals the implications of our approach. Finally, Section 6 concludes by 
summarising the results.  
2 Definition of Urban Capital Markets and its Actors 
A capital market is a place where financial instruments are traded, in contrast to a goods 
market where real goods are relevant. This paper examines capital markets for urban 
finance also denoted as urban capital markets. On these markets, financial instruments such 
as grants, loans, equity, or guarantees are traded to finance urban development projects. A 
capital market is always defined by investment needs, supply, and demand as demonstrated 
in Figure 1 for the urban case. More details and similar figures are part of the report of the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (2007).  
<<< Insert Figure 1 about here >>> 
Investment needs arise when urban areas are neglected and undesired development takes 
place. Then, the participants on the demand side recognise these specific needs and set up 
project ideas to overcome the problems related to the respective urban area. These 
participants are either public, quasi-public, or private bodies. Finally, the project ideas only 
come to an implementation stage if actors from the supply side are willing to provide 
financing for it. However, while we observe that for many European areas there is a need for 
urban development projects, they are often not initiated. The reasons for this omission of 
project initialisation will be analysed in connection to market failures between the demand 
side and the supply side actors in the remaining parts of this paper. Thus, in the following, 
we assume that needs are automatically transformed into demand and we will only 
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investigate situations where public interventions are necessary to match supply and 
demand, as this is the prevalent topic in connection with the JESSICA initiative and its 
different financial instruments. Of course, it is also advantageous to strengthen the 
transformation of needs into demand by increasing the awareness of urban topics with the 
promotion of JESSICA.  
3 Reasons for Market Failures and Intervention Opportunities 
With the help of the Net Present Value (NPV) Method, an investor can decide whether an 
investment, i.e., a project, is profitable for him. However, certain assumptions must be 
fulfilled. Those are met under perfect capital market conditions and lead to a decision which 
can be based on the NPV without consideration of subjective preferences (Fisher, 1930) and 
different financial instruments (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). The investment payment and 
discounted future cash flows are summed up to determine the project related increase in 
value. A positive value reveals that the investment should be realised by rational investors. 
But in the case of a negative NPV, the question of whether interventions such as subsidies 
might be able to correct some market failures by increasing the value and thereby initiating 
the project arises. In the following, we consider three main market imperfections which lead 
to a negative NPV and the omission of an investment which would be made under 
consideration of overall welfare. We will always denote the overall welfare valuation in a 
situation without failure or imperfections by NPVtot while the project value for a private 
investor will be defined as NPVproj. Eventually, we will see that in the presence of market 
imperfections, different financial instruments are not equally suitable to correct market 
failures. 
3.1 General Reasons for Market Failures 
The three main reasons for market failures named in the literature in general are external 
effects, imperfect competition, and incomplete information. All three aspects also have an 
impact on the initialisation of urban development projects, as they result in omission of the 
project under certain circumstances. In fact, this selection seems to describe the most 
important reasons for the omission of projects and conforms to the perception of market 
failures which justify political interventions (see Fritsch et al., 2003). Each market failure will 
be described in one of the following subsections and afterwards the connection to 
 
91 
 
intervention opportunities will be made in Section 3.2. However, there might be other but 
less dominant barriers for project initiation, some of which are mentioned in Section 3.3 for 
the sake of completeness. 
3.1.1 External Effects 
There are two types of external effects, namely external costs and external benefits. External 
costs – caused by negative externalities – are those costs arising with the production of 
goods for uninvolved parties. For urban infrastructure projects which increase, e.g., the 
traffic density of a hub, this could be the costs for better window insulation for residents 
made necessary by increased noise exposure. External benefits describe the positive utility 
related to the production of goods for uninvolved parties (and are thus caused by positive 
externalities). One example for such urban development projects is a public car park. Shops 
that are located nearby may gain new clients and thus have higher sales without having paid 
for the car park, as it is public. This is an example for one subgroup of external benefits, 
namely public goods, which plays an important role in the context of urban development. 
They are characterised by the fact that nobody can be excluded from using them – non-
excludability – and the good cannot be easily exhausted – inexhaustibility – (see Brown, 
2001). This is, e.g., the case for public areas and roads.  
Including external effects via NPVext in the Net Present Value calculation (from an overall 
welfare point of view) helps to identify market failures and intervention possibilities for 
public authorities. The overall value NPVtot then is  
                           (1) 
following the notation of Breuer (2012). Figure 2 shows the cases arising in the decision 
problem on project initialisation under consideration of external effects. Negative external 
effects produce costs and thus have NPVext < 0. If the mere financial project value NPVproj is 
greater than 0, two cases for the total value NPVtot are possible. First, the overall welfare can 
be increased (NPVtot > 0) by project implementation. In this case, private investors should be 
interested in the project and they directly support the overall welfare maximising solution 
(a). In the second case, NPVtot is less than 0, but the project is favourable for private 
investors. The project will thus be financed via (private) capital market actors despite the 
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overall welfare destroying character, due to negative external effects, resulting in a market 
failure (b). However, if in addition to negative external effects, the mere financial project 
value is negative, too, an implementation is not profitable for capital market actors resulting 
in the project not being realised which is in line with the overall welfare optimum (c).    
<<< Insert Figure 2 about here >>> 
Now, turning to positive external effects, the situation is analysed analogously. If the project 
value NPVproj is positive, the overall value NPVtot including both external effects and financial 
consequences is positive as a result. Therefore, this leads to project initialisation 
representing the overall optimal solution (d). Otherwise, if NPVproj is negative, we have to 
distinguish two cases. In the first case, NPVtot is positive and although the overall optimum 
would be the implementation of the project, it is not initiated by private market actors 
without public intervention, thus describing a situation of market failure (e). In the second 
case, where NPVproj and NPVtot are both negative, the project is not implemented and the 
optimal solution is achieved (f). 
Thus, two situations of market failure exist under consideration of external effects. First, 
projects are implemented in spite of being welfare destroying from an overall societal point 
of view (b). Second, projects are not implemented despite their overall welfare increasing 
character (e). While the first market failure can be only addressed by regulations accounting 
for negative effects via, e.g., taxes, the second is an interesting case for urban development 
project funding to compensate for external benefits. The following should hold true for (e): 
               [-        ⏟
  
         ]. (2) 
Hence, it would be acceptable for public authorities to subsidise at least the difference 
which renders the project value NPVproj positive and at most the full amount equal to the 
positive external effects. 
3.1.2 Imperfect Competition 
There are mainly four types of imperfect competition with a highly diverging number of 
supply side and demand side actors. In the case of monopoly or oligopoly, only a single or 
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very few providers of a certain good or service exist, respectively, whereas monopsony and 
oligopsony refer to a market with only one or few buyers (see Burkett, 2006). The problem 
of such incomplete competition situations is that the small number of actors can set the 
prices (to a certain degree) in contrast to being price takers under perfect competition. In 
the urban context, this could be a transport infrastructure monopoly which is prevalent in 
some European member states and regions.  
Assuming the existence of perfect competition leads to a project value which we will further 
denote NPVtot, because no participant can exploit others due to his power and – in the 
absence of any market imperfection  NPVtot can be understood as the overall welfare value. 
In contrast, we will now take a look at the value NPVproj associated with the decision of an 
investor to implement a project under the assumption that one of his suppliers has too 
much power and acts as a price maker. This case certainly is one of the main problems with 
project realisation under imperfect competition. The project value would be influenced by, 
e.g., investment costs which are higher than necessary due to the (positive) premium ΔI the 
price maker adds to the proper investment sum I, where I is defined as the amount in a 
perfect competition environment. With expected returns from the investment of E(m) and 
the discount rate i, the following holds true for a simple two-period model:  
               
 ( )
   
             
 ( )
   
           (3) 
As the premium ΔI is positive, only three cases are to be considered (analogue to NPVext > 0 
in Figure 2). First, NPVproj is higher than 0 and so is NPVtot. This directly leads to a social 
welfare increasing investment decision. Thus, the market does not fail. Second, when NPVproj 
is negative as well as NPVtot, no investment is made reflecting the ideal social welfare 
solution. Third, NPVproj is negative, however, NPVtot is positive. In this case, 
                ⏟ 
  
       
(4) 
is valid, which shows that the monopolist renders NPVproj negative only by his premium ΔI. If 
the monopolist is aware of the premium – as he adds it deliberately – he would harm his 
own interests, because the project will not be initiated at all. He would thus be better off by 
only setting the premium to the maximum value which still leaves NPVproj positive and by 
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siphoning off these profits. However, if the monopolist simply produces inefficiently and 
therefore does not add the premium deliberately, a substitution via public authorities is only 
reasonable in the case where the behaviour is not easily adaptable and the overall welfare 
still is higher due to some externalities coupled with the monopolist. This is the case for, e.g., 
natural monopolies in the infrastructure sector where the supply of goods could not be 
guaranteed otherwise. In such a situation, some kinds of external effects may lever the 
overall welfare value NPVtot and public authorities could compensate the negative NPVproj by 
adding subsidies, which again leads to a subsidy value of 
               [-        ⏟
  
         ]. (5) 
As seen in the last section, it would be acceptable for public authorities to subsidise at least 
the difference necessary to render the project value NPVproj positive and at most the full 
amount equal to the positive external effects (see (2)). This reveals that it is not possible for 
the monopoly to exploit the public or private beyond the value of the positive externalities, 
even if the minimum required subsidy value is higher than the one in Section 3.1.1. 
As a conclusion on incomplete competition, we can state that this type of market failure only 
needs to be addressed for specific categories of projects with a high probability of 
monopolism, such as the transport infrastructure sector (a natural monopoly). Nevertheless, 
an intervention via subsidies is only necessary if there are some external effects justifying 
those cost intensive measures. Otherwise, monopolistic-based market failures should not be 
eliminated through subsidies, but less costly interventions are more appropriate. Of course, 
it is possible that the monopolist (deliberately) siphons the subsidies given by public 
authorities as compensation for the external effects. However, this does not seem to be the 
major issue in urban project initiation with competition problems, as siphoning subsidies by 
the monopolist is only possible to a certain degree and goes along with other positive effects 
which outbalance the drawbacks. Further, the subsidies may prevent inefficient project 
developers from trying to become more efficient. Yet again, this is only possible to a certain 
degree and the developer harms himself as he could have higher profits by improving his 
efficiency. So, even if we cannot distinguish the two cases of either adding premiums 
deliberately or without awareness, public money can only be exploited to the extent it 
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delivers positive externalities. We will now discuss the next kind of market failure, namely 
incomplete information, which can analogously be analysed. 
3.1.3 Incomplete Information 
A typical example of incomplete information for (urban) development projects with 
consequent cost overruns and benefit shortfalls are again transport infrastructure projects. 
Flyvbjerg (2005) elaborates on the planning of large infrastructure projects and shows 
among other items the problem of information asymmetries in this context. Market failures 
due to incomplete information generally occur because investors are typically not able to 
assess all available information, as there are no scale effects and thus those (transaction) 
costs exceed the respective benefits. As they are aware of this problem, they include the 
uncertainty in their investment decision by adjusting the indicated values. We will first 
consider the case where NPVproj is underestimated by an investor due to this uncertainty. As 
the investor does not know whether the considered project is worth pursuing, he can only 
prudentially estimate the investment Î = I + Δ  > I and benefits Ê(m) = E(m) - ΔE(m) < E(m), 
where Î and Ê represent the average values of all projects whether worthwhile or not. The 
overall project value then is  
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which can also be written as 
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This results in the same situation as described in Section 3.1.2 with simply a larger additional 
term  n       f      Δ . A market failure arises in the case where the project value is 
negative, but the overall welfare value NPVtot (without information problems) is positive:  
                ⏟ 
  
      
  ( )
   
     (8) 
However, in contrast to the monopoly case in (4), the new “       ” c     f     h  
supplier of capital (the investor) due to missing information and is not (deliberately) set by 
the demander of capital (the project promoter). Now, the project is not going to be initiated 
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only because of the overly cautious estimates by the prospective investor. The promoter of 
the project can influence the  nv     ’  financial assessment if he can give him more and 
credible information, which will increase NPVproj. So, if there are informational asymmetries 
which hinder project implementation and which can easily be eliminated by the project 
promoter, he would harm himself if he does not credibly signal the information he has in 
order to convince the opposite partner of the project qualities. Such a signal could be a share 
of self-financing as mentioned by Batabyal and Beladi (2010), which reveals whether the 
project promoters (and/or developers) belief in its success, as they are then also dependent 
on the outcomes. If they are not able to finance sufficient parts of the project by themselves, 
then they would not agree to unfavourable financing conditions to compensate for the 
premium charged by the less informed investor and instead refrain from the completion of 
the project. Now, as a second case, in contrast, a bad (high risk) project profits from the 
average value calculation, if it is worse than the average. A promoter would directly accept 
the respective financing conditions which a promoter of a good project denies. This leads to 
adverse selection as introduced by Akerlof (1970). However, as the investors anticipate this 
selection, they will not provide any capital and the market will fail. Any kind of intervention 
should help by improving the information for the investors, because information asymmetry 
is the reason for this market failure. 
If the promoter (or developer) cannot signal on his own, but the public authorities are 
interested in the initialisation of the project due to some external effects, then subsidies are 
appropriate as long as they help to signal the general project quality. Otherwise, a subsidy 
independent of the project quality would just fill the financial gap, but the investor will still 
be aware of the uncertainty and will not be willing to finance the project. In the case where 
signalling is possible and external effects are coupled with the initialisation of the project, a 
subsidy in the range of   
               [         ⏟
  
         ] (9) 
is appropriate for the same reasons as explained before for (2) and (5). Hence, similar to the 
case of imperfect competition, subsidies are restricted to situations where informational 
asymmetry coincides with the appearance of external benefits when the project is realised.  
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3.2 Public interventions to Overcome Market Failure 
As we have now introduced all three major reasons of market failure and appropriate 
subsidy values, we will further analyse the possibilities of intervention to overcome them. 
First, we will describe public/policy intervention means in the case of market failure in 
general, before concentrating on the range of actions connected to UDFs within the JESSICA 
initiative, which will help to decide on the specific type of subsidy.  
3.2.1 Public Interventions in the Literature 
In general, for each of the three types of market failure analysed, several policy intervention 
possibilities arise (see Borrmann and Finsinger, 1999, Wied-Nebbeling and Schott, 2005, 
Fritsch, 2011). Figure 3 summarises them briefly. 
<<< Insert Figure 3 about here >>> 
For external effects, a major kind is defined by a first group of regulatory interventions, such 
as the limitation of market access, or liability laws. The second group consists of subsidies to 
support positive externalities or taxes to make negative ones financially unattractive. These 
groups apply to imperfect competition as well, but in addition, there is a third group of 
pricing or quality regulations. However, subsidy interventions are only mentioned in 
combination with external effects and for this reason they are marked in brackets. The 
interventions for the third market failure – incomplete information – are connected to 
rights, quality requirements, subsidies (again in combination with externalities), and the 
provision of information on general issues (national accounts) or commodities for a wide 
range of consumers by public agencies (e.g., economic research institutes). Nevertheless, as 
JESSICA is one specific policy instrument, it cannot cover all aspects of intervention, but 
concentrates on just one, which is the use of subsidies. It is important to note that our 
elaboration from Section 3.1 so far matches the general perception in the literature with 
respect to subsidy intervention.  
We will focus on this special kind of intervention in the following to answer the question of 
whether the application of JESSICA-type instruments such as loan subsidies is a suitable 
means to overcome failures in a specific market situation or whether a grant funding is more 
suitable. The overall financial support is the same in both cases, but for a subsidised loan, 
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the investor has to employ a higher amount of money first. After all loan repayments, the 
subsidy part corresponds to the amount of the alternative direct grant. However, if the 
project fails, there is an unplanned subsidy part in addition to this amount as the 
repayments will be cancelled. Therefore, both alternatives have different advantages and 
disadvantages, which should be evaluated for the specific context of application. 
3.2.2 Public Interventions in the Form of Subsidies for Urban Development 
If market failures are related to some kind of positive influence on the overall welfare as 
introduced in Section 3.1, the use of subsidies is justified to compensate for the welfare gain 
through positive external effects. This compensation is necessary (if reasonable – case (e)), 
as the private sector will not be willing to pay for the external benefits because they do not 
include other pe    ’  w  f     n  h     nv     n    c    n   Th               where a 
monopoly is present if its absence further reduced overall welfare, because the monopolistic 
supply then describes a positive external effect. In this case, public authorities should 
“support” the monopoly indirectly through subsidies by an amount which is not greater than 
the positive effect the monopoly has on the society. Concerning informational asymmetries, 
public authorities normally have the same information as private investors if they are not 
involved in the project (assuming that no other intervention – such as the establishment of a 
specific research institute for public information on urban development projects – 
simultaneously takes place). If the promoter does not provide enough information, he might 
harm himself. However, it is possible that he cannot provide the information through, e.g., 
self-financing to signal the success-probability. If the initialisation leads to positive external 
effects, an intervention through subsidies is appropriate to overcome problems arising from 
asymmetric information, as long as they are a credible signalling device. But in this case, 
public authorities need to be somehow (actively) involved in the project, because otherwise 
they would only have the same information as the private investor.  
The open question still remains which kind of subsidy funding – a grant or a revolving 
financial instrument – would be appropriate to address each of the three reasons for market 
failures. As already seen before, the requirement for the subsidy differs especially if 
informational asymmetry is related to the initialisation of the project. In such a case, the 
public subsidy should in addition to the mere compensation for externalities also set a signal 
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to the private investor that the project is of good quality and that there is thus no need for 
excessively cautious estimates of the project value. However, public authorities have two 
incentives that hinder the private parties in completely trusting them. First, public 
authorities’ intention is at least partially driven by the fact that they want to spend the 
higher level (e.g., European Union) funding to show their need for financial support, no 
matter whether it is necessary for a certain project or not. Otherwise, they would risk a 
reduction in funding allocation in subsequent funding periods. Second, public authorities 
may simply want to compensate the external effects and in this case, a subsidy might not be 
sufficient to signal the project quality. In contrast, they are also more interested in realising 
projects with high external effects even if their monetary outcome is not sufficient for the 
private investor (assuming that monetary and      n    ff c  ’    c         n   always 
perfectly correlated).  
Breuer (2012) analysed a general decision framework for the question of loans versus grants 
in the context of urban development funding under consideration of external effects and 
asymmetric information. Under perfect market conditions, both financing alternatives are 
equivalent and in the presence of external effects, the same holds true. However, he showed 
that the combination of external effects and asymmetric information renders loans 
favourable. This change comes from the fact that in situations with informational problems, 
public authorities should set a signal with their funding decision. This is possible, because 
when they subsidies by loans, public authorities become dependent on the project quality, 
as the loan needs to be repaid (though at to a certain degree smaller interest rates than with 
unsubsidised market conditions) through the project revenues. His main assumption on the 
signalling properties lies in the fact that public authorities gain information on the project 
quality when they analyse a project with respect to the amount of external effects which are 
produced by the project. Takalo and Tanayama (2010) make another assumption to show 
the need for R&D subsidies to overcome adverse selection. In their paper, external effects 
 n   n         c         c           n   h     v     h       f “              ” (   n ng 
grants) to signal project quality to private investors. The possibility of signalling through 
grants is in their case only plausible because of the correlation assumed. In this special case 
of correlated external effects and monetary outcomes, the strong commitment coupled 
through loans is not necessary as the belief in external effects indicated by the mere grant 
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support is a sufficient signal to private parties. In general, the extent of external effects 
might differ from the financial quality of the project. For project financing, the analysis of 
this relationship is notably absent in the literature. However, the question has been 
investigated for decades in the context of corporate social responsibility and financial 
performance with very ambiguous results (see, e.g., Salzmann, 2013). Thus, even in this well 
established and related research area, the relationship between the two components is not 
clear. Hence, we will refrain from the assumption that external effects and monetary 
outcomes are correlated and that this fact is common knowledge. Nevertheless, the work of 
Takalo and Tanayama (2010) support the main idea of signalling by subsidies and it further 
confirms the assumption of Breuer (2012) that the analysis of external effects 
simultaneously provides information on the monetary project quality, but with the 
difference that the outcomes need not be directly correlated. Another paper also supporting 
the former aspect of general signalling by subsidies and the incentive difference is the one of 
Kleer (2010). He states the adverse incentives of public and private parties in the context of 
R&D subsidies and reveals that subsidies are suitable to overcome private financing 
problems as long as they have a signalling character. Nevertheless, a distinct elaboration of 
specific funding means which have these characteristics is missing. In conclusion, the results 
from the three papers just mentioned are the same: subsidies can help to overcome adverse 
selection arising from incomplete information, in the cases where they are a suitable 
signalling means. Under our assumption (without the necessity of correlated external effects 
and monetary outcomes applied by Takalo and Tanayama, 2010), this is possible with loans 
instead of grants. In addition to the advantages of loan financing by public authorities, 
Breuer (2012) also mentions a drawback. The tax burden varies over time depending on the 
success of former supported projects. Grants are per construction never paid back and do 
not lead to such volatile tax needs. For this reason, grants should be employed as long as no 
signalling with loans is necessary. In the following, we will apply these results to the three 
market imperfections introduced in the paper at hand and their combinations.  
Market failures caused by the presence of (positive) externalities do not need to be removed 
by measures with signalling character, because the omission of project financing from the 
private parties is simply based on the mere financial gap and has no connection to any kind 
of informational asymmetries regarding the monetary project outcome. As long as public 
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authorities close this financial gap, and indirectly increase NPVproj, private investors will be 
willing to initiate the project if its financial value turns positive. In such a case, subsidies in 
the form of grants are a suitable means to launch socially reasonable projects. An alternative 
investment strategy via (reduced interest rate) loans does not deliver any advantages, as 
there is no necessity to signal the quality of external effects. Funding via a subsidised loan, in 
turn, could lead to volatility in taxation, which is neither appreciated by taxpayers nor by 
politicians. To conclude, the presence of external effects can be corrected by grant subsidies 
to achieve a better overall welfare solution.  
The same argumentation holds true for imperfect competition in the case where a monopoly 
is reasonable due to, e.g., securing the provision of goods. In such a situation, positive 
external effects arise which can be subsidised by public authorities. As long as there are no 
informational asymmetries connected to the project, the support through grant subsidies is 
more suitable than through loans (as already explained for pure external effects). In some 
way, the monopolistic inefficiencies are indirectly supported by subsidising, however, this is 
only possible to the extent of the positive external effects and the monopolist himself should 
be interested in reducing those inefficiencies to improve his profit. Finally, if there are no 
externalities connected to the project, then subsidies are too costly to reduce this market 
failure. 
Incomplete information can result in profits for the better informed project promoter only if 
these extra profits do not render the project unattractive to the private investors to begin 
with. In this case, the promoter should credibly signal the information that is needed to get 
realistic predictions for the project assessment from an external point of view. Sometimes, 
this might not be possible without external help, because, e.g., self-financing a sufficient part 
of the project is not feasible for the promoter. In such a case, public intervention might be 
necessary if it is able to assure credible signalling. However, public authorities are generally 
not integrated in the projects nor do they have more or better information than the 
prospective investor. Hence, an intervention through subsidies would not be helpful to 
correct this market failure. 
Nevertheless, the situation changes if there are market failures which arise from an 
informational background in combination with external effects. In these cases, public 
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authorities are involved in the project when assessing the positive externalities. As a result, 
they get information which might be helpful to evaluate the financial quality as well. Thus, 
the interventions should be made in the form of loans. Only in very specific cases – with 
correlated external effects and monetary outcomes – grants might be sufficient to signal the 
project quality. Nevertheless, the general suggestion without further information – for all 
participants – on such correlations would be to employ a financial instrument in the form of 
loans. By using this subsidy measure, payments to public authorities are also dependent on 
the successful development of the project. Hence, the private sector will be convinced of the 
project quality and will invest as well. Finally, if there is imperfect competition in addition to 
the other two market imperfections the argumentation in terms of funding means does not 
change.  
All proposed measures of intervention for urban development funding by the JESSICA 
initiative and traditional grants are summarised in Figure 4.  With the help of this figure, we 
will briefly summarise our approach. We started with the reasons for market failures, which 
are important in the urban context: (positive) external effects, imperfect competition, and 
incomplete information. We then worked out which kind of interventions might be suitable 
to overcome the resulting failures. So far, we have concentrated on loans as revolving 
instruments, but the ideas are equally applicable to equity and guarantees – the other two 
forms of JESSICA intervention. All in all, grants are appropriate if there are mere external 
effects or external effects in combination with imperfect competition. If external effects 
arise in combination with incomplete information, revolving and thus success-dependent 
instruments should be employed to signal good (financial) project quality. The same is true if 
imperfect competition occurs in addition. Finally, it should be noted that deviations from this 
suggestions are possible if the assumptions are not met, i.e., if there is general knowledge 
about correlated monetary outcomes and external effects of projects or the public authority 
cannot help to overcome the informational asymmetries. In the former case, grants are 
appropriate for every combination with incomplete information as the drawbacks from loan 
financing outweigh the benefits. In the latter case, grants (or loans) might help to close the 
financial gap, but they will not help to overcome informational problems. Other measures 
outside the scope of JESSICA, e.g., informational disclosure, might be an alternative, but are 
not the focus of the respective initiative and the paper at hand. 
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<<< Insert Figure 4 about here >>> 
3.3 Additional Barriers for Urban Actors 
Urban actors typically mention other and partially related barriers preventing them from 
participating in project implementation and financing. We will briefly refer to two often 
mentioned barriers and connect them with the aforementioned market failures. Regulations 
might be named as one reason for the omission of projects. However, some regulations are 
necessary to adjust prices in order to reduce market failures. This is the case for (negative) 
external effects which are normally not integrated in the calculation of future benefits and 
costs. Higher investment costs for a project with less negative externalities are not 
compensated without regulations. However, we agree that some specific market restrictions 
may cause problems if they are not adapted continuously. Uncertainty is a second barrier 
often stated. This is similar to the case of incomplete information (see Fritsch, 2011) and 
leads to estimation errors in the calculation as those introduced in the other context. This 
barrier can be partially removed by addressing the market failures arising from an 
informational background. 
4 Projects which Need Intervention to Overcome Market Failures 
In this section, we will now introduce typical urban development projects which are 
suggested to be integrated into UDFs and thus represent public measures with a success-
oriented character of intervention, e.g., loans, equity, or guarantees. Afterwards, in Section 
4.2 and Section 4.3, the identified types of projects are analysed with respect to their 
connection to market failures and categorised by the capability of different means of 
subvention to reduce the respective market failures. 
4.1 Suggested Projects for UDFs 
To evaluate where the introduction of UDFs in the context of the JESSICA initiative is useful, 
the EIB launched studies with several consulting partners in different regions of member 
states. Among the available studies, we selected those from the three most frequently 
represented countries – Germany, Italy, and Poland (the chosen sources can be found in the 
section on EIB evaluation studies at the end of the references). Analysing all proposed 
projects for the implementation under JESSICA, indirectly provides an overview of the 
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situation in urban capital markets and helps us to identify which kind of projects seem to be 
most suitable for UDFs.  
From the 16 regional studies, we identified 108 potential projects and assigned them to at 
least one of the 15 following categories: communication, energy or transport infrastructure, 
retail, office or residential buildings, culture, tourism, education, research, health, business 
start-up, industry/business, public buildings/spaces as well as (urban) agriculture. The 15 
categories were successively built to conform with the project rationale and eligibility 
criteria named in the studies from the three countries. Furthermore, the categories coincide 
with typical classification categories used in several (practi   n   ’) references. A project is 
classified to cover   c     n c   g     f  h       ’     c      n   v      h       c  v      c    
an important feature of the corresponding project. The distribution among these categories 
is displayed in Figure 5. 
<<< Insert Figure 5 about here >>> 
Figure 5 shows that 31 projects are connected to cultural aspects, 21 to transport 
infrastructure, 18 to energy infrastructure as well as to retail buildings, 15 to public buildings 
and spaces, 13 to tourism, 11 to office as well as residential buildings, 8 to each education, 
research and industry/business, 6 to health and start-ups and only 1 to communication 
infrastructure as well as agriculture. As there were only 108 projects described in the 
studies, some of them are assigned to more than one category. Some typical overlaps 
concern culture and tourism (10 overlaps), office, residential and retail buildings (6 overlaps) 
as well as start-up and industry/business support (4 overlaps). Table 1 in the appendix shows 
more details on the categorisation of the projects named in the studies. The first three 
columns give the member state, region, and project name. The last remaining columns 
indicate to which categories the project was assigned based on its description in the 
evaluation study. For each country, the project order corresponds to typical category 
groupings and the existing overlaps. As demonstrated by this table and highlighted by Figure 
5, the overall distribution of the number of projects among the categories is slightly 
decreasing with an upper half quantile being covered by the first 4 categories only (with an 
overall of mere six overlaps in culture or transport with energy or retail). We will now take a 
closer look at these most frequently covered categories in the upper half. A lot of projects 
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suggested have a cultural background such as the conservation of historical buildings or the 
construction of cultural centres for art galleries, museums, concert halls, or sport areas. 
These are followed by projects related to transport infrastructure with the creation and 
renovation of important hubs (for trains, busses, cars) as well as car parks. Another 
important part consists of energy related projects (energy efficiency renovation and 
renewable energy installation) and retail related projects (multi-purpose buildings and 
renovation of shopping areas).  
The reasons for the selection of the projects in the analysed evaluation studies are of 
organisational, legal, and financial character. For the implementation of JESSICA, the project 
preparation needs to be in a stage where data is available and planning on future cash flows 
is possible. The legal requirements are set by the ERDF (European Regional Development 
Fund) framework. In contrast, financial requirements target to identify projects which show 
a gap compared to market financing conditions (typical interest rates cannot be covered by 
project revenues). A distinction between the types of appropriate funding means due to the 
market failures concerned is in general missing in the studies. Sometimes it is even directly 
mentioned that either European Union grants or JESSICA mechanisms are at choice (see 
Deloitte, 2011b). Therefore, the studies do not separate projects by their suitability for grant 
or success-dependent (UDF) funding, but they only identify urban projects with general 
funding needs and eligibility. The paper at hand thus contributes to further elaborate the 
topic of urban development investing through appropriate financial instruments. 
4.2 Relation of Market Failures to the Upper Half of Project Categories 
Having identified which projects are generally seen to be suitable for JESSICA financing from 
a rather practical point of view with the help of the evaluation studies, we will now analyse 
typical problems connected with the most important project types in order to find out if 
these projects are prone to market failures which can indeed be corrected with the help of 
success-dependent funding types such as loans. First, we will analyse both types of 
infrastructure projects (energy and transport) which are among the four most important 
categories and then we will concentrate on the remaining two category of this group: 
cultural and retail building projects. 
 
106 
 
The projects suggested in the categories renewable energy or energy efficiency cover 
residential, industrial and public buildings. Brown (2001) identifies several reasons why 
energy efficiency projects are not realised even though they may be advantageous for a 
society as a whole. One of these reasons are external effects such as unpriced benefits. 
Further, he mentions insufficient and inaccurate information as well as incomplete markets 
with only few manufacturers in some sectors. Hence, the general condition which justifies 
subsidy interventions is met for this kind of projects. In addition, we can observe arguments 
that point to information problems which in turn signal the need for market intervention by 
JESSICA-type instruments as discussed in Section 3.2. 
In the context of transport infrastructure, one immediately has to think about the fact that 
typically only a few huge firms dominate the respective national or regional markets. This 
indicates a potential for failures arising from imperfect competition. As a lot of suggested 
projects aim at the renovation and installation of multi-purpose traffic hubs, the existing few 
huge firms need to be brought in together on the projects. Thus, we can identify competition 
problems as one cause for intervention in the field of transport infrastructure via JESSICA-
type instruments. In addition, infrastructure projects generally have problems with 
informational asymmetries (see Flyvbjerg, 2005) and thus also fulfil the second criteria for 
the use of success-related interventions as well. Moreover, some external effects play a role 
(see, e.g., Lijesen and Shestalova, 2007) and hence, the basic condition for subsidies is 
fulfilled as well. 
Projects with a cultural background, as defined in the studies, have regular income aspects 
from ticket sales or rents. However, these incomes might be lower than necessary, yet it 
may be worth to initiate the projects due to positive external effects, such as the 
maintenance of historic buildings and heritage as well as the support of sports. These ideas 
are in line with Coase and Humphreys (2003) as well as Ahlfeld and Maennig (2010). For such 
projects, we do not see major problems in terms of competition and information 
procurement nor did we find any evidence against this thesis in the literature. Thus, such 
types of projects seem to be better supported by success-independent solutions such as 
grants to compensate for the financial gap. But there is no need for, e.g., information signals 
to indicate project quality in general. 
 
107 
 
The same arguments can be made for the redevelopment of retail areas. Incomes from 
rental activities should be at least partially sufficient to cover the investment expenses. As 
the know-how for the construction of shopping areas is not too specific, the absence of 
competition should not be a major issue. In addition, information on expected rents and 
costs can be gathered by benchmarking, as shopping areas exist manifold in cities. 
Consequently, high costs in the case of brownfield redevelopment or demolition of 
neglected shopping areas may be compensated with positive external effects such as more 
quality of life for the citizens or costumer acquisition for the surrounding area which are 
found in studies like the one of West and Orr (2003). Hence, such projects should be 
subsidised by grants to compensate for the externalities only. 
We saw that the proposed projects reveal market failures which justify government or 
higher level interventions. Up to now, we identified two groups among the most frequent 
types of projects. The first group is defined by projects related to energy and transport 
investments with positive external effects, problems of imperfect competition and 
incomplete information, which should be supported by JESSICA measures (loans, equity, 
guarantees). The second group is mainly driven by market failures due to mere external 
effects and should thus be funded on a grant basis. This is the case for the construction of 
cultural centres and retail areas. 
4.3 Relevant Types of Imperfections for Each Project Category 
In the following, we will classify all analysed projects with regard to the type of 
imperfections that necessitate government intervention. The two groups, i.e., energy and 
transport infrastructure on the one hand and cultural centres and retail areas on the other 
hand, derived before will be expanded to obtain a complete structure. First, projects which 
would benefit from success-dependent financing (such as loans) represent the most 
important class for JESSICA funding, projects which need mere financial support to 
compensate for external effects benefit from a second class strongly related to JESSICA, but 
with need for grant funding. All other projects do not meet the requirements that justify 
subsidy intervention and are thus not important for urban development support. The results 
are shown in Table 2. 
<<< Insert Table 2 about here >>> 
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For each project category, all three reasons for market failures are listed. If a particular type 
of market imperfection is generally likely for the project category, it is marked by a plus. A 
minus indicates the irrelevance or absence of the respective market imperfection, whereas 
“ ”    c        low relevance. In the case of only externalities occurring, the appropriate 
f n  ng           “G  n ”  If external effects occur in combination with at least incomplete 
information, th     f      f n  ng                “J    CA”  wh ch    n   h   success-
dependent measures should be applied. If only imperfections of the last two kinds 
(imperfect competition and incomplete information) occur, or if “ ”     n             then 
no funding through subsidies should be necessary and the omission of such projects already 
reflects the market optimum sufficiently. 
The final categorisation of all projects follows the same arguments that were already applied 
in Section 4.2. Thus, we only very briefly substantiate the choices of plus, minus,    “ ” for 
those project categories not explained in detail before. Public buildings and spaces are a 
typical example of public goods and represent external effects as explained in Section 3.1.1. 
The projects connected to tourism mainly cover the renovation of tourist accommodations, 
historic buildings, and the construction of tourist centres and restaurants. Therefore, the 
projects are partially identical to those covering cultural aspects and otherwise with those 
from the category retail buildings. Thus, we can assume that externalities are the main 
reasons for market failures in these cases as well. Education is a typical category affected by 
external effects and incomplete information (see Fritsch, 2011), as the one who finances the 
education cannot entirely control if the educated individual will later be at his disposal. 
Nevertheless, the projects categorised as having an educational character in the EIB 
evaluation studies mainly concern the construction and renovation of school buildings and 
similar centres. In such cases, the risk of informational asymmetries is absent, because only 
the general increase of human capital is present for these projects. There are no 
asymmetries between the investors and the project managers, as the educational aspects 
are of an unspecific kind. For this reason, there remain only the issues related to public 
goods (external effects). The situation changes for specific educational and research 
activities. The risk of transferring knowledge to competitors is high as well as the risk of 
unsuccessful project outcomes. Hence, the investor depends on information about the 
project success probability which he usually cannot acquire on his own in new and 
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unestablished fields of interest  Th        f          c  nf       n f    h  “   ca   n”-
category thus needs to be always carefully checked on a project-by-project basis. For 
     c   w  h   “research” ch   c     h                        c          n . Projects from 
the next category – industry/business – are often related to the creation of industry, 
business and technology parks. They produce positive external effects for the surrounding 
area by attracting new firms and they can in general be seen as similar to research activities 
with respect to their categorisation. The initialisation of projects related to health care 
centres suffers mainly from information problems, as the demand is highly dependent on 
research in medical sciences and demographic changes which are both difficult to predict. In 
addition, there might be only few firms specialised on the construction and planning of 
health care centres. The support of business start-ups deals with the same issues as research 
and industry/business. In addition, imperfect competition is always a problem when funding 
start-ups. The reasons for the assigned categorisation of communication infrastructure 
correspond to those already stated for transport infrastructure projects. Finally, three types 
of projects are nearly unaffected by the analysed types of market failure and should be 
financed without public intervention if they are profitable. Those are the construction of 
office buildings, residential buildings, and projects of urban agriculture.  
To conclude, a number of the proposed projects from the EIB evaluation studies are not 
suitable for JESSICA-type instruments from a market failure perspective, but should either be 
financed by the market without public interventions or should be supported by grants. 
5 Implications 
At this point, we should recall our previous assumption regarding informational advantages 
of public authorities. Signalling through public loans is only possible if public authorities learn 
about the project quality when they analyse the value attributes of the external effects. The 
same might be true, to a different extent, for the project categories assigned to JESSICA 
funding in Table 2. Asymmetric information for infrastructure projects results from high 
costs to obtain the necessary information or similar effects, such as the consumers’ 
disinterest in assessing the costs and benefits connected to a certain topic (see Brown, 
2001). High costs for information should not constitute an impediment for public authorities 
as long as the supposed external effects are significant enough to justify a costly evaluation 
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of them and the financial quality of the project simultaneously. Through such an assessment, 
the negative consequences of asymmetric information should disappear, or at least have less 
impact. Thus, for infrastructure projects, a decrease of information inequalities by public 
authorities is plausible. The same applies to research, start-up and business/industry 
support. Especially, the first two deal with very sensitive data and making such information 
publicly available leads to a high risk of duplication through the respective competitors. 
Public authorities, however, can confidentially analyse the project, as they are dependent on 
the success for loan financing (which would be offered for suitable (“good”) projects). 
Nevertheless, in the case of information asymmetry in the context of education, one can 
doubt that the ability of public authorities to assess the necessary information is indeed 
better, as the decision where to apply the received education is made by each individual 
separately. Hence, the risk of educated employees joining a competitor may not be assessed 
with better accuracy by public authorities. To conclude, projects related to educational 
topics should be carefully investigated with respect to the reasons for asymmetric 
information, before they are finally supported by revolving financial instruments instead of 
grants.  
The need to further investigate individual projects, before a proper decision for JESSICA 
funding can be made, reflects an important aspect of the analyses done so far in this paper: 
The categorisation of projects helps to identify potential types of funding applicable to 
certain project categories, which provides useful information for high-level decision making. 
If public institutions want to determine where the employment of a UDF within the JESSICA 
initiative is appropriate to correct the urban capital market, indicators reflecting the 
respective categories reveal geographical units of special interest. Generally, for aggregated 
decision environments, a simplified typing is a common approach. Hence, we suggest to use 
the results of this paper to conduct a screening of certain geographical units in order to 
determine where to establish UDFs and where the general need is not sufficient to justify 
such a complex investment structure, but, e.g., grants suffice to connect the demand for 
urban development with capital suppliers. Of course, a more detailed project analysis should 
follow on the project level (through the UDF manager) as a supplement to this aggregated 
view in order to finally determine the subsidy intervention type for a specific project. If the 
recommended subsidy differs from the one suggested for its category, this deviation should 
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be well justified. Finally, the aggregated analysis of project categories structures the overall 
decision process on both levels in such a way that it indicates a type of subsidy and that 
individual deviations need separate explanations. 
The selection of particular regions which are suitable for UDFs based on an aggregated view 
depends on certain criteria such as the number of funds to be distributed, the amounts of 
money available, and the volume of projects. These criteria should be set up carefully 
according to the national or European funding conditions at the respective point in time. It is 
important to note that the restrictions should be rather generous, because projects may be 
eliminated afterwards in the detailed analysis. Conversely, a first-level selection which is too 
strict may hinder the establishment of UDFs in some locations despite its suitability. Without 
any specifications from those responsible for JESSICA, the definition of the boundaries 
remains a tedious task. We use a rather simple, but demonstrative proxy for the rest of this 
paper, namely the mere number of projects connected to JESSICA-type funding. In 
combination with the generous declaration of a project to be supported by JESSICA, the 
application for the paper is manageable and clarifying. However, it is based on the 
assumption that a project fully covers the typical project specifications from the assigned 
category.  
To demonstrate the decision process with its two steps, we take a closer look at the 
distribution of the appropriate funding types under consideration of the urban deficits 
named in the evaluation studies. To this end, we identified the categories applicable for each 
project and counted how many of these categories indicated a particular funding means. 
Table 3 in the appendix shows the number of categories for each project that correspond to 
the different funding means; the project “ n          n  n c           ch    k”  n M zovia, 
    n   c v     h  c   g      “      ch”  “    n         -  ”  n  “ n      /    n   ”  wh ch 
are all suitable for JESSICA-type funding. This results in the table entries 3 in the fourth and 0 
in the fifth and sixth column  Th  n      w    c       h       c  “ n  g  c      n g   n  
for lighting (street and public buildings/areas)” w  h  h          h  n   f n w   gh  ng 
         n  h         g  n  Th        c  c v     h  c   g      “energy infrastructure”  
“transport infrastructure”  n  “public buildings/spaces”  Th  f      w   h        handled by 
JESSICA-type instruments, whereas the latter is more suitable to grant funding. Thus, the 
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table entries are 2 in the fourth column for the two JESSICA-type categories, 1 in the fifth 
column for the connection to grant financing by the category of public buildings and spaces 
and 0 in the last column as there is no evidence for non-subsidy financing. This aggregation 
reveals those regions with a majority of suggested projects connected to JESSICA-type 
funding. These are Berlin, Campania, Hamburg, Mazovia, Pomerania, Puglia, Sardinia, South 
Poland, and Tuscany. For these nine regions, the potential for market failure correction by 
establishing a UDF seems to be indeed high (assuming that the proposed projects well 
       n   h    g  n ’  nv     n  n    ).  
Nevertheless, as stated before, after this general screening on an aggregated regional level, 
the projects need to be analysed in detail before a UDF should finally invest in them. As one 
example, we will now evaluate the projects for the region of Hamburg, Germany. Two 
projects are clearly assigned to categories indicative of JESSICA funding, namely the 
         ng  f     nk        g   n  n  g           (“ n  g    nk   W  h      g”)  n  an 
energy efficient area heating system (“Wä   v      n  z W   q       ”)  B  h      c   
should supply the adjacent estate with green energy or green energy heating, respectively. 
This primarily leads to less impact on the environment in comparison with the traditional 
supply in the areas, which is a positive external effect. The typical problems of energy 
infrastructure projects render loans (or equity/guarantees) favourable and as the 
informational asymmetries are of such a kind that they can indeed be removed by public 
authorities, financing the projects by the revolving instruments of a UDF as the method of 
choice can be confirmed also by a more detailed analysis.  
The construction of education, communication, and sports centres (“T r z   W   ”, 
“Neugraben-F  ch  k”  “R  h      gv      ”) relates to JESSICA-type categories through their 
educational aspects as well as to other externalities through cultural (and social) effects. The 
target group mentioned in the studies for “T   z   W   ”  n  “   g    n-F  ch  k” are 
primarily pupils. For this group, there is no direct risk of abusing the relationship and 
informational disadvantages for the other party as would be the case for an employer who 
finances further training for his employee. Hence, we do not see the need for a reduction in 
informational asymmetries for this kind of educational projects. Consequently, after a 
detailed consideration, we would suggest to refrain from employing revolving instruments, 
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but to apply traditional grant funding. However, the situation changes for the third 
educational project, because the qualification programmes are very specific and focus on 
adults and business innovation. The risk of information asymmetries is not absent in such 
cases anymore, and thus the use of loan financing can help to overcome information gaps 
related to the extent of successful training with possible higher reflows.  
Th       c  “h    h    v ng f          ,  n  c     c    c n   ”  n “Mü     nn    g” is a 
combination with normal residential apartments, which represent the major part of the 
project. All in all, there may be only a need for a slight support by grants as also indicated by 
the aggregated analysis.  
The reconstruction of a local trade area in “Wilhelmsburg” aims to provide flexible 
commercial sites for local/ethical economies. The externalities coupled with the local/ethical 
support should be covered by traditional grants, which is in line with the results from the 
aggregated view.  
To conclude, we would argue that the establishment of a UDF is possible for the region, as 
three of the named projects are indeed suitable for financing by revolving instruments. 
Hence, a UDF would contain slightly less projects than assumed by the aggregated analysis 
for this region, which identified five of the initial seven suggested projects to be appropriate 
for JESSICA. Figure 6 reveals the process of decision making, which we just applied for 
Hamburg, but which is equally valid for other regions. 
<<< Insert Figure 6 about here >>> 
So, in general, for each region, the potential projects should be first analysed in an 
aggregated way based on the project categories they generally belong to. If this already 
leads to a very low number of projects with potential JESSICA-type funding, a UDF will not be 
the appropriate means of support for the respective region (bottom part of Figure 6). In the 
case where the aggregated screening identifies a high number of potential JESSICA-type 
projects, an additional detailed analysis can help to further select those which are indeed 
eligible for financing through a UDF. For this, the typical categories assigned to the 
respective projects should be carefully questioned to their applicability in the specific 
context. Finally, for each region, one can decide whether to establish a UDF or not. Starting 
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with an aggregated analysis diminishes the effort necessary as some regions might directly 
fall into the c   g    “   UDF” and for the other regions the decision process is better 
structured by this top down approach. However, the exact conditions for the declaration of a 
region to be indeed a candidate for the establishment of a UDF should be defined by the 
responsible European (or national) authorities depending on, e.g., the amount of funding 
available and the volume of the projects and not necessarily on the mere number of projects 
as assumed for the sake of clarity in this paper. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper analysed market imperfections in the context of urban development funding and 
their implications for the intervention of public authorities. We revealed three main reasons 
for market failures, namely the existence of external effects, imperfect competition, and 
incomplete information, which may hinder the realisation of urban development projects. 
All three imperfections affect the relation of the overall welfare NPV (representing perfect 
conditions) to the (financial) one of the project in the actual market situation. Depending on 
the characteristics of these two values, situations where the welfare optimum is not met can 
be identified, thus representing market failures. The investigation of the impact of different 
funding measures in each imperfect market situation led to the conclusion that grants are a 
suitable means in the presence of mere external effects or in combination with imperfect 
competition, whereas the combination of external effects with incomplete information (or in 
addition imperfect competition) typically requires a success-dependent kind of funding such 
as loans, equity, or guarantees. Hence, JESSICA-type instruments are appropriate in 
situations with informational asymmetries and at least the imperfection of external effects. 
In a next step, we systematised projects proposed in the EIB evaluation studies for the 
implementation of JESSICA UDFs in the three European Union member states Germany, 
Italy, and Poland. This revealed that projects related to culture, tourism, retail as well as 
public buildings and spaces should get grant funding, as they are mainly prone to market 
failures arising from external effects. In contrast, projects in the fields of transport, energy, 
communication, education, research, business parks, and start-ups are indeed suitable for 
JESSICA-type funding. Finally, some projects mentioned in the evaluation studies do not 
seem to be worth funding from a market failure point of view. In particular, those related to 
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the renovation of office and residential buildings, urban agriculture as well as health care 
centres should not receive any kind of funding.  
To conclude, we can state that policy interventions in the form of funding are a solution if 
projects are not getting financed because of a market failure. However, the appropriate 
funding type is crucial to not disrupt normal market functioning. Thus, the connection 
between the potential omission of project realisation and market failures should always be 
carefully investigated before selecting funding instruments. In addition to an aggregated 
screening for regional and urban funding, a project always needs to be finally approved for 
the respective funding type as demonstrated for the suggestions of the Hamburg evaluation 
study. Thereby, policy interventions help to (re-) establish normal market functioning and do 
not distort it by even worsening the situation. However, we only analysed the intervention 
possibilities via JESSICA-type instruments and grants, as both belong to subsidies. It remains 
to carefully consider whether other interventions outside the scope of JESSICA work more 
effectively, if markets fail in the analysed situations.  
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Figure 1: Typical structure of urban capital markets. 
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Figure 2: Decision of project initialisation with external effects under the consideration of Net Present Value. 
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Figure 3: General intervention possibilities to overcome market failures. 
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Figure 4: Subsidy intervention measures depending on the existing market imperfections. 
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Figure 5: Number of proposed projects for UDFs per category. 
 
 
 
124 
 
 
Figure 6: Decision process on UDFs for a region.
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Table 1: Projects and assigned categories from the JESSICA evaluation studies.   
The last 15 columns represent the project categories covered by the      c  v       c   f   k   w  h  n “ ”. 
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Germany Saarland renovation of historically listed restaurant building x x
Germany Hamburg education and sports centre x x
Germany Hamburg education centre x x
Germany Hamburg education and communication centre x x
Germany Berlin arts-related service area with galleries x
Germany Berlin creativ centre (galleries, architects, start-ups) x x
Germany NRW offices at histiorically renovated outer wall x x
Germany NRW brownfield development to concert hall x
Germany Saarland redevelopment of shopping street x
Germany Saarland redevelopment of retail and hotel area x x
Germany Saarland revitalisation of retail properties x
Germany Hamburg reconstruction of local trade area x
Germany Hamburg health, living for elderly and commercial centre x x x
Germany Berlin redevelopment closed airport to business park x x x
Germany NRW   n    v     n  f       n          (      n      c     c    …) x x x
Germany NRW brownfield development to retail establishment x
Germany Saarland revitalisation of public pedestrian areas x x
Germany Saarland central heating supply for public buildings x x
Germany Saarland (renewable) energy supply enhancement for communities x
Germany Hamburg remodelling of a bunker to a green energy supplier x
Germany Hamburg energy efficient area heating x
Germany NRW modernisation of buildings x x x
Germany Saarland installation fibre optic infrastructure x
Germany Saarland high standard inner city residential area x
Germany Berlin research centre for engineering and technology x
Germany Berlin health care centre x
Germany Berlin research institute for culture and information technologies x
Germany Berlin start-up centre x
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Germany Berlin research centre for low energy x
Italy Sardina regeneration of ex-industrial building to sports, museum, library) x x x
Italy Tuscany music hall x
Italy Tuscany museum x
Italy Marche region revitalisation of historic centre x x
Italy Abruzzo subsidiesed housing and sports area x x
Italy Sicily concert hall and creativity centre and hotel x x
Italy Sardina regeneration of historic buildings to socio-cultural centre x
Italy Sardina university and sports centre x x
Italy Sardina spa x x
Italy Sicily regenerate urban space (green, transport, buildings) x x x x x
Italy Abruzzo reutilisation of psychiatric hospital to offices and retail spaces x x
Italy Campania multipurpose centre (offices, retail, hostel) x x x
Italy Sicily street regeneration for hotel restaurants, retail, residential x x x x
Italy Sardina market area regeneration x
Italy Sardina commercial, offices and social housing x x x
Italy Sardina upgrading roads (renewable energy light) x x
Italy Abruzzo air rail x
Italy Campania underground parking and top area reconstruction x x
Italy Sardina hub for roads and public transport x
Italy Sardina parking basement x
Italy Sardina enhancement of movability system and heliport x x
Italy Sardina airport upgrade x
Italy Tuscany restoration of hydroelectric power x
Italy Marche region low environmental impact industrial area x x
Italy Sicily energy reconversion of public buildings x x
Italy Sardina upgrading school buildings (renewable energies) x x
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Italy Sardina water supply system x
Italy Tuscany expansion of industrial estate area x
Italy Tuscany science park x x x
Italy Tuscany civic centre x
Italy Tuscany research centre x
Italy Puglia clinical care and research centre x x
Italy Abruzzo reutilisation of old area for public spaces and services x
Italy Abruzzo reutilisation of industrial complex x
Italy Campania educational building x
Italy Sicily restoration and regeneration of waterfront to new tourist port
Italy Sicily hospice x
Italy Sardina park and gardens x
Italy Sardina conversion into agricultural land x
Italy Sardina student and tourist accommodation in regenerated buildings x x
Italy Sardina research centre x
Poland Mazovia revitalization of station area and historic building x x x
Poland West ex-industry building conversion into culture centre x
Poland West regeneration of post-military into sports area x
Poland Pomerania culture centre x
Poland Pomerania construction and redevelopment of sports area x
Poland Lodzkie renovation and reconstruction of historic buildings into bars, bowling etc x
Poland Lodzkie revitalisation of post industrial districts for tourism etc x x
Poland Lodzkie renovation and construction for residential, sports etc areas x x
Poland Mazovia redevelopment into sports and recreation area x
Poland Mazovia revitalization of theatre and other cultural areas with ist surroundings x x
Poland Mazovia revitalization of urban green areas for culture, sports and recreation x x
Poland Mazovia construction of hotel and sports areas x x
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Poland Mazovia reconstruction of public spaces for education and sports x x x
Poland Mazovia renovation of socio-cultural centre x
Poland Mazovia revitalization of historical areas x
Poland Mazovia revitalisation of city passage and creation of parking area x x x
Poland West regeneration of quarters (retail, office, housing) x x x
Poland Mazovia adaption of catering spaces x x
Poland Mazovia energy cost management for lighting (street and public buildings/areas) x x x
Poland South rail, bus, road hub station renovation x
Poland South underground car park construction x
Poland West railway station regeneration x
Poland Pomerania regeneration of sites arouns railway station x x
Poland Pomerania transport enhancement x
Poland Pomerania regeneration of port x
Poland Mazovia bridge for motorists (traffic and tourism) x x
Poland Mazovia modernization of rail station x
Poland Mazovia modernization of rail trail x
Poland Mazovia construction of a car park x
Poland Lodzkie energy efficiency x
Poland Mazovia modernizationand extension of heating network x
Poland Mazovia renewable energy supply x
Poland Mazovia installation of solar collectors on public buildings x x
Poland Mazovia thermomodernization of schools x x
Poland South establishment of economic activity zones x x
Poland Mazovia industrial and nuclear research park x x x
Poland Mazovia adaption of office spaces x
Poland Mazovia creation of business and technology park x x
Poland Mazovia tourist information centre x
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Table 2: Types of imperfections and suitable means of funding. 
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Table 3: Appropriate funding means for each project.       
The last three columns represent the number of project categories covered by the respective project that correspond to 
JESSICA, grant or non-subsidised financing as identified in Table 1. 
 
Member 
state Region Project JE
SS
IC
A
G
ra
n
ts
N
o
n
e
Italy Abruzzo air rail 1 0 0
Italy Abruzzo reutilisation of industrial complex 1 0 0
Italy Abruzzo subsidiesed housing and sports area 0 1 1
Italy Abruzzo reutilisation of psychiatric hospital to offices and retail spaces 0 1 1
Italy Abruzzo reutilisation of old area for public spaces and services 0 1 0
Germany Berlin creativ centre (galleries, architects, start-ups) 1 1 0
Germany Berlin redevelopment closed airport to business park 1 1 1
Germany Berlin research centre for engineering and technology 1 0 0
Germany Berlin research institute for culture and information technologies 1 0 0
Germany Berlin start-up centre 1 0 0
Germany Berlin research centre for low energy 1 0 0
Germany Berlin arts-related service area with galleries 0 1 0
Germany Berlin health care centre 0 0 1
Italy Campania underground parking and top area reconstruction 1 1 0
Italy Campania educational building 1 0 0
Italy Campania multipurpose centre (offices, retail, hostel) 0 2 1
Germany Hamburg education and sports centre 1 1 0
Germany Hamburg education centre 1 1 0
Germany Hamburg education and communication centre 1 1 0
Germany Hamburg remodelling of a bunker to a green energy supplier 1 0 0
Germany Hamburg energy efficient area heating 1 0 0
Germany Hamburg reconstruction of local trade area 0 1 0
Germany Hamburg health, living for elderly and commercial centre 0 1 2
Poland Lodzkie energy efficiency 1 0 0
Poland Lodzkie renovation and reconstruction of historic buildings into bars, bowling etc 0 1 0
Poland Lodzkie revitalisation of post industrial districts for tourism etc 0 2 0
Poland Lodzkie renovation and construction for residential, sports etc areas 0 1 1
Italy Marche regionlow environmental impact industrial area 2 0 0
Italy Marche regionrevitalisation of historic centre 0 2 0
Poland Mazovia industrial and nuclear research park 3 0 0
Poland Mazovia energy cost management for lighting (street and public buildings/areas) 2 1 0
Poland Mazovia thermomodernization of schools 2 0 0
Poland Mazovia creation of business and technology park 2 0 0
Poland Mazovia revitalization of station area and historic building 1 2 0
Poland Mazovia reconstruction of public spaces for education and sports 1 2 0
Poland Mazovia revitalisation of city passage and creation of parking area 1 1 1
Poland Mazovia bridge for motorists (traffic and tourism) 1 1 0
Poland Mazovia modernization of rail station 1 0 0
Poland Mazovia modernization of rail trail 1 0 0
Poland Mazovia construction of a car park 1 0 0
Poland Mazovia modernizationand extension of heating network 1 0 0
Poland Mazovia renewable energy supply 1 0 0
Poland Mazovia installation of solar collectors on public buildings 1 1 0
Poland Mazovia redevelopment into sports and recreation area 0 1 0
Poland Mazovia revitalization of theatre and other cultural areas with ist surroundings 0 2 0
Poland Mazovia revitalization of urban green areas for culture, sports and recreation 0 2 0
Poland Mazovia construction of hotel and sports areas 0 2 0
Poland Mazovia renovation of socio-cultural centre 0 1 0
Poland Mazovia revitalization of historical areas 0 1 0
Poland Mazovia adaption of catering spaces 0 2 0
Poland Mazovia adaption of office spaces 0 0 1
Poland Mazovia tourist information centre 0 1 0
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Member 
state Region Project JE
SS
IC
A
G
ra
n
ts
N
o
n
e
Germany NRW modernisation of buildings 1 1 1
Germany NRW offices at histiorically renovated outer wall 0 1 1
Germany NRW brownfield development to concert hall 0 1 0
Germany NRW   n    v     n  f       n          (      n      c     c    …) 0 1 2
Germany NRW brownfield development to retail establishment 0 1 0
Poland Pomerania regeneration of sites arouns railway station 1 1 0
Poland Pomerania transport enhancement 1 0 0
Poland Pomerania regeneration of port 1 0 0
Poland Pomerania culture centre 0 1 0
Poland Pomerania construction and redevelopment of sports area 0 1 0
Italy Puglia clinical care and research centre 1 0 1
Germany Saarland revitalisation of public pedestrian areas 1 1 0
Germany Saarland central heating supply for public buildings 1 1 0
Germany Saarland (renewable) energy supply enhancement for communities 1 0 0
Germany Saarland installation fibre optic infrastructure 1 0 0
Germany Saarland renovation of historically listed restaurant building 0 2 0
Germany Saarland redevelopment of shopping street 0 1 0
Germany Saarland redevelopment of retail and hotel area 0 2 0
Germany Saarland revitalisation of retail properties 0 1 0
Germany Saarland high standard inner city residential area 0 0 1
Italy Sardina upgrading roads (renewable energy light) 2 0 0
Italy Sardina upgrading school buildings (renewable energies) 2 0 0
Italy Sardina regeneration of ex-industrial building to sports, museum, library) 1 2 0
Italy Sardina university and sports centre 1 1 0
Italy Sardina hub for roads and public transport 1 0 0
Italy Sardina parking basement 1 0 0
Italy Sardina enhancement of movability system and heliport 1 0 1
Italy Sardina airport upgrade 1 0 0
Italy Sardina water supply system 1 0 0
Italy Sardina research centre 1 0 0
Italy Sardina regeneration of historic buildings to socio-cultural centre 0 1 0
Italy Sardina spa 0 1 1
Italy Sardina market area regeneration 0 1 0
Italy Sardina commercial, offices and social housing 0 1 2
Italy Sardina park and gardens 0 1 0
Italy Sardina conversion into agricultural land 0 0 1
Italy Sardina student and tourist accommodation in regenerated buildings 0 1 1
Italy Sicily regenerate urban space (green, transport, buildings) 1 2 2
Italy Sicily energy reconversion of public buildings 1 1 0
Italy Sicily concert hall and creativity centre and hotel 0 2 0
Italy Sicily street regeneration for hotel restaurants, retail, residential 0 2 2
Italy Sicily restoration and regeneration of waterfront to new tourist port 0 0 0
Italy Sicily hospice 0 0 1
Poland South establishment of economic activity zones 2 0 0
Poland South rail, bus, road hub station renovation 1 0 0
Poland South underground car park construction 1 0 0
Italy Tuscany science park 3 0 0
Italy Tuscany restoration of hydroelectric power 1 0 0
Italy Tuscany expansion of industrial estate area 1 0 0
Italy Tuscany research centre 1 0 0
Italy Tuscany music hall 0 1 0
Italy Tuscany museum 0 1 0
Italy Tuscany civic centre 0 1 0
Poland West railway station regeneration 1 0 0
Poland West ex-industry building conversion into culture centre 0 1 0
Poland West regeneration of post-military into sports area 0 1 0
Poland West regeneration of quarters (retail, office, housing) 0 1 2
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1 Introduction 
The development of urban areas has been recognised as an issue of high priority by the 
European Commission during the last years. The scope of policy interventions in this field 
has been widened by the introduction of JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable 
Investments in City Areas) within the current programming period. The initiative promotes 
sustainable development in urban areas through financial engineering such as loans 
disbursed through Urban Development Funds (UDFs) (see European Commission, 2006). 
These tools imply that fractions of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) can be 
invested in UDFs or a Holding Fund (HF) – which again invests in several UDFs – by employing 
revolving financial instruments like redeemable loans. The specific nature of the underlying 
projects prompt a thorough analysis of the eligibility of UDFs. This needs to be done on the 
urban or the regional level to account for practical limitations arising from the regulations 
regarding the geographical concentration of funding through ERDF. However, current 
funding targets the regional areas exclusively.   
Despite the fact that this emerging topic is of high societal relevance, literature on the 
identification of possible target areas – cities or regions – is notably absent. As the JESSICA 
initiative is not meant to remain on an experimental stage, but will continue in the following 
programming period, research on the evaluation of funding needs for UDFs is necessary. In 
this paper, we propose an approach through three subsequent steps, and compare it to 
actual funding behaviour across European regions (but not cities). In the first step, we 
analyse the distance – D – among regions, the second step describes their movability – M – 
through urban development funding and the last step considers market imperfections – I. 
The combination of all steps – namely, the DMI approach – results in a separation of possible 
funding targets by funding type, focus of support, and urban development.  
The DMI approach can be applied for different geographical units. If policy concentrates on 
urban development, the considered funding targets should correspond to the urban level. 
However, as limitations from European funding regulations only allow the allocation of 
money to the regional level, this paper focuses on regions as funding targets for the 
development of its urban areas. A comparison of the obtained results with current funding 
procedures therefore remains possible. Nevertheless, the approach can be translated to an 
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analysis of cities instead of regions, once policy regulations allow a direct allocation to the 
urban level. 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the concept of separating 
funding targets, in order to determine where the establishment of UDFs is suitable to 
enhance urban development. Section 3 applies the approach to Italian, Spanish and UK 
regions. Section 4 displays mixed results in regard of the current locations for UDFs and HFs 
and discusses the impact of the geographical level and the indicator set applied. Section 5 
reviews the underlying assumptions for the analyses, sketches some sensitivity checks, and 
proposes possible extensions. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2 Method 
Our suggested approach can be divided into three steps. We start with the determination of 
differences among possible funding targets for urban development. The measurement of 
movability through funding follows and, finally, we add the extent of regional urban capital 
markets’ imperfection. The combination of all three aspects serves to identify regions where 
the establishment of UDFs (or HFs) is a suitable means to support urban development, but 
also reveals the regions’ funding focus, which can be either mere financial or comprise some 
additional impact improvement. Hence, in the following, we introduce each of the three 
steps through the existing literature (if possible) and outline a schematic figure, which adds 
the new dimension to the previous one, ending in an overall consolidation of the three parts.  
2.1 Distance Measured Through a Small Number of Indicators 
2.1.1 Measuring Differences among Cities 
The literature offers several approaches discussing the topic of differences among cities or 
regions as a whole. However, they either deal with a selection of aspects of urban life or 
they condense information on the differences by using indexes. Representatives of the first 
group are Nijkamp (1986) and Callais and Aubert (2007), and Oliveira Soares et al. (2003), Li 
et al. (2006), Singh et al. (2009), and Soler Rovira and Soler Rovira (2009) of the second 
group. The first group is not suitable for developing distance measures across regions 
because of the limited coverage of urban life components and the impossibility of combining 
the different approaches. The second group is likewise of no avail, because in-depth 
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interpretation is limited, but we need such information for the linkage to informational 
asymmetries and funding means in the section on market imperfections.  
However, measuring differences among regions using small indicator sets is crucial for policy 
decisions and their subsequent urban development interventions, and has already been 
discussed in the context by Breuer and Brueser (2014a). Using Principal Component 
Analyses, this study revealed that a smaller set of indicators covering all aspects of urban life 
quality can adequately represent the differences among possible funding targets originally 
defined by a larger indicator set. The smaller sets differ depending on the underlying 
geographical scope and contain the following indicators for regional comparisons: 
─ total population, 
─ total population at working age, 
─ total land area,  
─ number of tourist overnight stays per year per resident, 
─ number of tourist overnight stays per year, 
─ female proportion of working age population at level 1 or 2 ISCED, 
─ consumption of water per inhabitant. 
We will use this set of indicators as a basis for the comparison of regions and define a 
benchmark as well as the distance to this benchmark. A high distance to the benchmark 
indicates a need of funding. To clarify our concept and for ease of visualisation, we always 
plot the basic idea for the case of only two indicators. Note that the underlying concepts are 
the same for any set of indicators, hence our general methodological conclusions remain 
unaffected whether we consider two indicators or the whole set. 
2.1.2 Distance to a Benchmark Region 
We interpret the differences among regions by defining a benchmark region and calculating 
the distance to this benchmark for each of the regions analysed. Thereby, we can control for 
the impact of the indicators on the regions’ positioning and reveal possible investment 
fields. The benchmark definition trades off the optimal direction for the indicator values and 
practical capability. For the optimal direction, we define the desired orientation for each 
indicator of the smaller set. Practical capability is achieved by setting the benchmark as the 
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best value according to the underlying data for each indicator, thereby creating a synthetic, 
but viable region. This means that the benchmark region’s value for an indicator which 
should be high is set to the highest in the data. Contrarily, the benchmark value is set to the 
lowest among the regions included in the data set for indicators with low targets. In 
addition, some indicators might aim at achieving internal optima and are therefore set to the 
median of all regions’ values included in the analyses. The multidimensional distance to this 
benchmark can then be calculated by some distance metric. 
In a case for two indicators with high target values, the left plot of Figure 1 demonstrates the 
benchmark definition. The regions covered by the analysis are shown as small points and the 
benchmark is represented by the big point at the top right. The benchmark is set to the 
maximum value for both indicators and then compared to the regions. Those regions with a 
low distance to the benchmark are obviously in a better position concerning urban 
development, and therefore not the target for ERDF funding. In contrast, regions with 
medium to high distances can be described as main targets for funding through UDFs, as a 
need for investment in urban development appears. These regions are thus highlighted 
(“UDF candidates”) in the plot of distances, as shown on the right side of Figure 1. 
<<< Insert Figure 1 about here >>> 
2.2 Movability Measured through Funding Efficiency 
The second dimension considers the movability of regions towards the benchmark by urban 
development funding. Our analysis tests on former funding success in order to determine ex 
post which regions are movable through funding. Funding success in general and for 
Structural Funds in particular has already been studied in the literature. Nevertheless, some 
articles only refer to qualitative arguments (see, e.g., European Commission, 2000, Bachtler 
et al., 2003, Ekins and Medhurst, 2006) or apply too simple definitions of funding success. 
The latter is the case for, e.g., Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004), who analyse effectiveness 
of funding by determining which regions remain in need of funding, and Skubowius and 
Krawczyk (2009), who only consider the revolving utilisation of funding as a success measure 
for funding through UDFs. Hence, our approach in the context of urban development and 
Structural Funds extends existing concepts by allowing for a quantitative assessment of a far-
reaching definition of funding success – namely funding efficiency.  
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2.2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis for Funding Efficiency 
A well established method for the measurement of efficiency is the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). It depicts an efficiency measurement method for Decision Making Units 
(DMU) of similar types, using inputs and outputs of each DMU to determine an efficiency 
score. In our case, each region is one DMU. The DEA calculates the efficiency through an 
internal comparison, and there is no need to specify an efficiency benchmark or weights of 
the different input and output units (see Cooper et al., 2006). We will take the amount of 
funding given to a region as input and the multidimensional changes in the smaller indicator 
set (introduced in Section 2.1.1) for two subsequent time points as output. Within the 
analysis, regions with the highest multidimensional output per input are denoted as 
efficient. The inefficiency of the other regions is determined by the distance to the efficiency 
frontier which is generated by the efficient regions.  
A single input (funding) and two output (the changes in indicator 1 and 2) dimensions 
efficiency analysis demonstrates the general idea of DEA in Figure 2. In this case, the regions 
with the highest output changes per input for one of the two indicators – R1 and R3 – are 
denoted as efficient and positioned on the efficiency frontier. Moreover, other regions 
which do not have the overall best value on one axis, but have a better overall value than a 
linear combination of the values which lie on the efficiency frontier so far would yield, are 
added. In our case, this holds for R2, which thus expands the frontier as shown by the bold 
lines in the figure. The method thereby assumes that any linear combination of DMUs is 
feasible and creates partly artificial regions for comparisons – namely the frontier area 
between the three real regions R1, R2, and R3. Any point inside the area is defined by the two 
axes and the efficiency frontier is dominated by (combinations of) the three efficient regions. 
For example, this applies for regions R4 and R5, which reveal medium inefficiencies, as 
demonstrated by the distance to the efficiency frontier on the two corresponding dashed 
lines. In contrast, R6 is inefficient to a great extent, as its distance to the efficiency frontier is 
considerable. The benchmark regions (for efficiency considerations – note that these are not 
the same as the benchmark region introduced in Section 2.1) are also proposed by the 
analysis and are set to the points where the dashed line impinges on the efficient frontier. 
For, e.g., R6 the efficiency benchmark thus is B6, which is a linear combination of R2 and R3. 
Comparing the parts of the efficient frontier between these two regions then yields to the 
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precise composition of the benchmark, which is defined by 40 % of R2 and 60 % of R3. The 
efficiency scores can be obtained from Figure 2 by computing the relation of the distance 
from the point of origin to the positioning of the region to the one from the point of origin to 
its efficiency benchmark. Thus, the scores range from 0 to 1 in general, with 1 being 
efficient, and the other numbers reveal the magnitude of inefficiency in a decreasing order. 
Hence, the efficiency of R1, R2, and R3, the medium inefficiency of R4 and R5, and the extreme 
inefficiency of R6 are represented by efficiency scores of 1, 1, 1, 0.82, 0.77, and 0.19, 
respectively. DEA also displays how to improve the efficiency. The efficiency score of 0.19 for 
R6 means that the funding could be decreased to 19 % of the current amount without 
reducing the outputs, provided that funds for R6 are used in the same way as in its 
benchmark regions R2 and R3 while orientating slightly more towards R3 (see Cooper et al., 
2006, for more details on DEA).  
<<< Insert Figure 2 about here >>> 
The model does not make any assumptions with respect to the specific form of the 
underlying production function, but approximates it in a piecewise linear way based on the 
given set of DMUs. This means that the exact form of the general output-to-input ratio – 
namely, the productivity – is not determined ex ante, but results from the calculations by 
combining the “best” DMUs linearly. We assume non-constant returns to scale according to 
the input-output-relation and input orientation. In this context, the term “non-constant 
returns to scale” means that the inefficiency is measured based on the assumption that one 
DMU should be able to obtain the same outputs per input compared to another DMU of 
similar structure and not to the overall maximum output per input possible (see Cooper et 
al., 2006). A comparison with constant returns to scale would mean that each region should 
have the outputs multiplied with the same factor as the quotient of its input and the one of 
the best performing existing region. In contrast, assuming non-constant returns to scale 
refers to the possibility of performing worse than the overall best region and compares the 
achievable productivity to regions which have a more similar output-input-structure. Non-
constancy is plausible in the context of development funding, because, e.g., specialisation in 
one field of urban development and different historical backgrounds can lead to another 
urban structure. The efficiency benchmark for each city is hence a linear combination of the 
 
140 
 
two nearest and thus most similar efficient DMUs, as explained above. The second 
assumption – input orientation – implies that regions are compared on the basis that they 
would be able to achieve at least the same output with a lower input, because other regions 
did so. In technical terms, these two assumptions lead to the application of an input-
oriented BCC-Model. The abbreviation refers to Banker, Charnes, and Cooper, who 
developed this model (see Banker et al., 1984).  
2.2.2 Interpreting Movability 
After having introduced the concept of efficiency analysis via DEA, we now refer to the 
interpretation of such DEA results as a new dimension in the context of distance 
measurement. The left plot of Figure 3 extends the one of Figure 1. We compute the 
changes in the indicators of the smaller set (here again only two indicators for 
demonstration purposes) – the two aspects of the output – as a result of former funding – 
the input. The changes are defined for the time point of distance measurement and the 
previous time point. The DEA compares these changes in relation to the amount of funding 
the corresponding region received and computes the relative efficiency. This funding 
movability – the DEA result – is added as a second dimension to the former one-dimensional 
plot revealing the distances of regions to the benchmark (see the right plot of Figure 3). 
Thereby, the former UDF candidate area is separated by their appropriate funding focus, 
which means that movable regions with need for urban development funding should be 
supported mere financially, whereas less movable regions with need for funding require 
additional support through, e.g., technical assistance. In case this is successful, higher values 
of positive external effects in the future programming periods will automatically incur higher 
amounts of loans provided by public authorities (see Breuer, 2012). 
<<< Insert Figure 3 about here >>> 
The application of this approach requires that movability does not vary much from one 
funding period to the other, so we can use the former funding efficiency as a proxy for the 
next period. It is of course advisable to update the movability measure after each period and 
not to expect it to be a constant value. This is apparently in line with the idea of improving 
funding efficiency via, e.g., technical assistance, which would definitely change the 
respective region’s movability.     
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2.3 Imperfection 
A third dimension for the degree of imperfections existent in the capital markets for urban 
finance is used to determine which ones of the candidate regions might finally be eligible for 
funding through UDFs. Hence, we start by a general examination of the urban capital market 
as a reference point for the discussion on its imperfections. 
2.3.1 Structure of Urban Capital Markets and Public Intervention Possibilities 
Despite the fact that urban development funding is far-reaching and important to our 
society nowadays, literature on financial markets for urban development is notably absent. 
However, one study exists that addresses the structure of the capital market for urban 
finance in a general way (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007). Figure 
4 is a slightly adapted version of this structure based on the findings of the study. 
<<< Insert Figure 4 about here >>> 
The investment requirement arising from the analysis of regions in the need of funding (as 
described in the Section 2.1), can be transformed into demands by, e.g., the local 
government or property developers. On the other side – the supply side – private and public 
bodies provide sources like loans and grants to finance projects. On imperfect capital 
markets, the link between the two sides may be missing, because, e.g., informational 
disadvantages might hinder appropriate financing for the best projects. Hence, 
intermediaries should enter the market to obtain more perfect capital market conditions by 
connecting demand with supply. In this way, problems arising from market imperfection can 
be solved or at least mitigated with the help of revolving financial instruments such as 
redeemable loans.  
According to Breuer and Brueser (2014b), the three important market imperfections in the 
context of urban development funding are external effects, imperfect competition, and 
incomplete information. The analysis reveals that only positive external effects justify the 
application of any kind of urban development subsidy in general, and incomplete 
information is the driving factor for the use of subsidies in the form of revolving financial 
instruments within the JESSICA initiative. If private capital market participants from the 
supply side select projects for financing, they are interested in the profitability. If the 
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project’s Net Present Value is negative, but the financial value of the external effects related 
to the respective project (more than) compensates this gap, then public supply side actors 
can close this gap by subsidies and thereby render the project attractive to private market 
participants. The specific form of the subsidy means is determined by the relevance of 
informational advantages for some suppliers. If there are no market imperfections in form of 
asymmetric information, a grant subsidy is sufficient to encourage private investors, and the 
public sector only bears the limited risk of not having initiated any positive externalities for 
the fixed amount of the grant subsidy paid. In contrast, if private investors suffer from 
information asymmetry, public authorities need to participate in the risk to a larger extent 
(Breuer, 2012, elaborates on this specific distinction in more detail). This is possible by the 
application of a low-interest loan with a subsidy component, which reduces the necessary 
repayments. In the case of an unsuccessful project, the public authorities are then exposed 
to lower repayments which indirectly increase the subsidy by an unplanned amount (see 
Figure 5 for illustration). Through this dependence on project success for public capital 
suppliers, subsidised loans produce a signal to private suppliers, as public authorities 
evaluate the project when examining the value of the external effects.  
<<< Insert Figure 5 about here >>> 
This credible commitment device by loans (and other revolving financial instruments) helps 
to overcome informational asymmetries between the project provider and private (or other 
public) capital suppliers. Hence, UDFs might induce additional funding by other investors and 
could thus serve as one form of intermediation to establish project financing.  
2.3.2 Measuring Market Imperfection 
Breuer and Brüser (2013b) propose a specific measurement of market imperfections. They 
analyse the imperfections related to certain categories of projects, e.g., energy 
infrastructure or public spaces. The imperfections typically connected to infrastructure 
(communication, energy and transport), education, research, industry/business parks, and 
start-ups should be removed by JESSICA instruments, whereas for imperfections coupled 
with culture, tourism, public buildings/spaces, and retail buildings, grants are sufficient. For 
the paper at hand, the smaller indicator set introduced in Section 2.1.1 can again serve as a 
basis for the measurement of imperfections if (some of) the indicators are connected to such 
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project categories. We thereby develop an indicator-based measure of the magnitude of 
imperfections, separating those regions where the JESSICA initiative delivers the appropriate 
means of funding from those where the employment of grants is more suitable and, finally, 
from those regions which do not need any funding or need to be further investigated to find 
out the appropriate support for them. Thus, in the case where, e.g., one indicator especially 
reflects the need for projects which are hindered due to high imperfections removable by 
revolving financial instruments, the magnitude of this indicator defines the new dimension. 
The same holds true for another indicator reflecting the need for grants. In the left plot of 
Figure 6, the first indicator represents a need for investments in projects which should be 
financed by grants and thus defines the extent to which a region is exposed to this kind of 
market failure. The second indicator reveals investment needs that should be covered by 
revolving instruments. Thus regions with low values in indicator 1 (marked by small and 
darkly coloured dotted lines), have a high distance to the benchmark in this indicator, which 
reflects the respective investment need. As this kind of investment should be publicly 
financed via grants, the region’s imperfection value is set to a medium level. Regions with 
low indicator values for those implying JESSICA instruments (marked by small and darkly 
coloured dashed lines) get a high imperfection value. This procedure further separates the 
candidate areas in the right plot as circumscribed before. 
<<< Insert Figure 6 about here >>> 
As the employment of revolving financial instruments is the main feature of UDFs, the area 
that is suitable for such financial instruments should indeed be supported through UDFs 
(marked by a dashed rectangle). However, due to higher risk bearing properties of revolving 
instruments, public funding should rely on simple grants if severe problems of the respective 
type of market imperfection are absent, but funding needs are present (marked by a dotted 
rectangle). This third step finally separates possible funding targets and identifies those 
regions that would indeed benefit from the establishment of a UDF (“the upper rectangles”) 
under the assumption that the indicators are appropriate to reflect possible urban 
development projects with typical market imperfections. 
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3 Application  
The general idea of an HF is that it can invest in several UDFs simultaneously. The current 
development shows that HFs have a scope which is mostly regional and sometimes national. 
Furthermore, existing UDFs often have a very limited geographical scope on all levels. Thus, 
the definition of its geographical unit is a tedious task in practice. Apparently, only for small 
countries HFs and/or UDFs are likely to operate at a national level. Other countries at least 
have a clear scope for HFs – namely the regional level. Thus, for ease of comparability, we 
will focus on regions as geographical units. This section applies our approach for Italian, 
Spanish and UK regions. These three countries represent a convenient basis, because they 
have actually set up UDFs (and HFs) and simultaneously have a good Eurostat data 
availability for regions. Thus, we can compare our results to the current situation later on in 
Section 4.1.  
Some assumptions are necessary to facilitate the decision process. We disclose them directly 
and discuss them again in Section 5. Thereby, our assumptions can be adapted to future 
regulations and necessities evolving in the development of the new intervention means – 
the UDFs.  
3.1 Distance for Italian, Spanish and UK Regions 
Unfortunately, data for all seven indicators of Section 2.1 is not available for the points in 
time we consider. One indicator is absent for all considered countries, and we are forced to 
leave this one out. Neglecting it in the following analyses does not bias the results, as it is 
ignored for all regions from all three countries. Selecting other countries for the example 
would not help either, because a similar availability issue prevails. The remaining indicators 
are: 
─ total population (+), 
─ total population at working age (+), 
─ total land area (o),  
─ number of tourist overnight stays per year per resident (+), 
─ number of tourist overnight stays per year (+), 
─ female proportion of working age population at level 1 or 2 ISCED (o). 
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The target orientation is indicated in brackets. The benchmark region (for distance analysis) 
is thus defined by a six-dimensional value composed of the maximum of the total population 
in general and at working age as well as the number of tourist overnight stays in general and 
per resident, and the median values of total land area as well as female proportion of 
working age population at level 1 or 2 ISCED (representing basic education). We determine 
the distances to the benchmark for the time point of measurement based on the so-called 
city block metric (also known as the L1-Distance). This metric is not only suitable in the urban 
development context because of its name, but especially and more importantly because of 
its capability of equally weighting multidimensional evenly (among all indicators) distributed 
optima. This implies a “good” region to be close to the benchmark in all dimensions. To 
cohere with the subsequent calculations of movability, we use the data from 2007 as the 
time point of distance measurement, which should coincide with the time of the decision on 
funding in the 2007-2013 programming period. Arranging the distance values in an 
increasing order leads to the determination of the first dimension according to Figure 7 for 
Italian, Figure 8 for Spanish, and Figure 9 for UK regions.  
<<< Insert Figure 7 about here >>> 
Figure 7 shows the distances to the benchmark for all Italian regions included in the analysis 
and the bold ones are part of already established UDFs. This highlighting should facilitate the 
orientation in terms of consistency with the practical implementation. However, a detailed 
comparison of the results from the DMI approach with actually existing funds is conducted in 
Section 4.1. Regions with very low distances to the benchmark do not need to be funded by 
any kind of subsidy. In contrast, regions with medium to high distances should be supported 
in urban development. The critical value for being a UDF candidate region is set to half of the 
maximum distance among the considered regions. For Italy, all but one region – which is 
Lombardy – thus have a high distance to the benchmark. Lombardy is indeed Italy’s leading 
economic region surrounding the regional capital – Milan. It is thus plausible to assume the 
region to be closer to the benchmark than it is the case for the other regions. In contrast, the 
most distant region revealed by the indicators – Molise – is really one of the poorest in Italy. 
Agriculture is still the dominant economic sector in Molise. 
<<< Insert Figure 8 about here >>> 
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In Spain, we find that Catalonia, again the leading economic region, is revealed close to the 
benchmark by the indicator analysis (see Figure 8). And the most distant region Castile-La 
Mancha is indeed economically weak. The same is true for the UK regions with Surrey, East 
and West Sussex, East Anglia as well as Greater Manchester being much more economically 
successful than, e.g., South Yorkshire, which is supported by our distance analysis in Figure 9.  
<<< Insert Figure 9 about here >>> 
To conclude, the arrangements of distances to the benchmark in the above figures appear 
plausible with respect to the general development status of the corresponding regions. 
Setting the critical value to half of the maximum distance to the benchmark reveals a high 
number of regions as potential candidates for JESSICA funding. We refrain from setting a 
higher barrier, as this might incur too early rejections of some regions. Nevertheless, 
increasing practical experience with UDFs might help to improve the selection of reliable 
barriers in the long run. For the time being, our proxy separates the regions under 
consideration according to the three preceding figures. As we will see later on, sensitivity 
checks reveal that an adaption of this critical value does not alter the results much. The 
following two steps separate those regions denoted as UDF candidates so far. 
3.2 Movability for Italian, Spanish and UK Regions 
Funding efficiency in terms of medium- and long-term impact for the current programming 
period cannot be tested up to now, because the period has only freshly ended. We will thus 
analyse the efficiency of former ERDF funding for the 2000-2006 programming period on the 
urban quality of life enhancements apparent after the funding period. The underlying data 
structure for the analysis of funding efficiency is shown in Figure 10. We thus compare the 
changes in regional urban structure from the initial status (here: t1 – as this is the medium 
data point in the former programming period and comparable to the time frames in the 
Urban Audit data) to the final status (here: t2 – which is the data point subsequent to the 
former period of funding). Thereby, we assume that the first measureable impact on the 
urban level occurs after the funding period and there are no changes from 2000 to 2006 (or 
at least until 2003). Because the termination of urban development projects is rather 
towards the end of the programming period, macroeconomic changes obtained through 
funding can only be measured afterwards, therefore justifying our assumption. The time 
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point of decision on future funding is thus set to t2. Another compromise we have to make is 
on the funding itself. It is measured by overall ERDF funding (in ten million Euro) to a higher 
level region, i.e., the NUTS I region (the first sub-national level) which it is part of, attributed 
by the proportional population share as a proxy, because the specific amounts spent to 
urban development are not separately listed in the documents from that programming 
period, but are only given for the higher regional level.   
<<< Insert Figure 10 about here >>> 
A DEA then determines which regions were already funded efficiently in the 2000-2006 
programming period with respect to their rather long-term impact under the discussed 
assumptions. We will consider the DEA for UK regions in detail because of the high number 
of regions included in this data set. The last column of Table 1 shows the resulting efficiency 
scores for this analysis based on the changes in all six indicators compared to the benchmark 
as output for UK regions. Regions like East Anglia, Devon, Tees Valley and Durham, as well as 
West Yorkshire are efficient with a score of 1 and highlighted in the table. In contrast, 
regions like Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, Shropshire and Staffordshire, as well as West 
Wales and the Valleys are highly inefficient with scores smaller than 0.05, which is very low 
compared to the average of 0.61.  
One may take a closer look at the reasons for inefficient funding with the help of the 
detailed results shown in Table 1. The weights for each region’s efficiency benchmark are 
highlighted in dark and, e.g., in Lancashire’s case, a combination of 4 % of the region 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area as well as 96 % of the region Kent is 
proposed.   
<<< Insert Table 1 about here >>> 
Further investigating the outputs (the six dimensional changes in distances to the general 
benchmark as defined before) for the different regions in Table 2, we see that the  region of 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area uses funds more efficiently than Lancashire 
with respect to the first five outputs, that correspond to “total population”, “total 
population at working age”, “total land area”, “number of tourist overnight stays per year 
per resident” and  “number of tourist overnight stays per year”. Comparing Lancashire and 
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Kent, the latter is more efficient with respect to the second, fourth, fifth and sixth output, 
that refer to “total population at working age”, “number of tourist overnight stays per year 
per resident”, “number of tourist overnight stays per year” and “female proportion of 
working age population at level 1 or 2 ISCED”. A comparison of both efficiency benchmarks 
of Lancashire reveals that the first one is slightly more efficient in the first, second, third and 
fourth output change, and strongly more efficient in the fifth output change. However, the 
contrary is the case for the sixth indicator change, which demonstrates the positivity of Kent. 
Combining the results, Lancashire should follow Kent especially by improving the education 
for females (output 6). Furthermore, it should follow its other benchmark in terms of tourist 
overnight stays per year (output 5). In addition, an orientation on the efficiency for areas 
related to, e.g., tourists per resident (output 4) and working age population (output 2) could 
reduce the necessary funding for these topics in the long run. 
<<< Insert Table 2 about here >>> 
To this effect, it is highly interesting that the regions of Lancashire and Kent have a similar 
population size, and are both located at the sea on the one side, and next to a bigger city 
region on the other side. The commuters from Manchester or London carry wealth to those 
regions. As the proposed efficiency benchmark is focusing on Kent, it could in fact be 
practicable for Lancashire to orientate its funding behaviour towards the one of Kent in 
order to achieve better results from funding in the fields of population, tourism, and 
education. The region of Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area has another 
structure with more than the double of land area and a higher population number. However, 
the influence of this region to the efficiency benchmark is only small. 
Plotting now distance and movability for all UK regions in Figure 11 reveals the regions 
(among those in the need of urban development funding) which require mere financial or 
additional impact support. In general, regions at the bottom, such as Lancashire, also need 
help to improve funding impact through technical assistance, whereas cities at the top, such 
as Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area as well as Kent, would only need financial 
support to encourage investments.  
<<< Insert Figure 11 about here >>> 
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Applying the same method for Italy and Spain leads to an identification of the respective 
regional funding focus – financial or impact support – as revealed by Figure 12 and Figure 13. 
Regions like Campania and Sicily need an additional impact support in Italy. In contrast, 
Sardinia and Abruzzo only need financial funding to improve their distance to the general 
Italian benchmark region.   
<<< Insert Figure 12 about here >>> 
The same separation of regions for Spain demonstrates the weaknesses of, e.g., Galacia and 
Extremadura when funding impact is considered. Other regions – Community of Madrid, 
Aragon or La Rioja – achieved higher improvements in terms of the six indicators compared 
to the amounts of funding obtained in the former period and are thus movable without 
impact assistance as shown in Figure 13.  
<<< Insert Figure 13 about here >>> 
Summarising, the two dimensional separation of possible regional funding targets for urban 
development revealed regions with a need for development support and offered a 
specification of the respective funding focus. The next step further separates the UDF 
candidates by finally assigning the appropriate subsidy types. 
3.3 Imperfection for Italian, Spanish and UK Regions 
To determine the types of imperfections for each of the country’s regions, we consider the 
categories of possible urban development projects connected with each indicator continuing 
with the set introduced in Section 3.1. However, the first three indicators are not directly 
affected by single projects, but rather complex measures. They allow to indirectly capture 
the versatile development of regions and are therefore explicitly applicable only in the first 
two steps of the DMI approach. Their improvement is achieved through well placed projects 
in several fields of intervention. Hence, they are not linked to a specific project type and 
consequently cannot be combined with one financial subsidy instrument. The fourth and 
fifth indicators cover touristic aspects of urban life. Projects of this kind should be supported 
by grants, because they usually cover the renovation of tourist accommodations or 
attractions, and such projects do not bear a major risk of informational asymmetries (which 
is the essential decision criterion as described in Section 2.3). In contrast, the last indicator 
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measures the success of education projects, which are prone to informational asymmetries 
as the financier of the project cannot control whether the well-educated subjects will later 
be at his disposition. Hence, the best mechanism is a revolving financial instrument from the 
JESSICA initiative. This results in the following mappings of indicators and subsidy 
interventions:  
─ total population  none, 
─ total population at working age  none, 
─ total land area  none, 
─ number of tourist overnight stays per year per resident  grant, 
─ number of tourist overnight stays per year  grant, 
─ female proportion of working age population at level 1 or 2 ISCED  JESSICA. 
Hence, for each region and each indicator the proportion of its value to the distance to the 
benchmark shows the influence of the respective indicator to the overall need for 
development projects. The highest proportions are then selected as being representatives 
for the investment needs and the corresponding financing measures. If the proportion is 
among the 30 % highest for the indicator of female education, the imperfection value is set 
to one and the best financing type would be one of the JESSICA instruments. If the 
proportion is among the 30 % highest for the tourism indicators, the imperfection value is 
set to 0.5 and represents grant funding. Otherwise it remains zero because no or only the 
first three indicators have a high proportion on the distance. Thus, there is no clear 
relationship between the indicator values and the two types of financial instruments. If such 
a situation occurs for some regions, they might be further analysed in a more detailed way 
as we briefly sketch later on in Section 5. 
In the case where two indicators with different financing implications are highly influencing 
the distance to the benchmark, the average value defines the region’s degree of 
imperfection, and the appropriate funding should cover, e.g., grants and revolving 
instruments. In such a case, it is essential to ensure that neutralisation effects do not lead to 
a wrong separation of the regions, i.e., as long as revolving instruments are involved in one 
of the indicators highly influencing the distance to the benchmark, the respective region is 
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finally marked as appropriate for UDFs. The final results for Italian regions are plotted in 
Figure 14. 
<<< Insert Figure 14 about here >>> 
Liguria is a region with high market imperfections eligible for loan financing via UDFs, as 
public loans are a means to overcome its market failures arising from asymmetric 
information in combination with external effects and/or imperfect competition. However, if, 
in addition, funding movability is low, as is the case for Campania, the region especially 
needs technical assistance within the UDF to improve the overall impact of funding. In 
contrast, regions with imperfection values of 0.5 and without connection to JESSICA-type 
project needs – Aosta Valley, Basilicata, Molise, and Sicily – should be supported by grants 
only (in combination with technical support to improve the funding impact for those regions 
with low movability). The regions at the bottom are not prone to specific market failures 
with correction possibilities by subsidies, because the reasons for the distance to the 
benchmark are equally distributed among all indicator fields. Therefore, there is no focus for 
market interventions, which can be directly supported by grants and JESSICA instruments. 
Hence, a concentration of urban development subsidies in one of these forms should not be 
the overall focal point, but several types of support should be applied simultaneously, each 
on a smaller scale. Another possible reason for the “none” classification at the bottom could 
arise from a high importance of the first three indicators. In such a case, the analysis of some 
more indicators of special interest for such a region can help to indicate the mechanism 
which might influence the remaining three indicators not directly connected to the two 
financial instruments. Both ideas are going beyond the main aim of this paper – to obtain a 
generalised decision procedure applicable for several countries. We will therefore only 
further elaborate on this topic in the final discussion of Section 5.  
Applying the same analyses for Spain results in the separation of regions as demonstrated in 
Figure 15. The regions of Andalusia and Madrid have high imperfection and movability 
values, which render them suitable for the mere financial help of UDFs. Otherwise, the 
regions of Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura and Basque Country reveal low funding efficiency 
in combination with high imperfection. Hence, the UDFs should assist in impact 
improvement as well.  
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<<< Insert Figure 15 about here >>> 
Finally, Figure 16 shows the results for the UK. For, e.g., Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, and 
Oxfordshire as well as West Yorkshire, UDFs as mere financial support are appropriate. 
Other regions – Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly or Derbyshire – need additional help in 
impact achievements. The second rectangle covering among others Essex or Tees Valley and 
Durham describe those regions where grants are adequate.   
<<< Insert Figure 16 about here >>> 
Summarising, the DMI approach revealed those regions which are in the need for funding, 
and in addition showed the market characteristics for JESSICA-type funding. Moreover, the 
analysis defined the focus of the UDFs for the three countries analysed under the given 
assumptions. 
4 Implications 
In this section, we question our results and practical decisions by comparing the findings 
with existing funds. Furthermore, an urban level DMI approach adds implications for current 
geographical allocation criteria. 
4.1 Comparing the DMI Approach with Actual JESSICA Funds for Italy, Spain, and 
the UK 
In the following, we compare the identified regions suitable for the establishment of UDFs to 
the existing JESSICA funds. The regions under consideration in this paper so far all belong to 
the category of NUTS II, the second regional statistical unit of the European classification 
system. As the system is based on the country specific administration structures, the number 
of regions on the respective level differs. The same holds for the level a UDF or HF 
corresponds to, as demonstrated in Table 3. The first column describes the country the HF 
and its UDFs are part of, the second column exhibits the region, or the other level, the third 
column shows the name of the HF, and the fourth column contains the name of the 
corresponding UDF(s). This table demonstrates that the funds are not equally distributed 
across countries and regions, but a high concentration occurs in some parts of the European 
Union’s regions, e.g. in the London area. 
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<<< Insert Table 3 about here >>>   
This unequal distribution and the partial concentration on the same levels for UDFs and HFs 
renders a clear identification of possible funding targets for JESSICA by an aggregated 
systematic approach difficult. As a compromise and for ease of interpretation, we will in the 
following refrain from a distinction between these two forms and only compare the resulting 
UDF candidates from the DMI approach for Italy, Spain, and the UK with any of the two 
JESSICA funds actually established in the respective country. The results are listed in the last 
column of Table 3. The DMI approach confirms the selection of Campania in Italy and 
Andalusia in Spain. However, it suggests grant subsidies to be more appropriate for Sicily 
instead of the revolving instruments. Thus, our approach and the fund practice only coincide 
in terms of funding need for the region, but differ in the respective type of funding. In 
contrast, this is not even the case for the current JESSICA funds in Sardinia (Italy) and 
Northwest England (UK) with its NUTS II regions Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater Manchester, 
Lancashire and Merseyside. Unfortunately, our data set does not obtain enough values for 
the regions with the other three HFs – FIDAE, London, and Scotland – and their UDFs. Hence, 
they remain to be analysed once data is available. At the same time, there are regions 
identified as suitable for JESSICA by the DMI approach, but they do not have any of such 
funds established up to now. As a result, the DMI approach can only confirm the actual 
establishment of JESSICA funds in parts. Nevertheless, the DMI approach confirms Campania 
and Andalusia out of five verifiable regions to be JESSICA eligible, corresponding to an 
approval rate of 40 %. Our approach delivers results far away from random, with numerous 
regions per country analysed and only a small fraction of them selected to be a final UDF 
candidate. More specifically, only 23 % of all regions in the three countries under 
consideration were classified as JESSICA suitable, which is significantly lower than 40 %. 
From this perspective, the confirmation of some of the JESSICA funds via the DMI approach 
offers interesting results for future practical applications.  
However, we recall that it might be necessary to adapt the assumptions we made within the 
process of this paper, in order to account for practical conditions and regulations, which are 
not constant over time and beyond our scope. The most critical assumptions and their 
implications are discussed in detail in Section 5. Improved data availability on indicators and 
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funding amounts for lower geographical levels is essential to obtain reliable measurements. 
This would result in a complete comparison of all regions in one country and eliminate gaps, 
as we have seen for the UK where data from Scotland and London were not fully available. 
Another issue is the specification of exact funding amounts spent for urban development, to 
identify the regions which need technical assistance to increase their funding efficiency. 
Nevertheless, as the focus of urban development is evolving in European structural policy, 
the disclosure of the respective funding is already compulsory and will not hinder the 
application for future programming periods. 
4.2 Comparison of the DMI Approach for German Regions and Cities 
This section compares the application of the DMI approach for two different geographical 
levels in order to reveal the consequences of some practical regulations. One analysis 
focuses on German regions, which are categorised in the same way as already done for Italy, 
Spain, and the UK. The underlying indicators and assumptions are the same as well. The 
second analysis is conducted on the urban level. Thus, 37 German cities are compared and 
categorised by the DMI approach. All assumptions remain as before. However, the indicators 
used for this level differ, but are again taken from Breuer and Brueser (2014a). Their findings 
reveal that the geographical level of comparison determines the smaller indicator set 
suitable for the intra-level analysis of differences. This section demonstrates the resulting 
changes in decision outcomes if the inputs do not correspond to the geographical level 
under consideration for the policy objective. We refer to Germany with its regions and cities 
as an example, because data availability is similar for both levels. Although there are no 
UDFs actually existing in Germany, we compare the regions theoretically suitable for UDFs 
by the application of the DMI approach on a regional and on an urban level (by summing up 
the urban results for the respective NUTS II area). The application leads to the classification 
shown in Table 4.  
<<< Insert Table 4 about here >>> 
The urban measurement consists of one to five cities per region. However, even if there is 
only one city included in one region, it is important to note that the data does not cover the 
entire region, but only the geographical level of the respective city. The first column in the 
table names the NUTS II regions. The second to fourth columns show the resulting 
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classification of the regions to UDF, grant or no funding, according to the summarised 
analysis of cities. The next three columns demonstrate the same classification categories, 
but with the regions themselves as the basis. Finally, the last column concludes on the 
difference in the results of the two DMI approaches. It is striking that more than 60 % of the 
results change if the application is based on a different level (darkly highlighted). An example 
of very distinct results is the region of Düsseldorf, with two cities indicating UDF supporting 
needs, and three cities with grant funding suitability. However, if the entire region is under 
consideration, no funding results from the DMI approach, because the region’s distance to 
the benchmark is low, which indicates that no funding is necessary. Such neutralisation 
effects due to a majority of well performing cities in the region penalise its less favourable 
cities – in this case: Mönchengladbach and Mülheim an der Ruhr – which need funding. For 
the region of Düsseldorf, the better performing cities should support the others, because the 
region does not receive any external help. As a consequence of this lack of European funding 
for urban development, the region can decide on other priorities instead of urban support. 
They might, e.g., focus on rural development. Those priorities do not necessarily have to be 
in line with the European regional policy objectives. This would even result in a further 
deterioration of the weak cities. 
In general, there are two differences which long for a detailed consideration. First, a region 
is categorised as UDF suitable, but its city is not. Second, a city is suggested for a UDF by the 
urban DMI approach, but the regional approach does not confirm the results for the 
surrounding region. The first case concerns the regions Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein, and 
Stuttgart with their cities Berlin, Kiel, and Stuttgart. The second case covers Bremen in 
Bremen, Mönchengladbach and Mühlheim an der Ruhr in Düsseldorf, Freiburg in Freiburg, 
and Nürnberg in Middle Franconia. The reasons for those differences are mainly the 
neutralisation of good urban indicator values by a worse surrounding region (first case), or 
vice versa the neutralisation of poorly performing cities by a strong region (second case). 
Kiel, for example, performs well with respect to the indicator “female proportion of working 
age population at level 1 or 2 ISCED”. Contrarily, its region Schleswig-Holstein declines in 
comparison with other German NUTS II regions. In extreme cases, the discrepancies 
between the results of the two approaches arise from a considerable change in the distance 
to the benchmark. This happened for Berlin (first case) and Düsseldorf (second case). On the 
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one hand, Berlin is a small city-state which cannot be compared to the typical and large 
regions in Germany. Hence, the indicator values in general differ strongly from those of the 
other regions. In contrast, the city values are the best for three of the six indicators and very 
good for the other three. On the other hand, Düsseldorf is a very densely populated region 
with a high number of cities. This leads to very good indicator values for the regional level. 
Thus, it defines the benchmark for two indicators and is close to the benchmark for the 
others. These facts reveal the importance of geographical comparability. Such deviations 
strongly emphasise the necessity to include the urban level in urban development policy 
decisions and not, as currently done, the regions. 
To conclude, this analysis highlights the importance of adapting political decisions to the 
respective level under consideration. If funding is allocated to the region as the geographical 
unit without considering its sub-units and without specifying how to redistribute it on the 
lower levels, the amounts might highly differ from the needs for urban development in the 
cities which are part of the region, or even define the region (as we have seen for the small 
city-state Berlin). Consequently, the allocation of funding for urban development should be 
based on the performance of cities themselves and not on that of the region. Meanwhile, if 
the onward distribution within a region still remains in the current structure, it is important 
to ensure that the funds are forwarded to those cities that are indeed in need for urban 
development funding. 
5 Discussion 
Several assumptions were made within the process of determining funding targets suitable 
for implementing the JESSICA initiative with the help of the DMI approach developed in this 
paper. This section serves to provide an overview of all important explicit and implicit 
assumptions which might influence the results, but could be altered. 
First of all, the distance measurement is based on a set of six indicators only. However, this 
relatively small set results from a broader analysis that determined the corresponding 
indicators as being most influential for the comparison of regions (and cities, respectively). 
Thus, the larger input set, where the smaller selection is taken from, might be modified, 
once comparable data on cities and regions is available for several countries in Europe and 
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time frames. Furthermore, the desired direction of the respective indicators needs to be 
specified in advance. This should be part of the description of the initial set. However, the 
handbooks available for urban development indicators (see European Commission, 2004 and 
2007) do not provide such information. Therefore, we set the directions as seemed 
plausible. Another decision concerns the benchmark definition, namely the partly artificial 
construction, with the best value of each indicator as represented in the data. Moreover, the 
equally weighted sum of distances in all indicators describes the overall distance, and half of 
the maximum is taken as the boundary for being well developed without funding need. From 
our point of view, the last three choices do not contradict common practice in similar fields. 
Otherwise, these elements can be easily modified. 
To evaluate the sensitivity of such assumptions, we separately change some parameters and 
conduct the DMI approach for UK regions again. Afterwards, a comparison of the 
classification into the three categories – UDF, grants, none – reveals the robustness or 
weakness of our approach. Changes in the direction are most likely to be necessary for the 
two indicators set to a median as optimum (“total land area” and “female proportion of 
working age population at level 1 or 2 ISCED”). Setting the optimal value of the first indicator 
to the maximum instead of the median modifies the results by three more grant and three 
more UDF candidates (21 % adjustment of the results). A similar modification for the second 
indicator results in 14 variations (50 %). These two analyses highlight the necessity of a clear 
indicator definition including guidelines for their direction of development. Far less 
significant are changes in the distance boundaries. Lowering the distance barrier to a third of 
the maximum distance revises the classification for three regions (11 %). Moreover, an 
increase to two-thirds of the maximum triggers seven modifications (25 %). As these results 
are based on extreme changes of the barrier (namely a 50 % or 30 % adjustment of the 
barrier value), the modifications of the results appear acceptable. However, Figure 9 reveals 
that the distances to the benchmark are very small for many regions. Taking this fact into 
account, a barrier variation of 10 % might represent possible changes better. An increase 
leads to no (0 %) and a decrease to two (7 %) modifications. Therefore, the changes in the 
results are smaller than the 10 % barrier variation, which suggests robustness to a reaso-
nable extent. 
 
158 
 
The second group of assumptions covers all aspects of the movability analysis. First, we 
assumed that the impact of funding occurs after the respective programming period, namely 
in 2007. With this proceeding we tried to account for the time of decision making at the start 
of a new programming period while at the same time maximising the time interval but 
remaining comparable to urban data for the comparison in Section 4.2. Furthermore, the 
amount of NUTS I funding was proportionally assigned with respect to the population of the 
sub-regions (or cities). These two choices were necessary due to the absence of data for the 
other time frames and geographical levels. They can easily be adapted or at least largely 
improved when confidentiality of data is repealed or further data is collected. Additionally, 
we assumed that the input oriented BCC model fits well for the analysis of funding efficiency 
because of the higher influence of public authorities on the funding amounts instead of the 
results. Furthermore, we expect non-constant returns to scale due to low flexibility for 
regions (cities) to develop with certain geographical and cultural characteristics. By doing so, 
we assume that a linear combination of the best performing regions per group captures the 
efficiency gap of the other units. More critically, we assumed that the former funding 
efficiency is a good proxy for the future outcome. This involves the risk that regions with 
high efficiency in the past might already be very close to the benchmark, and a diminishing 
marginal utility may be present. Yet, as such regions are close to the benchmark, they do not 
need (much) funding support and should already be eliminated from the potential subsidy 
candidates in the first step.  
Regarding the sensitivity, the only testable assumption without changing the underlying 
model itself is the assignment of funding to the sub-levels. In order to test this, we conduct 
the same efficiency analyses as before, but change the input. Instead of assigning funding 
proportionally to the population, we now allocate it equally among all sub-regions. Thereby, 
the efficiency values for UK regions slightly vary in comparison to the results obtained in 
Section 3.2. Most of the deviations are very small and the median is even zero. However, 
those regions with very low population numbers differ more in the resulting efficiency 
values, as the variation in inputs is very high. Nevertheless, the categorisation into 
“additional impact improvement” and “mere financial support” remains the same for all 
regions, independent of the underlying funding allocation assumed. Hence, the mechanisms 
applied are not crucial for the final categorisation.  
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Finally, the last range of critical decisions within the procedure of applying the DMI approach 
covers all assumptions made to quantify market imperfections. First, we assume that 
projects covering the investment needs are always well represented by their group with 
respect to typical characteristics and the corresponding imperfections. Second, the decision 
whether the influence of an indicator and the represented imperfection is high depends on 
its share of the benchmark distance. Third, the underlying smaller set contains indicators 
which partly do not have a clear relation to urban development projects. In fact, just one 
indicator finally distinguishes between grant support and revolving financial instruments. 
And three of the six indicators only measure urban development indirectly. Those neither 
capture the relationship to grant subsidies nor to JESSICA financial instruments. These three 
simplifications are necessary to capture such a complex decision problem. Certainly, the last 
point is the most critical one, and probably leads to a high sensitivity of our results. 
Nonetheless, a more elaborated indicator set providing the opportunity to reveal urban 
investment fields directly would significantly improve the analysis. The authorities 
responsible for urban development policies should obligate the collection of such data and 
ensure the connection to possible subsidy means. To date, such specialised data is not 
available on a larger scale.  
As long as such insightful data sets are not available, thoroughly testing the sensitivity of 
quantified market imperfections due to changes in the smaller set is not possible. However, 
to get a first impression of the impact of further JESSICA related indicators, we include the 
next most important one. This is the indicator measuring the level of female population with 
an ISCED-level of 5 or 6 in education. With the help of this indicator, we continue separating 
those UK regions, which are part of the category “none”. There are two possibilities for a 
region to obtain this classification: there is indeed no funding appropriate or necessary, or 
there is no direct connection to one of the funding means (see Section 3.3). In the second 
case, our approach was not able to connect the general funding needs with the subsidy 
devices so far. This happens if there is a high distance to the benchmark in the three 
indirectly measuring indicators. For the UK, the second case occurs for nine regions – 
Cumbria, Devon, East Wales, East Yorkshire and North Lincolnshire, Lancashire, Lincolnshire, 
Northern Ireland, North Yorkshire, and South Yorkshire. For Spain, there are five regions 
assigned to the “none” category due to a missing connection to the funding means. For Italy, 
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in contrast, this case does not occur. Applying the same DMI approach for the most 
extensive example of UK with the six indicators already used before and the newly added 
one does not change any of the regions initially categorised as UDF suitable. However, it 
reveals that three of the NUTS II regions from the aforementioned “none” area are in fact 
UDF candidates, namely Devon, Lancashire, and South Yorkshire. One more region, namely 
Essex, turns out to be rather suitable for a UDF instead of for grant financing. This brief 
outline on considering indicators directly connectable to the means of financial support 
emphasises the impact on the underlying smaller indicator set. Hence, the number of 
indicators related to UDF financing determines the number of regions selected for it. 
Consequently, the set should contain evenly distributed indicators from all of the three 
categories: grants, UDFs and none. And of course, the indicators should appropriately 
capture typical market imperfections for the respective possible projects. This should be 
improved by future indicator sets. Meanwhile, it might be helpful to conduct a stepwise 
approach (as demonstrated by including an additional indicator) for those regions with a 
high distance to the benchmark on the one hand, and missing direct connection to one of 
the funding means the other hand. 
Throughout all of these points, either model specifications or data quality and availability 
issues are prevalent. The former choices (first and second group of assumptions) were made 
for theoretical reasons, whereas for the latter, practicability was the driving factor with little 
scope. Despite all restrictions related to data availability, the benefits of this approach 
exceed. Firstly, the approach combines three important aspects which open up a new view 
to intensify the debate. These three dimensions represent the complexity of urban 
development funding in general, and especially by revolving financial instruments. Up to 
now, the decision making process on the establishment of UDFs (and HFs) lacks a clear 
structure, but relies on a learning by doing mentality motivated by practical restrictions 
instead of theoretical reasons. Obviously, our approach is set up exactly the opposite way, as 
it starts out with the theoretical components being part of the decision process, and only 
compromises on practicability afterwards. It thereby reveals those fields with urgent need 
for action, namely data collection and provision, which should be enhanced to improve 
funding allocation and mechanisms. We introduce a tool that can be easily adapted to future 
practical requirements and the actual level of data gaps. However, the respective authorities 
 
161 
 
need to carefully analyse the mechanisms behind urban development funding to be able to 
conduct such adaptations. This is a crucial step for the long-term success of European 
development funding for urban development. Meanwhile, only certain components of our 
approach may be applicable. And as each of the three steps in the DMI approach already 
provides interesting and important information, this would yield successful progress even in 
the short run. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper discussed the combination of three different aspects of urban development and 
its funding to reveal regions which are eligible to funding, and where the establishment of 
UDFs (and HFs) is a suitable means to overcome market imperfections. UDFs can then 
enforce project investments on a larger scale to improve the region’s life quality and thereby 
contribute to diminish discrepancies. The determination of urban differences, the 
measurement of funding efficiency as a device to quantify movability of regions, as well as 
the consideration of market imperfections given by the same indicators are covered and 
integrated through three subsequent steps. This overall approach allows merging a high 
number of information into a neatly arranged separation of regions.   
We empirically tested whether the identified regions eligible for UDFs by our approach 
coincide with actually established ones. Up to now, such a test is not entirely possible, but 
piecewise verification can be realised with the help of some assumptions (on, e.g., 
proportional funding amounts), and was demonstrated for Italian, Spanish and the UK 
regions. Some regions with established JESSICA funds were correspondingly identified as 
suitable for this kind of support. Nevertheless, for some regions, the DMI approach yielded 
other or no subsidies as more appropriate to improve urban development in the respective 
geographical area. All in all, our results appear plausible and exceed a random selection. In 
addition, we revealed that many assumptions do not change the results to a large extent. 
However, a complete examination is not possible. Despite these missing verification 
opportunities, we contributed to the research on UDFs by introducing a conceptual 
approach for the determination of target areas which is up to now absent in the literature. In 
addition, this paper highlights the importance of clear distinctions between the various 
geographical levels as demonstrated by the example of German regions and cities. 
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However, within the application to Italian, Spanish and the UK regions as well as German 
regions and cities, several problems arising from practical limitations appeared and left open 
avenues for future revisions. Apart from data quality and availability issues, which should be 
urgently solved, the lack of transparency in the current decision process on the 
establishment of JESSICA funds appeared. This renders the interpretation of deviations 
between existing funds and the results achieved by the DMI approach difficult, and even 
prevents a clear analysis of reasons. Nevertheless, our approach is easily adaptable to 
changes in such structures, as the disclosure of our assumptions emphasised. 
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Figure 1: Distance to the benchmark. 
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Figure 2: DEA for the changes in two indicators as outputs and funding as input. 
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Figure 3: Combining distance and movability. 
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Figure 4: Structure of the capital market for urban finance. 
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Figure 5: Subsidy and repayment for different types and scenarios. 
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Figure 6: Adding market imperfections. 
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Figure 7: Distance to the benchmark for Italian regions. 
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Figure 8: Distance to the benchmark for Spanish regions. 
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Figure 9: Distance to the benchmark for UK regions. 
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Figure 10: Measuring funding impact of the former funding period. 
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Figure 11: Comparison of distance and movability to determine funding types for UK regions. 
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Figure 12: Comparison of distance and movability to determine funding types for Italian regions. 
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Figure 13: Comparison of distance and movability to determine funding types for Spanish regions. 
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Figure 14: DMI approach for Italian regions. 
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Figure 15: DMI approach for Spanish regions. 
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Figure 16: DMI approach for UK regions. 
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Table 1: Results and weights for the DEA with changes in six indicators as outputs. 
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Efficiency 
scores
Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,95 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03
Cumbria 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,35 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,65 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,18
Devon 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Dorset and Somerset 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,15 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,36 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,49 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,89
East Anglia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
East Wales 0,34 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,66 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,16
East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,25 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,18
Essex 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,13 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,80 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,41
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Greater Manchester 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Hampshire and Isle of Wight 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,89
Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire 0,25 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10
Kent 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Lancashire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,96 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,06
Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Lincolnshire 0,48 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,28 0,00 0,23 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,82
North Yorkshire 0,40 0,00 0,00 0,18 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,14 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,28 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,55
Northumberland and Tyne and Wear 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Nothern Ireland 0,30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,35 0,00 0,27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,08
Shropshire and Staffordshire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,04
South Yorkshire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,06
Surrey, East and West Sussex 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,62
Tees Valley and Durham 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
West Wales and the Valleys 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01
West Yorkshire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00
Weights
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Table 2: Interpreting the inefficiency with the differences in changes per output (indicator). 
Output 1: total population, Output 2: total population at working age, Output 3: total land area, Output 4: number of tourist overnight stays per year and per resident, Output 6: number of tourist 
overnight stays per year, Output 6: female proportion of working age population at level 1 or 2 ISCED.  
 
Regions Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 Output 6
Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,09 0,21
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire 0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,03 -0,11 -0,02
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,07 -0,06
Cumbria 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,17 0,21 -0,09
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,09 -0,08
Devon 0,01 0,01 0,00 -0,02 0,02 0,04
Dorset and Somerset 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,16 -0,34
East Anglia 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,06 0,25 0,01
East Wales 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,06 -0,08 0,09
East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire 0,00 0,01 -0,01 -0,01 0,01 -0,11
Essex 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,11 -0,08
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,12 -0,19
Greater Manchester -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,21 0,11
Hampshire and Isle of Wight 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,04 -0,11
Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,05 0,07
Kent 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,08 0,03
Lancashire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,18
Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire 0,01 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,08
Lincolnshire 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,07 0,11
North Yorkshire 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,13 0,08
Northumberland and Tyne and Wear -0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,07 0,20 0,13
Nothern Ireland 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,07 0,07
Shropshire and Staffordshire -0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,02 0,06 -0,04
South Yorkshire 0,00 0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,00
Surrey, East and West Sussex 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,04 0,00
Tees Valley and Durham -0,01 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,29
West Wales and the Valleys -0,01 -0,01 0,00 -0,03 -0,09 -0,24
West Yorkshire 0,02 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,33
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Table 3:  Comparison of existing JESSICA funds – HFs and UDFs – with the results of the DMI approach. 
NUTS 0 = statistical level “country”, NUTS I: first sub-national level, NUTS II: second sub-national level. 
DMI test: Column contains the results of the DMI approach applied in this paper with the three categories UDF (region suitable for JESSICA fund), Grant (region should be supported by traditional 
grants), or None (no subsidy elements are directly connectable to the respective investment needs or no investment needs). A “/” indicates that the respective region is not included due to gaps.  
Country Region JESSICA HF JESSICA UDF DMI test
Iccrea BancaImpressa SPA
Banco di Napoli SPA
Fondo Sardegna Energia (Equiter)
Banco di Sardegna S.p.A.
Fondo di Rigenerazione Urbana Sicilia SRL(Equiter)
ICCREA BancaImpresa
Andalusia
(NUTS II)
HF Andalusia AC JESSICA Andalucía, S.A. UDF
(national)
(NUTS 0)
HF FIDAE (ES) Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA /
Foresight Environmental Fund LP
Amber Green LEEF LP
Amber Green LEEF 2 LLP
The Housing Finance Corporation Ltd (THFC)
North West Evergreen LP
Chrysalis LP
Amber Green SPRUCE LP
Amber Green SPRUCE 2 LLP
/HF Scotland
UDF
None
Grant
/
None
United Kingdom
Spain
Italy
HF Northwest England
Northwest England 
(NUTS I)
Scotland
(NUTS I)
London
(NUTS I)
HF London
HF Sicily
Sicily
(NUTS II)
Campania
(NUTS II)
Sardinia
(NUTS II)
HF Campania
HF Sardinia
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Table 4: Differences for the DMI approach applied on two levels (urban and regional) with the same indicators. 
UDF: city/region suitable for JESSICA fund, Grant: city/region should be supported by traditional grants, None: no subsidy 
elements are directly connectable to the respective investment needs or no investment needs. 
A number higher than zero indicates that the category (UDF/Grant/None) is selected by the DMI approach for the number 
of cities or for the region.  
 
 
  
Region Nuts II UDF Grant None UDF Grant None
Arnsberg 1 1 0 1 0 0 No
Berlin 0 0 1 1 0 0 Yes
Brunswick 0 0 1 0 0 1 No
Bremen 1 0 0 0 0 1 Yes
Darmstadt 0 3 0 0 0 1 Yes
Detmold 0 1 0 0 1 0 No
Düsseldorf 2 3 0 0 0 1 Yes
Freiburg 1 0 0 0 0 1 Yes
Hamburg 0 0 1 0 0 1 No
Hanover 0 1 0 0 1 0 No
Karlsruhe 0 0 1 0 1 0 Yes
Koblenz 0 1 0 0 0 1 Yes
Cologne 0 0 2 0 0 1 No
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 1 0 1 1 0 0 No
Middle Franconia 1 0 0 0 0 1 Yes
Upper Bavaria 0 0 1 0 0 1 No
Upper Palatinate 0 1 0 0 0 1 Yes
Rhine-Hesse-Palatinate 0 1 0 0 0 1 Yes
Schleswig-Holstein 0 1 0 1 0 0 Yes
Swabia 0 1 0 0 0 1 Yes
Stuttgart 0 0 1 1 0 0 Yes
Thuringia 2 0 0 1 0 0 No
Trier 0 1 0 0 0 1 Yes
Urban Regional
Differ?
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1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, a new trend has emerged in the fund industry. Adding a second level 
of funds is becoming increasingly common among asset classes such as real estate, hedge 
funds, or mixed-assets funds. Under perfect market conditions, there is no need for any fund 
structure. As a consequence, adding a second level of funds on top of an existing fund with 
direct investments would not be welfare increasing, either. An adequate portfolio 
management on the first level would already lead to an efficient investment pool (as would 
be the case even without any funds). Evidently, any theory of multi-level fund structures has 
to begin with an analysis of the features of basic fund designs. Once the benefits of funds in 
general (due to imperfections of the market) have been analysed, the question arises of 
whether there are some practical or theoretical limitations at the first level which 
necessitate the use of a second level. One kind of such limitations which we will focus on in 
this paper is given by funding regulations encoded in European Union (EU) regional policy. 
They limit the investment horizon for so-called Urban Development Funds (UDFs) to a 
particular region. Therefore, a second level of funds – the Holding Funds (HFs) – may be 
added to diversify and create an efficient investment pool. Starting at this point, this paper 
helps to identify the advantages (and disadvantages) of multi-level fund structures in general 
by gathering information from the existing literature and analysing it in the context of 
transaction costs. By applying simulation techniques to urban development investments 
using funds (UDFs and HFs), we are among the first to explore the benefits of such multi-
level fund structures in this specific field.  
Before we start analysing the advantages of multi-level fund structures, we first concentrate 
on definitional boundaries connected to them. This is crucial, because the following terms 
are not always used uniformly. The first level of funds with direct investments in projects of 
one or several asset classes is usually denoted as funds in general or more specifically 
investee funds, target funds, or subfunds, where the last term will be used to denote first-
level funds in the following sections. For a second level of funds, the descriptions funds of 
funds, umbrella funds, feeder funds, or HFs are used in the literature. However, currently 
only funds of funds (FoFs) define a second level of funds in the proper sense, which are 
single managed investment vehicles with a portfolio of (sub-) funds as capital assets (see 
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Brands and Gallagher, 2005). Umbrella funds, in contrast, are rather meant to describe a 
legal framework in which the investor can exchange his involvement with the subfunds of 
one particular investment company easily and cheaply (see Sauer and Barde, 2005). A feeder 
fund is also only a legal framework but with just one subfund (see Turner, 2004). The term 
HF is defined by the European Commission for FoFs with special investment fields such as 
urban development within the JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment 
in City Areas) initiative (see “JESSICA HF Handbook” prepared for the European Investment 
Bank by PriceWaterhouseCoopers EU Services EESV, 2008). Nevertheless, an HF is very 
limited in its diversification at the moment.  Hence, FoF are currently the only true funds 
from a portfolio management point of view. Therefore, second-level funds in the broadest 
general sense will from now on be denoted by FoF, while HF will be used to refer to the 
second-level fund structures for urban development.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we will introduce the advantages and disadvantages 
of FoF structures in general as described in the literature (Section 2). Section 3 establishes 
the link between different investment designs – direct investments, funds, FoFs – and the 
respective transaction costs involved. The two most prominent arguments for FoFs listed in 
the literature are based on a transaction cost or risk reduction background. However, the 
weighting of the additional transaction costs and the diversification benefits through the 
second level of funds depends on the specific characteristics of each investment decision 
and cannot be determined universally. Therefore, Sections 4 to 6 address one special multi-
level fund structure intended to support European urban development only. Section 4 
introduces the investment design in this context as well as the current status of first-level 
and second-level funds (UDFs and HFs). Afterwards, Section 5 describes a simulation 
technique that quantifies the increase in welfare achievable through portfolio investments 
of both types. Finally, an example based on actual data from Poland is used to quantify the 
benefits obtained by comparing their monetary equivalent to the additional transaction 
costs incurred by utilising an HF (Section 6). Section 7 concludes the paper by summarising 
the results and implications. 
 
190 
 
2 Multi-level Fund Structures in the Literature 
Under perfect market conditions, there is no need for any fund structure. Thus, in order to 
understand potential welfare gains from establishing funds, it is essential to address market 
imperfections. Moreover, if one wants to justify FoFs, it must be shown that there are 
market imperfections which cannot be sufficiently resolved by basic single-layer fund 
structures. In this section, we briefly introduce the arguments for and against a second fund 
level described in the literature before reviewing their general validity in the next section. 
We screened the literature for the advantages of seven types of multi-level funds – hedge, 
mutual, equity, and real estate FoFs as well as feeder funds, umbrella funds, and HFs – from 
different sources: Nicholas (2004), Turner (2004), Brands and Gallagher (2005), Englisch 
(2005), Sauer and Barde (2005), Weidig et al. (2005), Carretta and Mattarocci (2009), 
Strachman and Bookbinder (2010), and the HF Handbook.  
There are several measures established for the evaluation of fund performance for the first 
level, such as the famous Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966). We use a similar approach for FoF 
evaluation by including a gross and a net component for the computation of the 
performance 
    
           
 
   (1) 
The variable   represents the net in ome from asset investments in the proper sense, and 
Δ  the in ome from other investments in the broader sense (such as interest rates for 
monies not yet invested in the subfunds). The next component, c, measures the costs, and   
describes the risk of the fund (the standard deviation of income generated by the first-level 
investments). We structured the benefits listed in the literature with the help of (1) as 
shown in Table 1, i.e., we collected the advantages for each of the five variables ϕ,  , Δ ,  , 
and  . Of course, ϕ fully depends on the other variables. However, as some articles discuss 
variations in ϕ without elaborating on the determining influences, we have added this 
variable to our list as well. Certainly,   and Δ  should increase and c and  should decrease 
to render a second level of funds beneficial (i.e., to lead to a better performance ϕ). 
<<< Insert Table 1 about here >>> 
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According to Table 1, two sources describe the potential to outperform the benchmark or 
the market as a general advantage without giving any detailed explanation. More 
specifically, two sources mention a possible in rease in   for hedge and equity FoFs, but 
once again without any profound justification. The HF is a special tool which can demand 
funding monies even if the projects to be financed by a particular UDF will not start 
immediately. This results in the generation of interests for this kind of monies. Decreased 
costs due to several economies of scale are broadly represented in the literature, among 
which are the bundled approval procedures for umbrella funds, the know-how transfer for 
real estate FoFs and HFs, the costs for monitoring in the case of an HF, and the due diligence 
of hedge FoFs. Finally, there are 14 aspects which lead to a decrease in the risk component 
 . Among them is diversifi ation in general for hedge, equity, and real estate FoFs as well as 
the fact that small investors can indirectly invest in first-level funds with high minimum 
investment fees to achieve a better diversification, while, conversely, large investors can 
invest in small subfunds. Furthermore, it is possible to reduce risk by investing in a second-
level fund which in turn allocates its resources in funds of different strategies, managers, 
numbers of assets, and investment periods. These diversification benefits are at least partly 
listed for all four types of proper FoFs (hedge, mutual, equity, and real estate FoFs). All in all, 
we see that the highest number of advantages described in the literature concern the risk 
component, followed by the cost reduction. 
The establishment of a second level is not always just advantageous, but may also cause 
drawbacks. However, this topic is covered in less detail by the literature we analysed (see 
Table 2). Nicholas (2004) mentions that there are some hedge FoFs which underperform the 
benchmark after consideration of fees. Moreover, he states that   may de rease be ause 
the second-level fund needs to hold liquidity reserves for possible exits of some investors. 
Those reserves only generate income based on interest rates for risk-free investments. The 
literature describes different types of additional costs, e.g., the remuneration of the FoF 
manager. Furthermore, an increase in risk due to the dependen e on the manager’s subfund 
and asset selection may arise as well as a lack of individuality of the second-level portfolio, 
whi h  annot be adapted to ea h investor’s needs. Again, there is a strong focus on cost and 
risk components.  
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<<< Insert Table 2 about here >>> 
Higher overall costs are acceptable if, in turn, the respective advantages mainly resulting 
from reduced risks dominate. This fact reveals the interdependency between the previous 
arguments and indicates the necessity of a systematic approach to evaluate the findings in 
the literature. As our aim is to analyse whether the arguments are generally valid, we embed 
the various advantages and drawbacks into the theoretical framework of transaction costs. 
For the following analyses, we consider transaction costs in the proper sense, such as costs 
for information gathering. By doing so, we assume that those costs correspond to the 
parameter c as defined before in equation (1). We do not cover transaction costs in a 
broader sense such as the indirect influence of transactions on the other components of (1). 
Under this assumption, we evaluate possible in reases of   against redu tions of  . We will 
first start out with a general analysis of fund structures as means of intermediation and 
come back to the specific arguments afterwards. At the end, we will demonstrate some 
investor dependent limits for additional fees to cover transaction costs for an artificial HF in 
Poland. 
3 Transaction Costs and Intermediation 
The analysis of a second level of funds is just an extension of the analysis of the benefits and 
drawbacks of a first-level fund. Hence, we will start out by examining why a fund should be 
set up on the first level to intermediate. The basis for the analysis is the logic of transaction 
costs, which influences decisions in complex investment environments in imperfect markets. 
Afterwards, we will extend the arguments to a second level of funds.  
3.1 One Level of Intermediation – the Classical Fund Investment 
A transaction in general is the process of exchange between two parties in different 
contexts, e.g., goods and services, monies, or contracts. The consumption of resources 
during this process is covered by the definition of transaction costs. The benefits of the 
arising costs can be the direct receipt of a good or the expected future added value of the 
money or the services connected to a contract. In the following, we will concentrate on 
financial transactions in the context of funds. 
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The assumption that the market under consideration consists of n direct investment 
possibilities (assets) and m investors without any funds leads to m·n possible transactions as 
shown in investment design 1 in Figure 1. Each investor needs to contact and evaluate each 
direct investment individually to come to a portfolio decision which results in the transfer of 
money and future monitoring of the investment. A fund is nothing else but an additional 
player which acts as an intermediary in a market. If only one fund is established that 
manages all direct investments, then the number of transactions can be reduced to m+n as 
demonstrated by design 2a. This is the minimum number of transactions necessary and such 
a structure is thus beneficial for passive management, where the only aim is a broad 
diversification via the number of assets. In case of investment design 2a, every investor 
1,…,m  an invest in every asset 1,…,n through the fund with a lower number of transactions 
(for n > 2, m > 2). And as each transaction is connected to transaction costs in imperfect 
markets, this could lower the overall costs. The circumstances which render such a design 
beneficial will be analysed in detail with respect to different types of transaction costs in 
Section 3.3.  
<<< Insert Figure 1 about here >>> 
A more complex design with first-level funds is shown in investment design 2b, where j funds 
exist and each fund can invest in each asset. This would result in m·j + n·j transactions, which 
is greater than the number in investment design 1 for j ≥ (m·n)/(m n). For example, if j 
equals m or n, the inequality is true. For lower values of j, there are some slight reductions in 
the number of transactions, but the difference is not that significant in comparison to the 
difference between investment design 1 and 2a. Hence, a setting with more than one fund is 
not transaction minimising and cannot be superior to the establishment of only one fund, as 
investors face a similar selection problem as in a situation with no funds at all. However, the 
necessity of multiple first-level funds may change if there are some restrictions on the 
possible investments of the funds (see design 2c). The reasons for restricted investment 
universes will be clarified in Section 3.4. In such a scenario, the number of transactions is not 
easily fixable in general. In the specific case of design 2c, the number of transactions is given 
by m·j + n.  
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3.2 Two Levels of Intermediation – the Fund of Fund Investment 
Adding a second level of funds in design 2a would only increase the number of transactions 
by one for a one-to-one relationship between the fund and FoF without any advantages. 
Investment design 2b is not considered further, because of the dominance of 2a. Thus, the 
establishment of a second level of funds would only be sensible for design 2c. Hence, 
restrictions (from, e.g., funding regulations) limiting the subfunds justify a second level of 
intervention. An example for n = 2·j – denoted as design 3 – is given in Figure 2. Design 3 is 
minimising the number of transactions under the assumption of certain investment 
restrictions on the first level by combining the advantages of design 2a with those of 2c. As a 
by-product of this generic analysis, we find that dual-layer fund structures, i.e., fund 
structures with FoFs, may be interpreted as a means to combine the advantages of actively 
managed funds (on the first level) with the benefits of diversification through passive 
management (on the second level) with a minimum number of necessary transactions. This 
finding will be of high relevance for several analyses in the remainder of this paper. 
<<< Insert Figure 2 about here >>> 
In the following, the analysis of transaction costs will help to demonstrate the advantages of 
design 2a in comparison with design 1 (Section 3.3). Afterwards, the restrictions of 
investment universes covered in Section 3.4 explain the benefits of the mixed form of design 
2c. Finally, in Section 3.5, its extension to a second level of funds (design 3) is considered by 
applying the logic of transaction costs to the arguments for an FoF structure from the 
literature. 
3.3 Types of Transaction Costs 
In order to decide whether the use of a fund is beneficial, it is important to consider the 
types of transaction costs for such investments. The systematisation and the resulting 
influences of intermediation of Table 3 are based on the findings of Breuer (1993). His 
general ideas are expanded to transaction costs arising in the context of funds for our 
purposes. 
The first category is denoted by TAC1 and describes volume independent costs which are not 
directly attributable to specific transactions. Representatives of such costs are those which 
 
195 
 
arise when someone starts investing in assets of a new field, because the investor needs to 
gain knowledge about the new environment first. Every market participant has those kinds 
of costs and thus, the introduction of an intermediary (fund manager) simply adds a constant 
amount to the overall value of these transaction costs. Comparing those costs for design 1 
and 2a leads to an amount of mTAC1 and (m+1)TAC1 respectively. Hence, the introduction 
of a fund increases the overall costs by TAC1. 
The second category of volume independent costs is defined by those which are directly 
attributable to a transaction (TAC2), e.g., the information costs for a specific future 
investment. Every investor needs to get informed about each asset if there is no 
intermediary involved, which results in costs of mn·TAC2. In the case with intermediation via 
a fund, the costs are (m+n)·TAC2, because every investor needs information about the fund 
and the fund manager about all assets. Thus, a fund reduces the costs for, e.g., n > 2 and 
m > 2. Other combinations of market participants – depending on the specific number of 
investors and assets – might also render funds beneficial. The progressive saving factor (i.e., 
m·n – m+n) which describes how many instances of TAC2 can be avoided by using a fund is 
shown in Figure 3. 
<<< Insert Figure 3 about here >>> 
The third category also describes directly attributable costs (TAC3), but this time they are 
volume dependent which means that they are, e.g., a function of the quantity of money 
transferred. If a fund is established, money is transferred twice, once from the investor to 
the intermediary and then from the intermediary to the direct investment, thus doubling the 
overall number of transactions. Of course, the fund manager bundles the money from the 
investors and condenses the process. Depending on the functional form of TAC3, this pooling 
can improve the overall costs per unit: a function TAC3 that is increasing at a decreasing rate 
can reduce the overall costs per unit, if the reduction is strong enough to compensate for 
the intermediary and the resulting increase in the number of transactions. Nevertheless, for 
linear volume dependency, the overall sum of transfer costs would double with the 
introduction of a fund, and increase even more for progressively increasing cost functions. 
For financial transactions, we expect the overall amount of this cost category to be quite 
small, however, it will not be completely negligible. As is well known, in many cases funds 
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charge fees that depend on transaction volume. If these fees are at least partially cost-
driven, they may serve as an indicator for TAC3 being of practical relevance. 
Finally, the last category of transaction costs is only dependent on the total volume while 
costs are not attributable to the specific transactions (TAC4). This is at least partially true for 
any kind of hardware and software infrastructure necessary to manage portfolios. In 
contrast to TAC3, reducing the number of transaction relationships from n to 1 for investors 
due to the introdu tion of an intermediary does not redu e investors’ transa tion  osts of 
this type. Regardless of the functional form of TAC4, the influence is negative, as there is no 
possibility to compensate for this transaction cost component. However, we deem these 
overhead costs relevant only to a very limited degree in the case of fund structures. 
The different classes of transaction costs typically arise distinctly in the four main phases of a 
transaction. The first phase comprises the general preparation, e.g., the acquisition of 
knowledge in a special field. The most important component here is TAC1. This phase is 
followed by the search for a partner – the first selection of possible investments for our 
context. TAC2 is the most important component in this case. The next phase describes the 
negotiation process, which might be seen as the actual investment decision process. Again, 
TAC2 is most important here. The last step is defined by the realisation phase. In the context 
of funds and asset investments, this phase is the final transfer of money to the selected 
funds or assets. TAC3 and TAC4 are equally important in this last step. We classified volume 
independent transaction costs to be of the highest importance for fund investments. This is 
in line with the significance of TAC1 and TAC2 for the first three phases of a transaction. In 
contrast, for fund investment, the final realisation does not cause the major part of the 
incurred costs, because there are only financial goods which need to be transferred and 
these are low-cost operations in contrast to the transfer of real goods. Therefore, we 
classified TAC3 and TAC4 to be of medium or even low importance in the context of fund 
investments. Hence, the advantage of funds mainly depends on the relationship between 
TAC1 and TAC2 for the respective investment decisions.  
The constant negative effect of TAC1 is based on the fact that there is an additional player in 
the market – namely the fund manager. In contrast, the positive effect of TAC2 is (in general) 
progressively increasing in m and n (see once again Figure 3). Assuming that there are a 
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relatively high number of market participants, the positive effect of TAC2 outweighs the 
negative effect of TAC1, which in turn can render funds advantageous. In addition, the 
negative influences of TAC3 and TAC4 should not be a major argument against intermediation 
via funds, because the realisation phase is less important for financial goods. Finally, in a 
normal market environment with enough players, a fund structure as described by design 2a 
is superior to direct transactions as demonstrated by design 1.  
The fund delivers investment opportunities at lower overall costs per unit in comparison to 
an investor’s own portfolio management. In other words, the same level of diversification 
(or more specifically, risk) can be achieved for less costs by the fund. However, the optimal 
trade-off between diversification and costs cannot be determined in general without further 
assumptions. While a fund offers a cost-effective investment opportunity for a high risk 
averse investor, it may not necessarily be the best option for low risk aversion. The latter 
type of investor may prefer to transact with only a small subset of the available direct 
investments without the intermediation via funds. 
3.4 Restrictions for Direct Investments of Funds 
This section will now review which type of restrictions on direct investments lead to design 
2c as a natural extension of design 2a. We find the following reasons for limited investment 
universes of funds: 
─ special knowledge requirements, 
─ uncertainty-based restrictions, 
─ institutional regulations, 
─ conflict of interest. 
First, the knowledge needed to initially analyse and further monitor investments can be 
sector or geography specific, which renders specialised fund managers for the respective 
field beneficial. Such learning effects result in lower transaction costs within the universe of 
the fund manager which can explain a reasonable negligence of other investment classes 
outside his scope. Second, portfolio optimisation is very sensitive to the uncertainty of 
parameter estimation. A fund’s return distribution (the most important sensitivity driving 
aspect) is influenced by different factors, e.g., firm size (Fama and French, 1993). To smooth 
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fund performance, it can thus indeed be positive to restrict the investment universe to, e.g., 
firms of a certain range of size and thereby obtain more robust portfolio decisions. These 
two arguments (special knowledge requirements and uncertainty-based restrictions) are in 
line with the work of Kacperczyk et al. (2005) which shows that concentrated portfolios have 
a better performance than more broadly diversified ones. Their results are based on the fact 
that fund managers who specialise in a sector have informational advantages which render 
their investment decisions beneficial. Among others, Fedenia et al. (2013) just recently 
confirmed these findings (for US securities). Third, institutional regulations can determine 
whether investments should have a focus in a particular region or sector. Examples are EU 
funding regulations, which define certain amounts of funding to be allocated within the 
respective geographical or thematic focus. These rules should ensure a distribution of 
funding to all investment fields or geographical units and are thus reasonable from a societal 
point of view. Fourth, there can be conflicts of interest, which reduce the (acceptable) 
investment possibilities. Some potential fund investors might have preferences for, e.g., 
sustainability support or sin-stock punishment. This excludes some sectors from their 
investment. 
As mentioned before, the first two reasons for the restriction of investment universes are 
valid for funds in general. If any of these two reasons applies, one should invest in more than 
one fund as indicated in design 2c. This renders the second fund level beneficial if an 
investor wants to reduce the risk he has to bear when he is too dependent on one sector or 
region. More specifically, one should invest in all subfunds. Nevertheless, the third point 
only holds true for funds connected to subsidy interventions from the EU or other 
institutions. This restriction is based on equality principles of social distribution of EU 
subsidies. In this case, investment design 2c can serve to mitigate overall welfare loss due to 
these lower level restrictions. The last argument also has a social (ethical) component, but 
from an individual point of view, because some investors simply do not want to support 
certain industries for matters of conscience. However, in this  ase of “ onfli t of interest”, a 
diversification via a second-level fund such as demonstrated in investment design 2c will not 
be useful, as the other assets are completely excluded from their investment decision. So, 
we will not consider this last aspect further, but assume the existence of one of the first 
three restrictions. 
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3.5 Advantages and Disadvantages of FoFs Analysed by Transaction Costs 
Up to now, we have evaluated several investment designs and have come to the conclusion 
that in an environment with restrictions, the employment of one fund per investment area 
usually is advantageous. However, it remains to be clarified why a single investor should rely 
on a second level of funds (design 3) instead of diversifying the funds on his own (design 2c). 
As we have already pointed out, the introduction of an FoF will be beneficial if this fund is 
restricted to passive management. Thereby offering diversification potential while the 
actively managed subfunds can exploit particular learning effects and smooth the 
performance through investment restrictions. In the following, we want to revisit the 
arguments in favour of FoF structures collected from the literature in more detail. We do so 
in order to relate them to our “generi ” analysis of transa tion  osts arguments. To be more 
specific, our line of thought is based on the results from Section 3.3 regarding the 
comparison of design 1 and 2a together with the four types of transaction costs which are 
analogously applied to the second level of funds. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
the extent of each transaction cost component might be different for a passively managed 
FoF. Therefore, it is indeed necessary to review the arguments from the literature with 
respect to this form of fund management. For the sake of clarity, we will focus on some 
selected aspects found in the literature which demonstrate the interdependencies among 
the arguments. However, the resulting interpretations are easily adaptable to all advantages 
and disadvantages of second-level funds listed in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Do economies of scale make FoFs a beneficial extension of fund structures? FoFs can 
provide human, capital, and time resources (see Englisch, 2005) that operate more cost 
effectively compared to the sum of efforts that all single investors would have to undertake 
individually to achieve portfolio decisions (see Nicholas, 2004). However, since the only 
useful FoF structure is passively managed, the extent of these benefits should be very small. 
Volume independent transaction costs (TAC1 and TAC2) decrease with increasing investment 
sums if they are considered per unit of investment. This justifies the alleged economies of 
scale for those costs which are (in large parts) independent of whether one or a high number 
of shares are invested into a subfund. Because TAC1 and TAC2 are highly relevant for funds, 
there is indeed potential for economies of scale on the FoF level. Nevertheless, the literature 
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does not recognise that a passive form is required for a second-level fund and therefore 
overestimates this benefit.  
Does an FoF make an investor’s own portfolio management unnecessary? Strachman and 
Bookbinder (2010) point out that a single investor’s own portfolio management is not 
necessary. The investor does not need to invest into or transact with the subfunds, since the 
FoF manager takes over this task. If an investor manages investments into j funds, he has j 
transactions with the respective costs. In sum, the m investors have j·m transactions 
(without consideration of the transactions between the subfunds and the assets), whereas 
with an FoF there are only j+m transactions within the same framework. However, for those 
costs which are volume dependent (TAC3 and TAC4), the intermediation through an FoF adds 
costs. Nevertheless, the financially greater components of transaction costs (TAC1 and TAC2) 
are independent of the volume and thus o  ur only j times instead of j·m for the ex hanges 
between the funds and the FoF compared to a situation with only single investors. Of course, 
the transactions between the investors and the FoF also incur costs, but as long as they are 
sufficiently low, the FoF structure might still be beneficial in comparison to an individual 
(passive) portfolio management. Nevertheless, due to the passive management, TAC1 and 
TAC2 are less important than they are on the first level. If there are some restrictions on the 
first level, the FoF can broadly diversify through a passive approach and thereby render an 
investor’s own (passive) portfolio management unnecessary. Again, it should be noted that 
this argument is strongly related to the preceding one as they are both founded on the idea 
of economies of scale due to transaction costs that are increasing only on a diminishing 
scale. As a consequence, we are able to confirm these lines of reasoning, but at the same 
time, we also find that these arguments are founded on the same transaction costs 
arguments and therefore represent different aspect of the same phenomenon. 
Does an FoF help to overcome diversification barriers related to minimum investment for 
small investors? Another alleged advantage is that a minimum investment requirement is 
removed for small investors with an involvement in a second-level fund. Hence, if an 
investor has a relatively small amount of money available to invest in funds, he can select 
only one or very few first level funds. This will not diversify his portfolio to a great extent. An 
FoF, in turn, collects money from several investors and can thus invest in more subfunds 
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than would be possible if every investor operates on his own (see, e.g. Nicholas, 2004). If 
some of the transaction costs are not linear functions of the volume of the overall 
transaction (but, e.g., volume independent), a minimum investment is plausible, because 
otherwise the costs are too high in relation to the involvement. Such kinds of transaction 
costs are covered by TAC1 and TAC2 and are important for funds. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to assume that small investors would be limited in their diversification of funds without an 
FoF. The demand for a minimum investment on the FoF level which corresponds to the sum 
of those from all subfunds would not be necessary for each investor as long as more than 
one investor invests in the FoF. Of course, it would be appropriate to ask for a minimum 
investment defined as that part that each investor contributes to the minimum needed for 
the subfunds. Nevertheless, this amount would be lower for an individual investor than in 
the case without an FoF. Thus, we can confirm this advantage and see that there is a high 
dependence between the decrease in risk and the decrease in costs. This again reveals the 
strong interdependencies among the advantages and disadvantages of multi-level fund 
structures discussed in the literature. 
Is FoF manager remuneration a drawback of FoFs? Nicolas (2004), Brands and Gallagher 
(2005), Sauer and Barde (2005), as well as Caretta and Mattarocci (2009) all state that the 
second level produces additional manager fees. Nevertheless, all kind of fees should just be 
a reallocation of monies, but they do not describe additional costs in a narrow sense. The 
manager takes over the tasks of interacting with the subfunds. Thus, these costs are shifted 
from the investors’ own level to the FoF manager’s level. If there is competition in the 
market, it is reasonable to assume that the fees just correspond to the transaction costs 
caused by the delegation of portfolio management. Hence, management fees on their own 
should not be a criterion to evaluate the general benefits of FoFs. In practical applications, 
these fees might be utilised as a proxy for transaction costs caused by the implementation of 
an HF. However, note that the FoF should be passively managed and the extent of costs 
should be smaller than typically assumed in the literature. 
Summarising, we saw that there are a lot of interdependencies between the positive and 
negative aspects of FoFs. But under normal circumstances, the second-level fund should be 
beneficial, as the savings (per unit) through intermediation should be high enough compared 
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to the additional costs for the management of the FoF (assuming that there is enough 
competition to ensure that fees are adequately set to reflect the actual incurred costs). 
Furthermore, the extent of additional costs is much lower for passively managed funds 
which are the only reasonable type of second-level funds derived from our analyses. 
Moreover, the aspects extracted from the literature (see Table 2) which argue that there is 
an increase in risk do not play an important role for passive FoFs. The combination of all 
these factors indicates that an FoF structure is beneficial for investment decisions with 
restricted universes in  omparison to the investor’s own passive management of the 
available subfunds which would result in the same level of diversification.  
Nonetheless, every kind of diversification is costly and an investor might thus refrain from 
diversifying across different subfunds in order to save transaction costs. Instead, the investor 
might choose only one subfund to reduce transaction costs, but at the same time he 
foregoes diversification opportunities. Depending on his risk aversion, he might be willing to 
a  ept a higher risk   of his investment portfolio for lower  osts   in terms of equation (1). 
Our generic analysis so far is not able to compare such investment behaviour with the choice 
of investment design 3. Instead, we have to des ribe in more detail the investor’s de ision 
problem if we want to de ide between the two alternatives “investing in only one subfund” 
versus “investing in a well-diversified FoF”. We thus focus on one specific form of funds and 
FoFs, namely UDFs and HFs, and evaluate the decision problem for an example of two 
regional Polish UDFs and one HF in the remainder of the paper at hand. We compare the 
diversification benefits through an HF with an investment decision where each investor can 
only randomly select one of the UDFs without any diversification among funds but with 
lower overall transaction costs. For this case, we are able to determine acceptable increases 
in the sum of transaction costs for each type of investor that still render the HF beneficial 
due to its diversification benefits. To begin, we will introduce urban development 
investment structures and general literature findings on the advantages and disadvantages 
for these specific first and second levels of funds.  
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4 Urban Development Support through Fund Structures 
4.1 Urban Development Investment Schemes 
As already mentioned, the idea of FoF investment in the specific form of HFs arose in the 
framework of European funding of urban development. Figure 4 shows the structure 
typically sketched in JESSICA related documents. At the top level, the European Commission 
and its subdivision for regional policy, the DG Regio, can invest (mainly subsidies assigned to 
the country or region in political Operational Programmes (OPs)) in an HF or directly in 
several UDFs via the national or regional managing authorities of the ERDF (European 
Regional Development Fund). The establishment of an HF is not necessary, it is optional. 
Each UDF diversifies its investment in multiple urban development projects (the direct 
investments typically from one region). The investments can take the form of equity, loans, 
or guarantees.  
<<< Insert Figure 4 about here >>> 
With the idea of levering the subsidies by private and public investors, the scheme within the 
dashed lines is comparable to the investment and intermediation designs introduced in 
Section 3.1 and 3.2. The European institutions already diversify to a certain extent by being 
involved in a large number of UDFs and HFs. However, if they assign, e.g., subsidised loans to 
UDFs directly and some of them fail, they are not part of a portfolio of subfunds among 
which the repayments are reallocated. An HF could (partly) adjust temporal imbalances in 
financing needs within several UDFs. Hence, the diversification effects would increase with 
the use of an HF. Most other investors do not invest in a large number of UDFs, but only, 
e.g., in the one of their region. Thus, they have to make a decision among different 
investment opportunities. The investor (or the policy maker) has to evaluate the advantages 
and disadvantages of each investment – direct, fund, or fund of fund. However, as we have 
just shown under the assumption of same diversification levels, an investment design where 
the investor diversifies direct investments on its own is more costly than a UDF. And 
diversifying among UDFs should be more costly than investing with the help of an HF. 
However, the investor may choose to refrain from a second level of diversification to reduce 
costs. So finally, for the evaluation of whether HFs are a useful extension of UDFs, the 
decision to be made is between design 3 and an investment in, e.g., only one UDF. This topic 
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will be covered by Section 5 and 6. In the following, we will first analyse the literature on HFs 
and reveal the missing diversification in currently existing funds of this type afterwards. 
4.2 Justification of HFs by Former and New Arguments 
So far, we have analysed FoF benefits in general. But we have not elaborated in detail on the 
most interesting part for urban development funding, namely the comparison of advantages 
and disadvantages listed in the general literature with the “pros and  ons” from the JESSICA 
HF Handbook, as shown in the last columns of Table 1 and Table 2. The table entries for HFs 
are most similar for hedge and real estate FoFs. This is plausible, because real estate 
investments are just a special category of urban development projects on the one hand. On 
the other hand, hedge funds are very complex and capital-intense investments. This fact 
equally corresponds to the nature of urban development projects. Thus, the specific 
background of these two kinds of FoFs seems to match the one of HFs most appropriately 
and may help to understand their advantages and disadvantages.  
Considering the details, we see that the alleged similarities between hedge FoFs and HFs are 
economies of scale, diversification of investment strategies, and easy changes of the 
portfolio (which is questionable for passive FoFs). Furthermore, two aspects are very similar, 
namely the additional costs of due diligence (hedge FoFs) and monitoring (HFs) for the 
second level of funds and the respective decrease in costs for the subfund-level. Comparing 
real estate FoFs with HFs shows that the economies of scale in general are mentioned for 
both types of second-level funds. The same is true for the know-how transfer from the 
higher level manager to the fund manager or investor. Moreover, diversification via 
investments in different strategically orientated subfunds is also relevant. We found some 
more “pros and  ons” in the JESSICA HF Handbook not mentioned (in a similar way) in the 
other sources. Among these advantages is the notion of a potential generation of interest 
payments whi h are at the HF manager’s disposal as long as he does not invest the money 
into subfunds. Concerning the drawbacks, the handbook states some additional costs due to 
time-consuming and costly processes. Furthermore, it is mentioned that an HF would add 
less value if the expertise on urban development financing exists on the other levels. This 
aspect is strongly linked to an alleged smaller impact of HFs if urban investment strategies 
for projects have already been set up and if subfund structures are already active in the 
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market. The terms “add less value” and “smaller impa t” are not further  larified. However, 
we would not necessarily classify these aspects as disadvantages but rather as reduced 
advantages due to a lower extent of know-how transfer. The disadvantages named in the 
handbook clearly reveal that the current focus of HFs lies on organisational benefits and 
costs and not on diversification issues, which we identified in Section 3.2 to be a very 
important aspect when it comes to the justification of FoF structures. Furthermore, we saw 
that the HF should be passively managed and therefore the extent of additional costs should 
be small (and less than with an investor’s own portfolio management). 
Hence, we think that, if we compare HFs with the two most similar types of second-level 
funds, it is obvious that the potential of a second fund level in the context of urban 
development is not recognised yet. Although a number of HFs has been established in the 
last few years, their nature is rather of an organisational kind and diversification is not 
relevant so far, as we will see in more detail in the following. 
4.3 The Current Situation of HFs for Urban Development: No Diversification 
Even though HFs could have great potential by cost-effectively diversifying among subfunds 
(UDFs), the currently existing HFs show a different picture. We analysed 21 calls for 
expressions of interest from 16 HFs for urban development support within the JESSICA 
initiative of 10 European countries1. 
<<< Insert Table 4 about here >>> 
Table 4 shows the country, the respective reference number of the call, the name of the HF, 
the level (country or region), the amount of the call in the national currency and in euro, the 
number of UDFs for the call, as well as the number of OPs. The budget from one OP can be 
allocated to the respective geographical scope only within the regulatory requirements. We 
see that the number of UDFs is very low with a value in the range between one and three 
funds when adding up multiple calls for one HF. In some cases, the number of required UDFs 
                                                                                                         
1 Available online at http://www.eib.europa.eu/products/jessica/eoi/index.htm. 
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remains unspecified. Furthermore, it should be noted that some UDFs even set investment 
barriers for smaller geographical areas than the one of the corresponding OP, which leads to 
a fragmentation of the funds. Of course, this fragmentation is an attempt to diversify 
geographically (or rather distribute equally), but this sets restrictions to the optimal 
allocation of funding which might not be overall welfare increasing. In some regions, projects 
might not be ready for implementation, yet. Thus, the money should temporarily be 
invested in other regions. This is not possible with such strict constraints. In addition, some 
of the HFs shown in Table 4 have a clear thematic focus such as, e.g., the London Green Fund 
for energy efficiency and ecological waste management in the greater London area. 
Selecting such a restrictive orientation for an HF leads to less project/UDF choices and thus 
higher risk due to lower diversification possibilities. Furthermore, our analyses have shown 
that a second level of funds would only be value enhancing by mere diversification of funds 
so that a thematic orientation of the FoF is not necessary and would even reduce the 
possible benefits of the second level. These aspects reveal that the advantages named in the 
JESSICA HF Handbook do not even fully occur in the current HF structures. There is no 
strategy diversification for the London Green Fund, which only invests in one very specific 
branch of UDFs. In general, we only see the necessity of a thematic focus on the first level of 
funds as this can reduce informational asymmetries and thereby enhance the performance 
of the respective fund. However, the only plausible multi-level fund structure is the one 
demonstrated by investment design 3 with one single HF (per, e.g., country as this is a 
typical investment universe). Moreover, the (questionable) advantage of an easy change in 
the portfolio does not seem to meet the practical criteria when there is only one UDF as a 
subfund, e.g., for Scotland. This strategy even contradicts the diversification through the 
second level. If the HF is set up for knowledge transfer only, we would question its benefits. 
The mere know-how can be provided more easily by assistance in establishing the first level 
of funds. 
In general, we can state that if the benefits of the second-level funds are not achieved, the 
intended structure should be called into question. As the current structure is very new, we 
cannot assume that it has developed over time as a useful solution if it does not appear to 
be efficient from a scientific point of view. Thus, for such new topics, it is appropriate to take 
an advisory role by suggesting solutions established in similar multiple-level funds and/or 
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derived on the basis of theoretical implications. The diversification via a second level of 
funds due to restrictions on the first level might be the most promising advantage of HFs in 
the JESSICA context. However, it is obvious that there are transaction costs related to such a 
diversification process as well. The weighing of these two aspects will be the focus of the 
following sections. As mentioned before, an investment design where the investor diversifies 
on its own is typically more costly than the implementation of an HF, i.e., design 3 from 
Figure 2 dominates the design 2c of Figure 1. Hence, for HFs the general decision is between 
the HF investment and a direct UDF investment without second-level diversification as has 
already been discussed for FoFs in general in Section 3.5. This question can only be answered 
for each specific context. Therefore, in the next sections, we will set up an artificial HF and 
compare the improvement through diversification, measured as risk reduction, with the 
possible occurrence of additional transaction costs. Up to a certain limit, those costs can 
increase and the HF remains beneficial at the same time. 
5 Theory: Simulation of UDFs and HFs 
5.1 Definitions and Assumptions  
The most common form of UDF financing for projects at the moment consists of loans. 
Hence, the following reflections and analyses will focus on this financing type and the 
resulting credit portfolios only. However, the ideas are analogously applicable to equity or 
guarantees. Generally, the reason for diversification is risk reduction. For credit funds (and 
FoFs), the risk is that several urban projects are not able to make their payments and the 
respective credits default. If this happens to many credits of one fund, the portfolio value 
decreases dramatically. A concentration of investments in one fund then leads to a 
significant decrease in wealth for the investor.  
For each loan, regular payments – the annuity – are part of the contract agreed in advance. 
These payments consist of two components, the interest payment and the piecewise 
repayment of the debt. The annuity is a constant amount with a decreasing interest and an 
increasing repayment component. The cash flows generated by the project under 
consideration need to be high enough to cover this regular constant debt service. As 
operating cash flows depend on the capital structure with the respective interest payments, 
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this measure is not appropriate to cover the lenders’ point of view. Therefore, banks usually 
take the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA) as a proxy 
for the cash flows available for credit related payments into account. For this reason, we will 
analyse the EBITDA as a cash flow description in the following. Equation 2 formalises the 
restriction that EBITDAs should be high enough to cover the annuity with the help of the 
debt service coverage ratio (DSCRt, see, e.g., Finnerty (2013) for more details) for each time 
step t (less or equal to the maturity T of the credit):  
 SC t  
E IT At
Annuity
 ≥ 1    E IT At ≥ Annuity  (2) 
The tolerance of few violations of (2) is individually regulated for each loan. In the following, 
we will set the barrier to no tolerance at all, i.e., one violation directly implies the total 
default of a credit without any recovery. Thereby, we assume that the EBITDA of each period 
covers the respective regular payment without any exception, i.e., we set a strict insolvency 
boundary. So there is no possibility for the project to refinance the annuity payment by 
former surpluses, because the project distributes its profits right away instead of 
accumulating it. Furthermore, there is no value recovered when a loan is prematurely 
terminated, which means that we assume a direct liquidation of the project without any 
recaptured value. This is a very strict insolvency assumption with an inefficient form of 
liquidation. The thresholds can analogously be adapted to less strict insolvency boundaries, 
e.g., one or two periods of delay might be accepted and/or a certain recovery rate is defined. 
Furthermore, the restriction of insolvency could be lowered until the time of maturity which 
would correspond to the case of no liquidation at all. However, as several types of urban 
development projects are prone to market imperfections connected with informational 
asymmetries, the worst case consideration of insolvency with direct liquidation of a 
“worthless” proje t as the most cautious approach seems appropriate. Thereby, we assume 
that fund managers are in general not able to determine the remaining value and whether a 
project will recover from a bad period or not and thus do not accept any delays in payments 
at all. Furthermore, they liquidate it to stop any kind of nonmonetary support as well. As 
UDFs are not limited to the mere financial component, but the European institutions and 
some other public investors also deliver technical assistance via these funds, a continuation 
would be too costly as long as a restoration of solvency is too uncertain. These assumptions 
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might be relaxed for, e.g., thematically specified UDF managers (in accordance with Section 
3.4) because they can more correctly estimate the probability of a rebound and the value of 
a recovery. The mathematical formulation of the first insolvency assumption with direct 
liquidation leads to (3). To check for robustness, we will relax this condition later in Section 
6.4. 
   oan default    t   T  E IT At   Annuity  (3) 
As different urban development projects might be of a similar type or be carried out in the 
same region, success and failure are more or less correlated. This fact mainly determines the 
portfolio risk mentioned above. If one project in, e.g., one region fails, then the chances that 
another project also fails are high because of a common driving factor. Figure 5 
demonstrates this risk related to the development of the EBITDA and the annuity over time. 
<<< Insert Figure 5 about here >>> 
For the top illustrated paths, the development of the projects is uncorrelated. Therefore, the 
default of the lower project is independent of the success of the upper one. In this case, the 
portfolio is naturally diversified. The bottom plot shows the contrary. In this specific 
example, the two paths are 100 % correlated. Hence, after the default of the first project 
follows the default of the second in the highlighted area. This kind of portfolio risk defines 
the focus for the remaining sections of the paper at hand. 
5.2 Simulation of UDFs and HFs Portfolio Risks 
For the simulation of portfolio risks on the first (UDF) or second (HF) level of funds, it is 
essential to realistically capture the movements of the EBITDAs over time. In finance and 
economics, the application of a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) to simulate, e.g., asset 
or stock development is very common (see, e.g., Gerber et al., 2003). However, for our 
analysis, the cash flow consideration is dominant. As the EBITDA is the main driver for the 
asset value, we focus on this part of the asset value development only and thus slightly 
deviate from the standard application. By doing so, we are in line with some other work such 
as Myers and Turnbull (1977), Bhattacharya (1978), Brennan (2003), Huang and Chou (2006) 
as well as Brandao and Saraiva (2008). The latter two even apply it to (infrastructure) project 
flows, just as we do.  
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Most assumptions of a GBM do not pose a major problem in this field of application. 
However, we have to clarify whether it is plausible to generate only positive values of 
EBITDAs. As the definition of a default is effective early enough, namely in the first period 
where (3) is true, to prevent the EBITDA from falling below zero (which would not be 
possible to be simulated with a GBM), the consideration of EBITDAs by GBM is not critical. A 
GBM is a stochastic process with independence of the future development from the past or 
the current state. This means that deviations in the expected development – possibly with a 
drift rate – of EBITDAs over time are not dependent on the changes to the EBITDA which 
occurred in the prior periods. These characteristics of the GBM are applicable to project 
flows in the same way as to cumulated (asset) values. However, the parameters describing 
the motion are different in their extent. For cumulated values, e.g., typically a higher drift 
rate is plausible per definition of accumulation. For project flows, this increase should be 
significantly smaller. In contrast, the stochastic component should be higher. 
An example for two projects with EBITDAs E1(t) and E2(t), a  orrelation of ρ and an average 
(small) drift  1 and  2 as well as a standard deviation  1 and  2 of the EBITDAs delivers the 
stochastically influenced solution for the first time step t1 as shown in equation 4 (see 
Sigman (2007) for more details on GBM): 
E1(t1)   E1(t )  e
√t1  1  11                                       1 t1, 
E (t1)   E (t )  e
√t1      ( ρ  11   √1 ρ
   1 )       t1
. 
(4) 
This block of equations defines the EBITDAs E1(t1) and E2(t1) after the first period of the 
credit maturity, i.e., after one year. The first component of each equation – E1(t ) or E2(t ) – 
describes the start value of the EBITDA at the present point in time (with t0 = 0). The second 
part, i.e., the first part of the exponential function, models the correlated random values and 
the last part –  1 t1 or  2 t1 – adds the drift to the value development of the EBITDA. The 
correlated random variables are based on the so-called Cholesky factorisation (see Dahmen 
and Reusken, 2008), which determines the coefficients of a linear combination of two or 
more random numbers depending on the (size of the) correlation matrix. This factorisation 
decomposes the correlation matrix in such a way that the newly constructed random 
numbers are interacting as defined by their correlation. With the help of the solution for 
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E1(t1) and E2(t1) and solutions for further time steps E1(ti) and E2(ti) with i = 2,…,T, it is 
possible to create stochastically driven correlated processes which satisfy certain realistic 
project parameters such as the average increase in cash flow value (measured through the 
drift rate). The formalised form of such a process for the two projects is shown in (5) as two 
sequences of EBITDAs. Plotting it for generated random numbers would result in two 
(correlated) paths of EBITDA values similar to the top or the bottom representation of Figure 
5. 
  E1(t ), E1(t1), E1(t ), …, E1(T)    
  E (t ), E (t1), E (t ), …, E (T)  . 
(5) 
For each time step and project, we add up each annuity payment made to the final wealth of 
the fund. To correct for the difference in time, we compound the values by the average 
annual bond rate for Poland, namely 4%. However, so far, the result only is one single 
randomly, though realistically determined EBITDA path per project and the corresponding 
terminal wealth at the end of the considered time frame. The reliability of single paths is not 
high enough to base real investment decisions on it. Hence, a further commonly used 
method will serve to substantiate the outcomes: the Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS). It is 
often used in combination with the GBM for financial applications (Glasserman, 2004). The 
method describes a class of algorithms that create a random sample in order to numerically 
solve a problem which is impossible or very difficult to solve analytically. The algorithm runs 
a high number of simulation paths with the final result of a probability density and 
distribution for the fund wealth at the end of the time frame which approximates the real 
but unknown one. For a high number of runs, the law of large numbers applies. Therefore, 
the resulting density and distribution are good estimators and may be used as the basis for 
the derivation of different properties of the solution, e.g., expected value calculations or risk 
assessments. Each run of the MCS applied here consists of the generation of one path for 
the EBITDA development per project (see (5)) and the computation of the terminal fund 
wealth. However, as soon as the generated EBITDA value fulfils the insolvency and 
liquidation condition (3) for one time step, the loan is set to default directly and the project 
subsequently does not add any value to the final wealth anymore. After completion of all 
runs, the relative frequency of all realised wealth values defines the resulting density and 
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distribution which are of interest for the evaluation of multi-level fund structures. A 
comparison of an investor’s final wealth of single investments in one randomly selected UDF 
on the one hand and for an alternative investment in an HF on the other hand demonstrates 
the advantages of an HF for urban development projects in the next section. 
6 Application: Simulation of an HF for Poland 
6.1 Simulation Input: Data from the EIB JESSICA Evaluation Studies 
In order to evaluate the advantages of HFs exemplarily, we analyse the proposed urban 
development projects of the JESSICA evaluation studies for the two Polish regions Lodz and 
Mazovia conducted for the European Investment Bank (see Deloitte, 2011a and 2011b). 
Those two studies contain the most detailed financial information on a relatively high 
number of projects. We extracted all financial data given in the studies and selected two 
UDF portfolios with all seven projects of each region for which data and information was 
fully available and usable. For the comparison with an HF investment, all 14 projects were 
selected as one portfolio afterwards, which is in line with the passive management approach 
for the second fund level demonstrated in Section 3.2. We set the maturity to 10 years for 
comparability issues and the periods to one year like in the studies. After time and 
documentation adjustment for the data, we determined the annuity and the forecasted 
EBITDA for each project i ϵ {1,…,14}. The annuity of each project is given and per definition 
constant over time. The start value Ei(t0) for each project is given as well. However, we 
normalise the values to reduce the dominance of a few heavily funded projects which would 
render any kind of fund construction unnecessary. As the studies do not have any risk 
assessment and assume secure financial flows, we only take their forecasts as input for the 
simulation and randomise their development for any time step other than the first one. 
More specifically, we extract an average annual increase of EBITDA between 0 % and 3 % for 
different projects as the drift rate µi from the studies. A comparison of these rates with the 
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International Property Database2 (IPD) information for Polish real estate investments shows 
that the drift rates are close to those listed for different sectors, which are between 1 % and 
2 %. In contrast, the standard deviation  i for the project EBITDAs extracted from the 
JESSICA evaluation studies is zero. To agree with reality, we adapt this value by taking the 
highest value from the IPD as a cautious estimator, which means we set all  i to 10 %.  
The last input parameter to be derived is the correlation matrix of all projects. For each 
project, the studies contain a description of its components and aims. Using this information, 
we categorised the projects by region, their general type of project (building re-
/construction, infrastructure, or public spaces re-/formation), and the respective 
subcategories. Those categories were selected to cover the considered project descriptions 
appropriately with respect to their differences and similarities. To keep the subcategories of 
buildings, infrastructure, and spaces equal in size, we applied a cluster analysis of the nine 
subcategories for building re-/construction assigned to the projects of the studies. The nine 
subcategories can be reduced to three by pooling education, health care, and residential to 
“human” buildings,  ultural, tourism, and publi  to “so ial” as well as business, offi e, and 
retail to “work”. The resulting mappings are shown in Table 5. The first column contains the 
title of the project, the second and third the region, the next three columns the categories, 
and the last three groupings of columns show the assignment to the respective 
subcategories. A value of 1 indicates that the corresponding feature is true for the project 
and a value of 0 demonstrates the absence of the corresponding characteristic. For each pair 
of projects, the respective two rows define the computation values for their correlation. We 
always compared the number of the same features which have a value of 1 with the number 
of features the project has been assigned to. According to our assumptions, neutral or 
different features do not influence the correlation. Thereby, we obtained a correlation value 
reflecting the similarity of the two considered projects. For example, the projects in the first 
two rows are both located in Mazovia and cover a re-/construction for a social building. This 
                                                                                                         
2 Available online at http://www.ipd.com. 
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leads to three identical features out of five possible. Hence, their correlation is assumed to 
be 60 % for the purpose of this study.   
<<< Insert Table 5 about here >>> 
The general idea of approaching the correlation coefficients for project EBITDAs by the 
aforementioned categories implies that the EBITDAs are dependent on those categories. 
Thereby, we indirectly integrate the dependence on different driving factors, such as the 
sector or region, into the simulation of EBITDAs. Computing the actual correlations of the 
assigned properties for each pair of projects as described above then leads to the correlation 
matrix for the 14 selected projects as shown in Table 6. Its rows (and columns) correspond to 
the same project order as was given in Table 5. 
<<< Insert Table 6 about here >>> 
Already at first glance, it is obvious that the correlations within one region (highlighted with 
dark filling) are much higher than between two regions. The exact average intra-regional 
correlation values of 0.58 for Mazovia and 0.72 for Lodz and the inter-regional value of 0.40 
confirm this impression. The main feature which determines the differences and similarities 
is the regional affiliation reflecting the regional economy. However, we see that, especially 
for Lodz, the intra-correlation is also driven by the similarity of the projects other than the 
mere regional affiliation. 
Finally, all model parameters have been set and all project dependent input parameters 
have been extracted from the studies and the IPD. The next step consists of analysing the 
simulation outputs. 
6.2 Simulation Output: Resulting Portfolio Risks 
As a first result, we will consider the simulated paths illustrated in Figure 6 for a UDF with all 
seven projects selected for Mazovia. Due to the high number of simulation runs realised, the 
figure only depicts the paths of a random selection. Otherwise, most parts would be 
completely black, because the total number of runs is 1 million.  
<<< Insert Figure 6 about here >>> 
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There are two features visible in this representation which can directly be derived from the 
inputs. First, the drift rate is very small because the paths belonging to each project and run 
remain or return on average close to the start value. This corresponds to a drift rate 
between 0 % and 3 % as extracted from the studies. Second, the deviation (slightly) 
increases over time. The determination of the EBITDA development through a GBM implies 
that the deviation of one value is calculated on the basis of the previous time step value. 
Therefore, they add up over time, which results in a slightly funnel-like shape.  
One further characteristic of the paths, which is not demonstrated in Figure 6 is the fact that 
there are always seven paths correlated as they describe the results from one single 
simulation run. One such set of seven paths is listed individually in Figure 7. Per definition, 
the correlation is not identical across all pairs of projects. Hence, the parallelism of two 
paths is not all the same for each pair. However, the similarity in structure for some pairs of 
projects is obvious. One example for such a pair with a highly correlated path development 
is the one printed as bold lines. However, all projects have a basic similarity because they are 
all in the same region, which influences the correlation computation as described above. 
Particularly, the upward movement between time to maturity eight and seven occurs in all 
six continuing paths listed in the figure. Such an increased EBITDA could be the result of a 
positive external shock to the region. The consequence of these similar developments leads 
to the kind of portfolio risk introduced in Section 5.1 which is also visible in Figure 7 by the 
simultaneous default of two loans at time to maturity 5. In this credit portfolio – UDF 
Mazovia – and simulation run, three out of seven projects have a DSCR < 1 once and 
therefore default. Having a broader project portfolio with lower overall correlations would 
lead to less correlated defaults.  
<<< Insert Figure 7 about here >>> 
The resulting discrete probability distributions for the final wealth of each portfolio – the 
two UDFs and the HF – from all runs and all seven or 14 projects are shown in Figure 8. The 
first striking characteristic is that the scales of the final wealth are different for the three 
investment opportunities. The HF for both regions has a maximum terminal wealth of nearly 
70 million euro, the UDF Lodz has approximately 36 million euro and the UDF Mazovia has 
34 million euro. Second, the distribution of wealth slightly jumps at 12, 13, or 27 million 
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euro, respectively. Before the maxima, the probability slightly jumps again. These jumps 
indicate that in the majority of runs the same defaults occur.  
<<< Insert Figure 8 about here >>> 
In general, the overall wealth of a portfolio is not the same as the overall wealth of an 
investor as he does not hold the full portfolio, but only a part of it. In the following, we 
assume that an investor has to decide whether to invest 1 million euro in either one of the 
UDFs randomly selected or 1 million euro in the HF. The share of each portfolio defined by 
an investment of 1 million is the appropriate measure to compare the final wealth 
opportunities. The distribution of the investor’s final wealth is demonstrated in Figure 9. 
<<< Insert Figure 9 about here >>> 
The graphs in the figure intersect several times around 600 000 or 1 million euro. These 
parts of the distribution show the typical structure of investment decisions without any 
overall dominant solution. As the three graphs intersect, the evaluation of the distribution 
(or density) of final wealth depends on the investor’s risk preferen es whi h we will analyse 
in the next section.  
6.3 Interpretation 
In order to finally evaluate whether the second level of funds, namely the HF, is better than 
a single fund investment on the first level, we have to relate the gain in monetary equivalent 
of the value of the level of diversification to the maximally acceptable transaction costs for 
the investment in an HF. Hence, we will determine which amounts of transaction costs, 
measured as share of the investment, are acceptable if the risk is reduced through this 
passive diversification. Thereby, we evaluate the parameters   against   of the portfolio in 
terms of equation (1). Depending on an investor’s risk aversion, an appropriate utility 
function reflecting the decision maker’s preferen es sorts the differen es in the wealth 
probably available after the maturity of the investment. The general constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) function (Armitage, 2005) is formalised in (6). 
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    for      1 
ln( )   for     1 
 (6) 
The parameter   ≥   denotes the investor’s degree of risk aversion and normally ranges 
between 1 and 10 with the lower values reflecting only limited risk aversion preferences and 
the greater the value the higher the aversion to risky investments. For each possible final 
wealth Wj, with j being one of all possible states of wealth levels – denoted as J – covered by 
the probability density obtained in the simulation, the utility U(Wj) is defined by (6). 
Equation (7) then determines the monetary certainty equivalent CE to the uncertain value of 
the final wealth in dependence of the investor’s risk aversion  overed by his utility fun tion. 
 (CE)   E( ( ))   ∑ pj ( j)
J
j 1
  
(7) 
The factors pj describe the probability of each respective final wealth obtained from the 
probability density. The differences in the CE of an investor’s expe ted utility for either the 
uncertain final wealth when investing in the HF or investing randomly in one of the UDFs 
measures the monetary increase in value through diversification and thus the maximum 
acceptable transaction costs in t = T for the second level of intervention. For the calculation 
of the CE for an investment in one of the UDFs, we slightly adapt the calculation from (7) to 
 (CE  F)    .  E( (   F ))    .  E( (   F  ))  (8) 
By this equation, we account for the fact that the investor cannot evaluate which one of the 
UDFs he should choose without incurring costs. Therefore, the selection of one of the UDFs 
would be nothing else but a lottery. This is a reasonable assumption in such complex 
investment environments as urban development financing. He randomly invests in one of 
the UDFs as an alternative to the HF. Therefore, the CE needs to account for the fact that the 
investor has an equal chance of selecting either the UDF of Mazovia – UDF M – or the one of 
Lodz – UDF L. Furthermore, we  ompute the differen e ΔCE of CEHF defined by (7) with CEUDF 
defined by (8) and put it into relation to the amount I initially invested, i.e., ΔCE/I which is 
shown in the second column of Table 7. Even the smallest risk aversion assumed here allows 
for transaction costs at time t = T of 1.21 % of the investment as reward for the 
diversification. In this specific case, this rate corresponds to a monetary equivalent of 
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approximately 12 100 €. The greater the risk aversion parameter  , the greater is the 
monetary equivalent of risk reduction through diversifi ation. For   = 10, we have a rate of 
even 4.83 %.  
<<< Insert Table 7 about here >>> 
In order to compare the results to actual transaction costs of passively managed funds, we 
need to take into account that the aforementioned values always cover a time frame of T 
years. Normally, fees of funds are described by annual rates and they range between 0.15 % 
and 1 % of total fund wealth for passive funds. Therefore, we have to subtract the amount of 
the accumulated annual transaction costs from the final wealth for the range of plausible 
transaction costs.  We thus assume that fees need to be paid each year and the amount of 
these payments is defined by the percentage set in advance (in our case we include several 
values between 0 % and up to 1 %). For the calculations, we sum up all T = 10 payments and 
consider the different points in time by accounting for interest rate effects until the final 
time of evaluation T. The initial wealth serves as a proxy for the corresponding market value 
of all fund assets and is assumed to be the basis for the share of fees to be paid. This sum of 
compounded fees reduces the possible final wealth and thus the value for the determination 
of the CE for the HF. By this approach, we directly compare the benefits through 
diversification with the costs for the implementation through the HF. The values for CEUDF 
remain the same as before, as we only consider the additional fees caused by the 
establishment of the HF. The resulting values for ΔCE/I in dependen e of the investor’s risk 
aversion parameter   and several rates of transaction costs are shown in the remaining 
columns of Table 7. These columns demonstrate that the overall advantage of the HF 
depends on the investors’ preferences and the extent of transaction costs for this second 
level of funds. For costs of 0.15 %, the relative CEHF is higher than CEUDF for all but the least 
risk averse investor be ause ΔCE/I is always positive for   > 1. For   = 1, the difference in CE 
turns negative as highlighted by a dark shade. The general benefit of the HF decreases with 
greater additional costs, i.e., more and more cells turn dark. For 0.25 % costs, the HF does 
not remain advantageous for investor preferen es of   < 5. For 1 % costs, the HF is not 
beneficial anymore.  
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As we have just seen, the extent of additional costs needs to be relatively low to render HFs 
beneficial. At the beginning, we found out that a drawback of FoFs mentioned in the 
literature is that they underperform the market because of high fees. For an actively 
managed second level of funds this drawback might indeed be true. However, an active FoF 
management is not suitable at all and this disadvantage is thus invalidated for an HF 
investment and a wide range of investor preferences and plausible costs.  
6.4 Robustness Checks 
So far, we have only conducted the analyses for one specific combination of all inputs and 
model parameters. In the following, we will substantiate the results by variation of both the 
most crucial input and the most crucial model parameter. The most critical input is the 
computed correlation matrix and the parameter which should be discussed is the strict 
insolvency and liquidity condition.  
As a first step, we conduct the same analyses as before, but change the input correlation 
matrix. If all projects are uncorrelated, the defaults occur randomly without any dependence 
on the project features such as the regional affiliation. Table 8 displays the resulting values 
of ΔCE/I.  
<<< Insert Table 8 about here >>> 
We see that the HF becomes beneficial for more combinations of investors’ preferences and 
transaction costs. In contrast to the situation of Table 7, for, e.g., 0.25 % costs, the HF is 
advantageous for preferen es of   >   instead of   > 4. Even for 0.5 % costs, the HF remains 
beneficial for the four highest types of risk aversion considered in the analyses. This change 
in results is plausible as we removed all inter-regional correlations, which helps to diversify 
through an HF and renders this investment alternative even more advantageous. However, 
we also removed the intra-regional correlations. This adaption, in contrast, counteracts the 
need for an HF. Hence, the darkly shaded area with unbeneficial HFs still covers 30 % of all 
cells in the table. Therefore, in a second step, we modified the initial correlation matrix by 
only eliminating all inter-regional correlations. This delivers the results of Table 9. The table 
shows that the HF turns beneficial for even more combinations of investors’ preferences and 
costs. For, e.g., 0.25 % costs, only the least risk averse investors would choose a random UDF 
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investment instead of the HF. For 80 % of the illustrated combinations the HF is 
advantageous which is in line with the idea of risk reduction by combining different regional 
UDFs with low interdependencies in a second-level fund.  
<<< Insert Table 9 about here >>> 
Concerning the model, the most crucial parameter is the definition of an insolvency event 
formalised in (3). A loan defaults at the first time the EBITDA of the project falls below the 
annuity payment condition and it is directly liquidised. The results achieved with this 
restriction define the upper limit for the added value of an HF. In a first step, we relaxed this 
restriction by allowing the loan to default once and defining the second shortfall as the 
insolvency and liquidation event. All other inputs and parameters remain the same as used 
in Section 6.3. The results in Table 10 demonstrate that the HF is advantageous in less cases 
in comparison with Table 7, i.e., for only 38 % of the analysed combinations in contrast to 
45 % for the highest restriction. Further reducing the assumption in a second step by 
allowing for two shortfalls before liquidation further slightly reduces the number to 37 % 
(see Table 11). Hence, we see that the highest restriction indeed delivers the highest number 
of combinations which render an HF advantageous but relaxing it only slightly weakens the 
results. If the EBITDA falls below the annuity, it often does not recover from this 
development and therefore, the benefits only change to a small extent. 
<<< Insert Table 10 and Table 11 about here >>>  
6.5 Final Remarks on the Interpretation of the Results 
Concluding, many simulations lead to HFs being advantageous for the given additional 
transaction costs TAC1, TAC2, as well as TAC3 and TAC4 (if present) of the HF. Considering this 
sum in more detail shows that there are internal shifts which favour low overall transaction 
costs. As elaborated in Section 3.3 for the first level of funds and transferable to the second 
level, the main drivers are TAC1 and TAC2, the volume independent costs. The reduction in 
TAC2 per unit through a second fund level depends on the number of direct investments n 
and the number of investors m. For the Polish example, n is set to 14, but m remains 
unspecified. However, it is reasonable to assume that m > 2 as there should be ERDF monies, 
national and/or regional resources, and other public and private investors coming together. 
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Hence, n and m are both higher than two, the critical limit for reductions. Nevertheless, the 
HF should be passively managed, which limits the positive effect of such costs. For TAC1, we 
have a constant negative effect of intermediation and thus additional costs. Those might be 
reasonable for passive FoFs, but the extent of costs to be covered per investor should be 
low. This leads to a plausible range for (small) increases in overall transaction costs that still 
render HFs beneficial for most investors. However, the exact maximum transaction costs for 
which the HF remains advantageous depends on the investor’s risk preferen es. But for risk 
averse investors and low ranges of cost shares, this barrier should not be reached by far. This 
will be particularly true, if more than just two UDFs are included in one HF. Hence, our 
analyses only define the lowest limit for the  advantageousness of an HF in terms of the 
number of subfunds. 
As an extension of our approach and with respect to investment design 3 in Figure 2, it 
would be advisable to add all other (potential) Polish UDFs to the one HF constructed here. 
Thereby, the Polish HF would serve as a means for passive management intervention in 
addition to the restricted actively managed first level. The more the UDFs differ in terms of 
regions and project types, the more the HF becomes beneficial for a wide range of investors 
as we have seen in the sensitivity analysis for inter-regional correlations. Furthermore, we 
normalised the project scales to prevent the dominance of some projects which could 
render a second (or even a first) level fund unnecessary. It is advisable to finance projects of 
similar investment amounts within such fund structures to obtain diversification. Finally, we 
want to briefly comment on the alternative left out so far: the direct investment in, e.g., one 
urban development project. From our point of view, such projects are a very risky 
investment opportunity if the investor is not specialised in the respective subfield of urban 
development with its precise features. Therefore, we would not advise this form of direct 
investment without any additional form of risk management, which, in turn, would be costly 
as well.  
Taking into account these aspects, a multi-level fund construction would help to attract a 
wide range of investors to lever scarce public funds for urban development support. 
 
222 
 
7 Conclusion 
This paper analysed the advantages of multi-level fund structures, in general and for urban 
development in particular. The first part of the paper concentrated on literature findings 
dealing with several types of second-level funds. The advantages and disadvantages found in 
the literature can mainly be explained by the same background: transaction cost 
considerations. Another important argument for a second fund level arises from 
diversification benefits for investment designs with restricted universes on the first level of 
funds. Such restrictions are plausible if, e.g., special knowledge requirements or institutional 
regulations are prevalent. The arguments were evaluated by a generic approach analysing 
several investment designs. For the same level of (maximal) diversification, a second-level 
fund operates more cost-effe tively in  omparison to an investor’s own portfolio 
management. The final relationship of the advantages achieved through different extents of 
diversification and the disadvantages due to a small overall increase in transaction costs 
depends on the exact decision problem of each investor and the considered investment 
universe. Therefore, the second part focused on one specific field of second-level funds, 
namely HFs for urban development support.  
For one decision environment – urban development funding in two Polish regions – we 
analysed the relationship between those two components. Given these constraints on the 
investment universe, we were able to reveal the overall benefit of an artificially constructed 
Polish HF for several investment ranges and investor preferences in comparison to a limited 
diversification by investing in only one of the UDFs. The reduction in default risks through 
diversification offers room for a range of admissible transaction costs that seem high enough 
to render HFs beneficial for potential risk averse investors in this field. As a final result, we 
would recommend that European institutions should strongly enhance the establishment of 
HFs. As we saw in the Polish example, an HF is a useful tool to account for investors’ risk 
preferences in a decision universe that is as complex as urban development finance. The 
approach applied here is analogously transferable to other countries and regions. However, 
we would be surprised if the results differ from those in this paper. Therefore, we would 
recommend that European institutions establish one HF in all member states which then 
serves to passively diversify the existing UDFs. Only passive diversification offers the 
possibility of increasing welfare for risk averse investors by low ranges of transaction costs. 
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At the moment, existing HFs are more or less administrational entities which do not exploit 
these advantages. But if those institutions want to attract other investors and thereby lever 
scarce public resources, it is essential to change this situation. 
Finally, we want to briefly discuss the limitations of our analysis and the respective 
opportunities for future research. The two most critical assumptions of our approach are the 
definition of the insolvency event with direct liquidation and the computation of the 
correlations. As long as data on realised UDF projects is not available, our idea of correlation 
computation and insolvency restrictions can only be validated by a variation of the 
parameters set. An empirical justification of the general ideas can be made ex post in the 
future. The insolvency and liquidity assumption influences the benefit of an HF positively as 
the insolvency with liquidation occurs quickly. However, for urban projects with high 
informational asymmetries, this might indeed be realistic. But the robustness check 
demonstrated that lowering this condition only slightly weakens the results. Generally, the 
lower the number of insolvency cases and the lower the related losses, the less beneficial is 
an HF. In an extreme case, the fund could refrain from direct liquidation regardless of any 
insolvency event before maturity, and the HF will then be beneficial for slightly less 
combinations of preferences and costs. In this vein, our results describe an upper boundary 
of HF advantages. But concerning the number of UDFs, we have considered the lower bound 
of HF advantages by looking at two UDFs, and it is reasonable to assume that the welfare 
gains through enhanced diversification strongly increase with higher numbers of UDFs 
included in the analysis. Thereby, we compromised on the two possibilities of extremes 
regarding insolvency and the number of funds. It is reasonable to assume that HFs would 
remain beneficial for more combinations of preferences and costs and also for less strict 
insolvency definitions with higher numbers of UDFs. This hypothetical statement could be 
tested in future research if data on more UDFs is available. The second assumption on the 
computation of the correlations for different projects also influences the results of the 
analyses. The lower the inter-UDF correlations and the higher the intra-UDF correlations the 
more important is an HF. We tried to apply a cautious approach for the determination of 
correlations and validated the results by variations of the correlation matrix. In all 
computations, the HF remains advantageous for small transaction costs of the second fund 
level and different types of investors. But again, the application of a second-level fund for 
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two UDFs defines the case with the lowest diversification and the more different UDFs are 
included in an HF, the lower the inter-UDF correlations and the higher the intra-UDF 
correlations should be. This would render an HF beneficial for even more combinations of 
risk preferences and costs.  
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Figure 1: Schematic investment designs with maximum one level of intermediation. 
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Figure 2: Schematic investment design with two levels of intermediation. 
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Figure 3: Potential factor of costs reduction by intermediation. 
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Figure 4: Multi-level fund structure for urban development support. 
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Figure 5: Credit portfolio risk for two uncorrelated (top) and correlated (bottom) projects with the same annuity. 
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Figure 6: A selection of all simulated paths for the (artificial) UDF of Mazovia. 
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Figure 7: A selection of seven correlated paths generated in one single simulation run. 
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Figure 8: Simulated probability distribution of the final portfolio wealth for the artificial UDFs and HF. 
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Figure 9: Simulated probability distribution of the investor’s final wealth for the artificial UDFs and HF. 
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Table 1: Advantages of multi-level fund structures. 
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Know-how transfer for own strategies + +
Information on subfunds +
Monitoring of subfunds +
Due diligence of subfunds +
No own portfolio management +
Diversification in general + + + +
Diversification for small investments +
Minimum investment: small investors + + + +
Maximum investment: large investors +
Access to closed subfunds +
Investment risk: only invested subfunds +
Avoid restriction from legal frameworks +
Different strategies + + + + + + + +
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Table 2: Disadvantages of multi-level fund structures.  
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Additional manager remuneration – – – –
No diversification: only one subfund – –
Subfunds correlated: same company –
Outdated subfund data: wrong decisions –
Manager filters subfund data: no transparancy –
Dependence on manager's subfund selection –
Dependence on manager's asset class selection –
Same portfolio for all investors –
Higher skewness –
Lower kurtosis –
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Table 3: Systematisation of transaction costs. 
  
 
 
 
TAC1 TAC4
Example: Gathering information on asset
classes in general
Example: Hardware and software
 infrastructure necessary for transactions
Influence: Constant negative effect of
intermediation 
Influence: Negative effect of intermediation
Importance: High for funds Importance: Low for funds
TAC2 TAC3
Example: Gathering information on a fund
before and after investing in it 
to analyse the investment
Example: Costs for the transfer of money 
proportional to the investment 
(as far as fees are cost-driven)
Influence: Positive effect of intermediation
for, e.g., a minimum of three market
participants and funds
Influence: Positive effect only for costs which 
increase at a decreasing rate, 
otherwise negative effect 
Importance: High for funds Importance: Middle for funds
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Table 4: Existing Holding Funds. 
 
Country Reference Holding Fund Level
Amout of 
call
Amount of 
call in million 
EUR
Amount of HF 
in million EUR 
(2012)
# UDFs # OPs
Spain VP-1004 FIDAE Country 122m EUR 122 128 10
Spain IR-899 JESSICA Holding Fund Andalucia Region 80m EUR 80 86 1
Bulgaria VP-960 JESSICA Holding Fund Bulgaria Country 31m EUR 31 33 2 1
Greece VP-959 JESSICA Holding Fund Greece Country 258m EUR 258 258 6
Italy VP-1056 JESSICA Holding Fund Campania Region 64m EUR 64 100 2 1
Lithuania VP-950 JESSICA Holding Fund Lithuania Country 20m EUR 20 227 1 1
Lithuania IR-865 JESSICA Holding Fund Lithuania Country 54m EUR 54 227 min. 3 1
Lithuania JESSICA Holding Fund Lithuania - sum Country 74 227
Czech Republic KB/VP-947 JESSICA Holding Fund Moravia-Silesia Region 480m CZK 19 20 1
Poland VP-1005 JESSICA Holding Fund Mazovia Region 155m PLN 37 40 1
Poland VP-963 JESSICA Holding Fund Pomerania Region 220m PLN 53 57 1-2 1
Portugal K –94 JESSICA Holding Fund Portugal Country 130m EUR 130 130 6
Italy VP-993 JESSICA Holding Fund Sardinia Region 66m EUR 66 70 1
Poland VP-965 JESSICA Holding Fund Silesia Region 250m PLN 60 60 1
United Kingdom K /VP–946 JESSICA Holding Fund Scotland Region 33m GBP 40 56 1 1
Italy VP-964 JESSICA Holding Fund Sicily Region 53m EUR 53 148 1 1
Italy K –9 9 JESSICA Holding Fund Sicily Region 90m EUR 90 148 1 1
Italy JESSICA Holding Fund Sicily - sum Region 143 148
Poland IR-912 JESSICA Holding Fund Westpomerania Region 140m PLN 34 33 1-2 1
United Kingdom VP-1068 London Green Fund Region 12m GBP 14 113 1 1
United Kingdom IR-927 London Green Fund Region 50m GBP 60 113 1 1
United Kingdom IR-893 London Green Fund Region 35m GPB 42 113 1 1
United Kingdom London Green Fund - sum Region 116 113
United Kingdom IR-887 Northwest Urban Investment Fund Region 60m GBP 71 114 2 1
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Table 5: Basis for correlation determination of the suggested urban development projects. 
 
Project
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P
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c
Otwack: Regeneration of urban green areas 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Piaseczno: Installation of solac collectors in the public buildings 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Piaseczno: Modernisation of the railway station in Paseczno 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Piaseczno: Replacement of street lighting in the city with low-energy lamps 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Polfa Tarchomin S.A. (Warsaw): Warsaw innovative entrepreneurship area 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
Warsaw City Hall: Adaptation of building for catering purposes 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Warsaw City Hall: Adaption of building for office purposes 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Lodz City Hall: Revitalisation of building  EC-1 South-East (Se-Ma-For) 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
 odz City Hall   evitalisation of urban buildings in the area of railway station –  odz Fabry zna 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Lodz City Hall: Revitalisation, modernisation and adaptation of  post-industrial building for public purposes 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Piotrków Trybunalski City Hall   uilding of the sport gallery " ugajskie  łonia" 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Piotrków Trybunalski City Hall: "Young Old City" 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
The Aflopa  eal Estates  td. (Pabiani e)  Fa tory "Centre" –  omprehensive revitalisation of post-fa tory building 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Zgierz City Hall: Building of restaurant in the Waver House 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Category Buildings Infrastructure SpacesRegion
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Table 6: Correlations of the suggested urban development projects. 
  
 
1.00 0.60 0.60 0.20 0.60 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
0.60 1.00 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
0.60 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.83 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.33
0.20 0.25 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00
0.60 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.22 0.33 0.22 0.33 0.22 0.22 0.56 0.22 0.11
0.60 0.75 0.50 0.33 0.22 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67
0.40 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33
0.40 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.22 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75
0.60 0.50 0.17 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.67 0.50 0.83 0.50 0.33
0.80 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.22 0.67 0.33 0.75 0.67 1.00 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
0.40 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.22 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.50 0.60 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75
0.40 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.56 0.33 0.67 0.75 0.83 0.60 0.75 1.00 0.43 0.29
0.40 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.22 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.50 0.60 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.75
0.40 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.11 0.67 0.33 0.75 0.33 0.60 0.75 0.29 0.75 1.00
Mazovia
M
az
o
vi
a
Lodz
Lo
d
z
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Table 7: Difference in certainty equivalent for an HF and a random UDF investment. 
   
 0 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025 0.003 0.0035 0.004 0.005 0.01
1 1.21% -0.04% -0.67% -1.30% -1.92% -2.55% -3.18% -3.81% -5.07% -11.39%
2 2.18% 0.88% 0.22% -0.43% -1.08% -1.73% -2.39% -3.04% -4.36% -10.98%
3 2.89% 1.55% 0.88% 0.21% -0.47% -1.14% -1.82% -2.49% -3.85% -10.73%
4 3.38% 2.01% 1.32% 0.63% -0.06% -0.75% -1.44% -2.13% -3.53% -10.59%
5 3.70% 2.31% 1.61% 0.91% 0.21% -0.49% -1.20% -1.90% -3.32% -10.50%
6 3.92% 2.52% 1.81% 1.10% 0.40% -0.31% -1.02% -1.74% -3.17% -10.43%
7 4.11% 2.69% 1.98% 1.27% 0.56% -0.15% -0.87% -1.59% -3.03% -10.35%
8 4.31% 2.88% 2.17% 1.46% 0.74% 0.02% -0.70% -1.42% -2.86% -10.24%
9 4.54% 3.11% 2.40% 1.68% 0.96% 0.24% -0.48% -1.21% -2.66% -10.09%
10 4.83% 3.40% 2.68% 1.96% 1.24% 0.52% -0.21% -0.94% -2.40% -9.91%
ΔCE/ I
costs
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Table 8: Difference in certainty equivalent for an HF and a random UDF investment and uncorrelated projects. 
  
 0 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025 0.003 0.0035 0.004 0.005 0.01
1 1.32% 0.10% -0.51% -1.12% -1.73% -2.33% -2.94% -3.55% -4.77% -10.89%
2 2.56% 1.33% 0.71% 0.09% -0.53% -1.15% -1.77% -2.39% -3.63% -9.85%
3 3.73% 2.48% 1.85% 1.22% 0.59% -0.04% -0.67% -1.30% -2.56% -8.90%
4 4.79% 3.51% 2.88% 2.24% 1.60% 0.96% 0.32% -0.32% -1.61% -8.07%
5 5.70% 4.41% 3.76% 3.11% 2.46% 1.81% 1.16% 0.51% -0.79% -7.38%
6 6.46% 5.15% 4.49% 3.83% 3.18% 2.52% 1.86% 1.20% -0.13% -6.83%
7 7.06% 5.74% 5.07% 4.41% 3.74% 3.07% 2.40% 1.73% 0.38% -6.43%
8 7.53% 6.18% 5.51% 4.84% 4.16% 3.48% 2.80% 2.12% 0.76% -6.15%
9 7.87% 6.51% 5.83% 5.15% 4.46% 3.78% 3.09% 2.41% 1.03% -5.97%
10 8.11% 6.74% 6.05% 5.36% 4.67% 3.98% 3.29% 2.59% 1.20% -5.87%
ΔCE/ I
costs
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Table 9: Difference in certainty equivalent for an HF and a random UDF investment and no correlation between projects of different regions. 
  
 0 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025 0.003 0.0035 0.004 0.005 0.01
1 2.38% 1.15% 0.53% -0.09% -0.71% -1.33% -1.95% -2.57% -3.81% -10.03%
2 4.42% 3.15% 2.51% 1.87% 1.23% 0.60% -0.04% -0.68% -1.96% -8.41%
3 5.98% 4.67% 4.02% 3.36% 2.71% 2.05% 1.39% 0.73% -0.59% -7.25%
4 7.06% 5.73% 5.06% 4.39% 3.72% 3.04% 2.37% 1.69% 0.34% -6.52%
5 7.77% 6.41% 5.72% 5.04% 4.35% 3.67% 2.98% 2.29% 0.90% -6.12%
6 8.21% 6.82% 6.13% 5.43% 4.74% 4.04% 3.34% 2.64% 1.23% -5.92%
7 8.48% 7.08% 6.38% 5.68% 4.97% 4.27% 3.56% 2.85% 1.42% -5.83%
8 8.69% 7.28% 6.57% 5.86% 5.15% 4.43% 3.72% 3.00% 1.56% -5.76%
9 8.89% 7.47% 6.75% 6.04% 5.32% 4.60% 3.88% 3.16% 1.71% -5.68%
10 9.12% 7.69% 6.97% 6.25% 5.53% 4.81% 4.08% 3.35% 1.89% -5.56%
ΔCE/ I
costs
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Table 10: Difference in certainty equivalent for an HF and a random UDF investment with a relaxed insolvency and liquidation restriction. 
  
 
 0 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025 0.003 0.0035 0.004 0.005 0.01
1 0.94% -0.30% -0.92% -1.54% -2.16% -2.78% -3.40% -4.02% -5.26% -11.49%
2 1.73% 0.46% -0.18% -0.82% -1.45% -2.09% -2.73% -3.37% -4.65% -11.09%
3 2.36% 1.06% 0.40% -0.25% -0.90% -1.56% -2.21% -2.87% -4.18% -10.80%
4 2.82% 1.49% 0.83% 0.16% -0.50% -1.17% -1.84% -2.51% -3.85% -10.61%
5 3.14% 1.80% 1.12% 0.45% -0.23% -0.90% -1.58% -2.26% -3.62% -10.48%
6 3.36% 2.00% 1.32% 0.64% -0.04% -0.72% -1.41% -2.09% -3.47% -10.40%
7 3.52% 2.15% 1.47% 0.78% 0.09% -0.59% -1.28% -1.97% -3.36% -10.34%
8 3.64% 2.27% 1.58% 0.89% 0.20% -0.49% -1.18% -1.88% -3.27% -10.29%
9 3.75% 2.37% 1.68% 0.99% 0.30% -0.39% -1.09% -1.78% -3.18% -10.23%
10 3.87% 2.49% 1.79% 1.10% 0.41% -0.29% -0.98% -1.68% -3.08% -10.16%
ΔCE/ I
costs
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Table 11: Difference in certainty equivalent for an HF and a random UDF investment with a further relaxed insolvency and liquidation restriction. 
  
 0 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025 0.003 0.0035 0.004 0.005 0.01
1 0.81% -0.42% -1.03% -1.65% -2.26% -2.88% -3.49% -4.11% -5.34% -11.51%
2 1.48% 0.23% -0.40% -1.03% -1.65% -2.28% -2.91% -3.54% -4.80% -11.13%
3 2.06% 0.78% 0.14% -0.50% -1.14% -1.78% -2.43% -3.07% -4.35% -10.82%
4 2.52% 1.22% 0.57% -0.08% -0.73% -1.38% -2.04% -2.69% -4.00% -10.59%
5 2.88% 1.56% 0.90% 0.24% -0.42% -1.08% -1.74% -2.40% -3.73% -10.41%
6 3.15% 1.82% 1.16% 0.49% -0.17% -0.84% -1.51% -2.18% -3.52% -10.27%
7 3.37% 2.03% 1.36% 0.69% 0.02% -0.66% -1.33% -2.00% -3.35% -10.17%
8 3.54% 2.19% 1.52% 0.85% 0.17% -0.51% -1.18% -1.86% -3.22% -10.07%
9 3.69% 2.34% 1.66% 0.98% 0.30% -0.37% -1.05% -1.74% -3.10% -9.99%
10 3.83% 2.47% 1.79% 1.11% 0.43% -0.25% -0.93% -1.62% -2.99% -9.90%
ΔCE/ I
costs
  
 
